Illinois Federation of Public Employees Local 4408 v. Lopinot

2021 IL App (5th) 200083-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 11, 2021
• Docket: 5-20-0083
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (5th) 200083-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 03/11/21 The text This order was filed under of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0083 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ) Appeal from the LOCAL 4408, ) Circuit Court of ) St. Clair County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 18-CH-633 ) ANDREW LOPINOT, as St. Clair County Treasurer; ) MARK KERN, as St. Clair County Board Chairman; ) ST. CLAIR COUNTY; ANDREW GLEESON, as ) Chief Judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit; and ) THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE ) STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Honorable ) Todd D. Lambert, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of county, county board, and county treasurer on probation officers’ union’s complaint for a writ of mandamus and a declaratory judgment, as well as a permanent injunction, to compel county, as most populous county in the judicial circuit, to budget for and directly pay the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits of probation officers assigned to other counties in the circuit, and subsequently seek reimbursement from those counties, despite its past practice of doing so, because the Probation and Probation Officers Act (730 ILCS 110/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)) does not require such actions on the part of the most populous county in the circuit.

1 ¶2 The plaintiff, Illinois Federation of Public Employees Local 4408 (Union), appeals the

November 14, 2019, order of the circuit court of St. Clair County, which granted the motion for

judgment on the pleadings filed by the defendants, St. Clair County Treasurer Andrew Lopinot,

St. Clair County Board Chairman Mark Kern, and St. Clair County (St. Clair County), 1 as to the

plaintiff’s complaint for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and application for a

permanent injunction requiring St. Clair County to budget for and directly pay the salaries, health

insurance premiums, and other benefits of all probation officers in the circuit, including those

assigned to other counties within the circuit. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On December 12, 2018, the Union filed an amended complaint and application for

temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against St. Clair

County in the circuit court of St. Clair County. According to the complaint, the counties of the

Twentieth Judicial Circuit, which includes the counties of St. Clair, Randolph, Monroe,

Washington, and Perry, entered into an agreement to operate as a shared probation district pursuant

to section 15 of the Probation and Probation Officers Act (Act) (730 ILCS 110/15 (West 2018)).

The complaint alleges that prior to 2019, St. Clair County included in its budget and directly paid

the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits for all the probation officers in the

circuit. Each year, the other counties in the district reimbursed St. Clair County for the salaries,

health insurance, and other benefits of the probation officers assigned to those counties.

¶5 According to the complaint, on November 26, 2018, the St. Clair County Board passed a

2019 budget which “stripped funding for *** probation officers that work in Randolph, Monroe,

1 Andrew Gleeson, as Chief Judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois were also named as defendants in the Union’s complaint. However, they were not signatories to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and they are not parties to this appeal. 2 Washington, and Perry counties (the Affected Members),” thus preventing the St. Clair County

Treasurer from paying the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits of these

probation officers. Count I of the complaint requested a temporary restraining order preventing St.

Clair County from proceeding with the portion of the 2019 budget that terminated the paying of

the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits of the Affected Members. Count II

requested a preliminary injunction staying enactment of that portion of the budget and ordering

the payment of all salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits under 2018 budget levels

until the resolution of this case. Count III sought a writ of mandamus compelling the St. Clair

County Treasurer to continue paying the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits

of the Affected Members “from the funds he holds in trust for the outlying [c]ounties.” Count IV

sought a declaratory judgment that the St. Clair County Treasurer is required to pay the salaries,

health insurance premiums, and other benefits of the Affected Members.

¶6 The Union attached a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Chief

Judge of the Twentieth Circuit, in effect from January 1, 2018, until December 31, 2018, to its

complaint. See Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 485 (1989) (while

the county boards are needed to approve the salaries of court employees, the chief judges are to be

considered the employer of such employees for the purposes of collective bargaining). In addition,

the Union attached correspondence showing that the other counties reimbursed the St. Clair

County Treasurer for their shares of the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits of

the probation officers in 2018.

¶7 Following the filing of the complaint, the circuit court entered a temporary restraining order

as requested by the Union, requiring St. Clair County to pay all the probation officers’ salaries,

health insurance premiums, and other benefits until such time as a hearing could be held on the

3 petition for a preliminary injunction. On December 21, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court entered

an order requiring the Chief Judge of the First Judicial Circuit to assign a judge from that circuit

to hear the case. Thereafter, on January 11, 2019, the Honorable Todd D. Lambert entered an order,

by the agreement of the parties, granting a preliminary injunction requiring St. Clair County to pay

all salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits to the Affected Employees at 2018

levels until the merits of the Union’s complaint could be determined.

¶8 On May 31, 2019, St. Clair County filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2018)). In

the motion, St. Clair County argued that the Union is not entitled to the relief sought in its

complaint because, despite its past practice, there is no legal requirement that it pay the salaries

and benefits to the Affected Members because the Affected Members are not assigned to St. Clair

County. Having considered the briefing and arguments of the parties, the circuit court entered an

order on November 14, 2019, granting St. Clair County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On November 19, 2019, the Union filed a motion for rehearing pursuant to section 2-1203 of the

Code (id. § 2-1203). On January 23, 2020, the circuit court entered an order denying the Union’s

motion for rehearing. On April 3, 2020, this court entered an order allowing the Union to file a late

notice of appeal.

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The well-established standard of review for an order granting judgment on the pleadings

has been set forth by our supreme court as follows:

“Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] In ruling

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, only those facts apparent from the face of the

4 pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record may be

considered. All well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts are taken

as true. [Citation.] Our review is de novo. [Citation.]” M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.

Luke’s Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (2001).

¶ 11 Here, the Union requests a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus requiring that St.

Clair County pay the salaries, health insurance premiums, and other benefits of the Affected

Members, who are probation officers assigned to the other counties in the circuit. The

responsibility for the payment of probation officers is set forth in the Act. 730 ILCS 110/0.01

et seq. (West 2018). Pursuant to section 9b(3) of the Act (id. § 9b(3)), “probation officers are

judicial employees designated on a circuit wide or county basis and compensated by the

appropriate county board or boards.” Pursuant to section 14 of the Act (id. § 14), “[t]he amount of

compensation to be paid any *** probation officer *** shall be determined by the county boards

of the several counties in which such officers, respectively, are appointed, and shall be paid by the

county treasurer on the warrant of the county comptroller or other person authorized to issue

warrants on the county treasurer ***.”

¶ 12 Here, the Union does not dispute the fact that the probation officers of the Affected

Members are designated on a county basis as opposed to a circuit-wide basis. In fact, the Union

defines the “Affected Members” as those probation officers assigned to Randolph, Monroe,

Washington, and Perry Counties. As such, section 14 of the Act (id.) requires that the county

treasurer of the county in which the officer is appointed pay the compensation of those probation

officers. Accordingly, although for many years St. Clair County has paid the compensation for the

probation officers assigned to the other counties, and then has been reimbursed by the other

counties, the Act does not require St. Clair County to do so.

5 ¶ 13 The Union argues that section 15 of the Act (id. § 15) supports its position because St. Clair

County, as the most populous county in the circuit, is given responsibility for facilitating

reimbursement to the counties from the Illinois Supreme Court Division of Probation Services

(Division). Section 15(4) of the Act (id. § 15(4)) provides that the Division shall reimburse the

counties for probation services as set forth in that section. To receive such reimbursement, section

15(9) (id. § 15(9)) requires that, before the fifteenth of each month, the treasurer of any county that

has a probation department, or the treasurer of the most populous county, in the case of a probation

department funded by more than one county, submit an itemized statement of all approved costs

incurred. That section provides that the Division then forwards the approved costs to the

comptroller for payment to the county treasurer. Id. Section 15(9) of the Act further provides as

follows:

“In the case of payment to a treasurer of a county which is the most populous of counties

sharing the salary and expenses of a Probation and Court Services Department, the

treasurer shall divide the money between the counties in a manner that reflects each

county’s share of the cost incurred by the Department.” Id.

¶ 14 Our review of the language of section 15 reveals no requirement that the most populous

county in the circuit compensate probation officers designated for the other counties in the circuit.

The scope of section 15 is limited to the method a probation services district uses to process

requests for reimbursement from the Division, and in no way governs the method the counties use

to compensate their probation officers in the first instance. Moreover, with regards to benefits,

section 15(11) makes clear that the respective counties shall be responsible for fringe benefits. Id.

§ 15(11). For these reasons, we find that the Union has failed to identify a tangible legal interest

the Affected Members have in receiving compensation and benefits directly from St. Clair County

6 as required to sustain a declaratory judgment action. See Roland Machinery Co. v. Reed, 339 Ill.

App. 3d 1093, 1097 (2003). Similarly, the Union has failed to establish that the Affected Members

have a clear, affirmative right to such compensation and benefits from St. Clair County as required

to establish a claim for a writ of mandamus. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999).

¶ 15 The Union argues that the payment method set forth in the Act for the payment of probation

officers violates the separation of powers doctrine because it hinders the chief judge’s ability to

administer the probation department. We disagree. Whether the money to pay the compensation

for probation officers comes from St. Clair County or another county, the Act requires the

compensation of such officers as the chief judge warrants and provides for reimbursement by the

Division as set forth above. All other authority with respect to the supervision of the officers

remains with the chief judge. In fact, in Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d

453, 476 (1989), the primary case on which the Union relies to advance its separation of powers

argument, the court found that the fact that the county pays the salaries of nonjudicial employees

of the judicial branch does not violate separation of powers, so long as the counties are “entitled

to no other role in regard to the courts’ nonjudicial employees that might arguably be considered

the role of joint employer.” This system set forth in the Act thus comports with separation of

powers principles.

¶ 16 Finally, we note that the circuit court made a finding in its order granting judgment on the

pleadings that “no part of the Act, nor any other law or judicial decision, requires the payment

structure currently in place in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit for payment of Affected Members’

salary and fringe benefits.” (Emphasis added.) Section 6-5(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(705 ILCS 405/6-5(2) (West 2018)) specifically addresses the payment of compensation and

expenses to juvenile probation officers working within a probation district. Neither party

7 presented, considered, nor reconciled the language in section 6-5(2) with the language of the

Probation and Probation Officers Act, the facts alleged, or the requested relief in the Union’s

amended complaint. As such, the trial court’s finding is plausible but potentially specious.

¶ 17 CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 14, 2019, order of the circuit court of

St. Clair County, which granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by St. Clair County.

¶ 19 Affirmed.