Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel Williams v. Lee

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250171-U

Order filed August 31, 2026

____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT

2026

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ex rel. SHONA L. WILLIAMS, ) Du Page County, Illinois, )

Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-25-0171 ) Circuit No. 21-F-418 v. )

) Honorable

) Neal W. Cerne,

SAMUEL R. LEE, II, ) Judge, Presiding.

)

Respondent-Appellant. )

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.

Justice Holdridge dissented.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court abused its discretion by excluding vacation and holiday overnights when calculating father’s annual overnights for purposes of child support.

Appellant waived argument concerning the court’s calculation of the parties’

incomes. The court’s order requiring father to reimburse mother for birth-related expenses was contrary to the evidence and is therefore vacated.

¶2 Respondent, Samuel R. Lee, II, a self-represented litigant, appeals the Du Page County circuit court’s child support order establishing his financial obligations to petitioner, Shona L.

Williams. He argues the court erred by (1) miscalculating his annual overnights with his child as the correct calculation would meet the 146-overnight threshold for the application of the “[s]hared physical care” calculation in section 505(a)(3.8) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024)), (2) relying on his 2024 paystub that included a one-time retroactive payment to determine his income, and (3) requiring him to reimburse birth-related expenses in an amount exceeding the actual expenses established by the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the cause.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 29, 2021, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 46/101 et seq. (West 2020)) on Shona’s behalf seeking to determine the existence of a father and child relationship, naming Samuel as the putative father of Z.L., born November 12, 2020. The circuit court directed the parties to complete and submit financial affidavits following its adjudication of paternity. Samuel did not submit a financial affidavit. The Department issued a request to admit pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (eff. July 1, 2014) to Samuel, which established that his gross monthly earnings were $5,917, as a result of his failure to respond to the request.

¶5 On February 4, 2022, the court entered a child support order that established Samuel’s monthly support obligation as $611.61 based on his $5,917 gross monthly income and ordered him to provide medical insurance for the child. The transcript of this child support hearing is not in the appellate record. However, it is undisputed that Samuel appeared as a self-represented litigant and failed to clarify whether that imputed amount was accurate when the court inquired. In June 2022,

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after obtaining counsel, Samuel filed an amended petition for allocation of parental responsibilities and allocation of parenting time.

¶6 On November 18, 2022, Shona, also through private counsel, filed a motion to modify child support and set contribution towards support-related expenses. She alleged that the child support award was inadequate because it relied on Samuel’s income as stated in the Department’s unanswered request to admit, which did not reflect his true income. She asserted Samuel’s continued refusal to disclose his actual income amounted to a substantial change in circumstances and requested the court modify child support to reflect his actual income.

¶7 Shona also petitioned for Samuel to contribute to their child’s healthcare expenses pursuant to section 505 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(4)(A) (West 2022)), claiming that she incurred $4,929.65 in out-of-pocket medical expenses from the time of Z.L.’s birth through May 2022. She requested the court order Samuel to reimburse her $2,957.79, representing 60% of these expenses.

¶8 Pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Department petitioned to vacate the February support order and sought entry of a new order, alleging that Samuel had fraudulently concealed his true income. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022). A later amended petition alleged that Samuel’s actual gross monthly income was $8,840 rather than the $5,917 income used to establish his support obligation. The circuit court granted the Department’s petition to vacate the February support order following a hearing in which it concluded Samuel’s failure to correct the court when it inquired into his income amounted to fraud by omission.

¶9 A. Agreed Allocation Judgment

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¶ 10 On December 19, 2023, the parties entered an agreed allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time judgment order (allocation judgment), which allocated regular parenting time to Samuel as follows:

“A. Alternating weekends from Friday at Noon to Tuesday at 2:00 pm; and B. Alternating Monday at 9:00 am to Tuesday at 2:00 pm (the week preceding his alternating weekend parenting time).”

All time unaccounted for from Samuel’s parenting time schedule was designated as Shona’s.

¶ 11 Holiday and vacation parenting time schedules have priority over regularly scheduled parenting time under the allocation judgment. It allotted two consecutive weeks of vacation to Shona, and four weeks to Samuel, two of which were required to be exercised during the summer.

¶ 12 The allocation judgment established an alternating holiday schedule based upon even-and- odd numbered years, with exceptions for Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, and Z.L.’s birthday. Shona and Samuel were assigned parenting time for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day respectively, from the Saturday prior to that holiday until the following Monday. During Z.L.’s birthday, Samuel would have the child from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. and Shona from 2 p.m. until 10 a.m. the following day. Thanksgiving break was to be divided equally with the first and second half alternating between even-and-odd numbered years. Shona would enjoy the first half of Thanksgiving break on even years and Samuel, the second half. Vice versa in odd years. Winter break was also divided equally. Each party would enjoy spring break and Juneteenth in alternating years. Given that Z.L. was not yet of school age, the local school district’s calendar would determine the duration of Thanksgiving, winter, and spring breaks.

¶ 13 B. Hearing on Child Support and Medical Expense Contribution

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¶ 14 On November 18, 2024, the court held a hearing on the Department’s petition to set child support and Shona’s motion for contribution to medical expenses during which each party testified concerning their income. Shona, a flight attendant, earned $70.12 an hour. Her 2020 through 2023 W-2 forms, end-of-year paystubs, and most recent paystub were admitted into evidence. Her October 2024 paystub reflected gross earnings of $41,646.15. However, she testified it did not accurately reflect her income because she took a leave of absence that year to care for her ailing mother. She did not object to the court imputing 77 hours per month at her current hourly wage in determining child support. She also testified that she received a $13,000 retroactive payment for the years 2020 through 2024, resulting from a recently signed collective bargaining agreement. Samuel, an electrical mechanic, testified to his W-2 forms from 2021 through 2023 and his 2024 paystubs through November 1, 2024, that were admitted into evidence but not included in the record on appeal.

¶ 15 The parties offered competing calculations relating to Samuel’s annual overnights under the allocation judgment. Shona testified to the specific overnights Samuel had exercised in 2024 to date as well as his expected overnights for the remainder of the year, utilizing her own 2024 calendar as a demonstrative exhibit.

¶ 16 During closing argument, the Department requested the court recalculate support for the years 2021 through 2024 and offered its own calculations based on the parties’ incomes. It utilized 144 overnights for Samuel in its support calculations. Samuel’s counsel disputed that number, maintaining the allocation “judgment speaks for itself” and argued the court should strictly rely upon the allocation judgment, contending it afforded Samuel a minimum of 146 overnights. Samuel’s counsel advocated for the imputation of a higher income to Shona but otherwise maintained the financial documentation and “the pay stubs speak for themselves.”

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¶ 17 Shona’s private counsel presented her petition to contribute to medical expenses. Shona testified that Z.L. endured a brachial plexus injury during birth and received treatment for this injury “for about the first seven months of her life.” The medical bills related to this treatment were admitted into evidence. She testified the total expense related to the injury was “just shy of about $26,000” with most of the expense covered by her insurance. Her out-of-pocket expenses were “[r]ight at about $5,000,” which she later clarified as $4,929.25. 1 She testified that Samuel had agreed to contribute to the bills in 2021 upon proof of her payment. She sent him electronic bills by text message, but admitted she did not have those texts, bank, or other records which would prove her payment.

¶ 18 Shona’s counsel requested that Samuel contribute $2,957.79, equating to 60% of the medical bill expenses. When asked by the court where the 60% originated from, Shona’s counsel explained “I’m taking 60 percent of $4,929.65, the total amount of out-of-pocket expenses” that Shona had paid and applying the parties’ income ratio. Samuel’s counsel argued that it would be prejudicial to order Samuel to contribute to the expenses and that Shona did not present proof of payment.

¶ 19 C. November 27, 2024, Support Order

¶ 20 On November 27, 2024, the court entered an order that, inter alia, established Samuel’s child support obligation, determined retroactive monthly support arrearages, and granted Shona’s petition for contribution to medical expenses.

¶ 21 The court calculated Samuel’s 2024 income by annualizing the $112,459 in earnings shown on his October 2024 pay stub, resulting in $134,950 in annual gross earnings. Given that Shona

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There is a 40-cent discrepancy in the amount of out-of-pocket medical expenses identified in Shona’s testimony and claimed in her petition for contribution.

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conceded that she had worked fewer hours in 2024 and agreed to an imputation of income, the court calculated her 2024 gross annual income as $64,791 based on 77 hours of work per month at her $70.12 hourly wage.

¶ 22 The court next determined Samuel enjoyed a total of 130 annual overnights based on his regular parenting time and specifically excluded vacation and holiday overnights from its calculation. It concluded that the parties’ alternating holidays and “equal vacation time” would “cancel each other out,” stating:

“that the regular parenting time should be the basis for counting the overnights as vacation and holiday time is celebration time that is outside of the basic child rearing duties. Further, and most importantly, vacation and holiday times normally rotate between the parties and that can result in differing number of overnights from year to year. So, in [even] years the overnights could be 144 and in odd years 147.

One could argue for an automatically modifying child support amount on a yearly basis, but this is not allowed by Appellate Court rulings. Or, the Court is in a position to base support on either the odd year or the even year, which seems completely arbitrary.”

The court set Samuel’s prospective monthly child support obligation at $1,037.12 and calculated separate retroactive support amounts for each year from 2021 through October 2024.

¶ 23 It granted Shona’s petition for contribution to healthcare expenses finding that Shona paid “$4,929.25 for birthing and related expenses for the first 7 months and $5,000 for a shoulder injury the child incurred during the birth process. These total $9,929.25.” It ordered Samuel to reimburse Shona 60% of this total, equaling $5,957.55.

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¶ 24 Samuel proceeded as a self-represented litigant after the hearing and filed a motion to reconsider the November support order, which challenged the support order on the same grounds that he raises in this appeal. The court heard and denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 25 Samuel timely appealed.

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 Samuel reiterates each of the three challenges to the child support order that were raised and rejected by the circuit court following his motion to reconsider. The first two concern the calculation of his child support obligation. First, he asserts that the court miscalculated his annual overnights by improperly excluding an average of his vacation and holidays. Second, he argues the court erred by factoring in a non-recurring payment that artificially inflated his income. Lastly, he contends that the record does not support the amount the court ordered him to reimburse Shona for birth-related medical expenses.

¶ 28 The Department responds that the court’s factual finding that Samuel had fewer than 146 annual overnights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It argues Samuel has forfeited any issue concerning the court’s income determination, or alternatively, the court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the financial documentation submitted during the hearing. It takes no position as to the birth-related medical expenses issue.

¶ 29 We must address three preliminary concerns before reaching the merits of Samuel’s appeal. First, the Department contends that Samuel’s failure to reference the circuit court’s income determination in his notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that issue. We have an independent duty to evaluate our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of an appeal. Dus v. Provena St. Mary’s Hospital, 2012 IL App (3d) 091064, ¶ 9.

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¶ 30 The notice of appeal identifies both the court’s support order and the final order that denied Samuel’s motion to reconsider. The notice further specifies that Samuel seeks relief related to the court’s calculation of his annual overnights and his obligation to pay Z.L.’s medical expenses. It does not reference the court’s computation of income in setting child support which the Department argues deprives this court of jurisdiction to review the court’s income determination.

¶ 31 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) requires the notice of appeal to “specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court.” A notice is a jurisdictional step that vests a reviewing court with jurisdiction only to consider judgments or parts of judgments specified within. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 176 (2011). The Department compares the notice of appeal in this matter to the one found insufficient to vest jurisdiction in In re Estate of York, 2015 IL App (1st) 132830,

¶ 36. There, the appellant’s brief sought reversal of the court’s ruling with respect to count I of a motion to dismiss, whereas her notice of appeal identified seeking review of count II. Id. ¶¶ 36- 37. Because the substance of the notice of appeal plainly denoted count II, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to consider the dismissal of count I. Id. ¶¶ 37, 40. The notice of appeal found wanting in York is not analogous to the one before us. It is generally accepted that notices of appeal are liberally construed. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433 (1979). A notice confers jurisdiction when, considered as a whole, it fairly and accurately sets out the judgment complained of and relief sought and apprises the successful party of the nature of the appeal. Id. at 433-34. Furthermore, an unspecified judgment is reviewable where “it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.” Id. at 435 (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)). Here, Samuel challenges the court’s child support order which he has correctly identified in his notice.

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The income of the parties is a necessary component in setting child support. We find that this issue is not independent from Samuel’s other appellate contentions, as the Department contends, but is a step in the procedural progression connected to Samuel’s appeal.

¶ 32 Second, we note that his brief does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the Illinois Supreme Court rules. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) governs the content of an appellant’s brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rules of procedure facilitate the clear and orderly presentation of arguments that allow courts of review to properly ascertain and dispose of appellate issues. Hall v. Naper Gold Hospital LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. These rules are not suggestions, but mandatory (Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2021 IL 126507, ¶ 37), and the obligation of compliance is shared by attorneys and self-represented litigants alike. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Self-represented litigants are not afforded more lenient treatment. Id. We possess the inherent authority to dismiss an appeal for rule noncompliance. Lindenmier v. City of Rockford, 156 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79 (1987).

¶ 33 Samuel’s brief’s short statement of facts is insufficient to fully understand his appeal, in violation of Rule 341(h)(6). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). He incorrectly asserts that the de novo standard of review applies to each of his issues and fails to provide supporting authority, in violation of Rule 341(h)(3). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The argument sections supporting his challenges to income and medical expenses do not cite any authority, contrary to the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 34 Despite these violations, Rule 341 is not a jurisdictional limitation upon this court; rather, it serves as an admonition to the parties. Brown v. Brown, 62 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332 (1978). We retain discretion to reach the merits of the appeal where (1) the appellant’s brief adequately apprises us of the arguments (see Young v. City of Centreville, 169 Ill. App. 3d 166, 169 (1988)),

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(2) the facts necessary to understand the issue are simple (In re Marriage of Burke, 185 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255 (1989)), and (3) reaching the merits serves the interests of judicial economy. See Zadrozny v. City Colleges of Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 3d 290, 293 (1991).

¶ 35 The three appellate issues before us are discernible from Samuel’s brief. The facts underlying his contention of error relating to birth-expenses are not complicated. Our understanding of the facts with respect to Samuel’s child support contentions is aided but not dependent upon the supplemental facts and proper record citation in the Department’s brief. Lindenmier, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 79; Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 9. We believe reaching the merits in this instance is in the best interests of judicial economy.

¶ 36 Third, Samuel relies exclusively on In re Marriage of Whittaker, 2021 IL App (5th) 200162-U, to support his position that an average of his vacation and holiday time must be included in an overnight calculation for the purposes of child support. Notably, Whittaker is the only case cited in Samuel’s brief. Whittaker, however, is a nonexistent case that appears either entirely fabricated by Samuel or hallucinated through his improper use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in violation of supreme court policy. Ill. S. Ct. Policy on AI (eff. Jan. 1, 2025) (“[S]elf- represented litigants are accountable for their final work product. All users must thoroughly review AI-generated content before submitting it in any court proceeding to ensure accuracy and compliance with legal and ethical obligations.”). In doing so, Samuel again violates supreme court rules, commits sanctionable conduct, and it is within our discretion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), to dismiss his appeal or strike a portion of his brief. See In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶¶ 108-119. Nonetheless, in our discretion, we elect to reach the merits of Samuel’s appeal and address each issue in turn. See Maslovska v. Shigabetdinova, 2026

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IL App (1st) 250702-U, ¶¶ 13-14 (declining to dismiss or strike portions of a brief due to AI violations where the issues are simple).

¶ 37 A. Child Support

¶ 38 Samuel argues that the court erred in excluding the average of his vacation and holidays in determining his annual overnights and by utilizing his 2024 paystub that did not accurately reflect his income. Generally, issues of child support are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Schomburg & Osland, 2016 IL App (3d) 160420, ¶ 19. A court abuses its discretion where no reasonable person would agree with the position it adopts. Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 177 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997). Samuel’s contention that the court erred in calculating overnights for child support purposes concerns a factual determination of the court that will stand unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Moorthy & Arjuna, 2015 IL App (1st) 132077, ¶ 41. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where “an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence.” In re Custody of K.P.L., 304 Ill. App. 3d 481, 488 (1999).

¶ 39 1. Annual Overnight Determination

¶ 40 The Parentage Act requires that a court issue a child support order upon a party’s motion once parentage is established and requires that the court “use the guidelines and standards set forth in Sections 505 and 505.2 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act” when determining support. 750 ILCS 46/801(a) (West 2024). Basic child support is computed under section 505 of the Marriage Act by determining each parent’s monthly income, combining those incomes, selecting the corresponding appropriate amount from the schedule of basic child support obligations based on the parties’ combined monthly net income and number of children of the parties, and calculating the parent’s respective percentage share of the obligation. 750 ILCS

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5/505(a)(1.5) (West 2024). Where parents “[s]hare physical care,” meaning each parent “exercises” at least 146 annual overnights with the child, 2 the basic child support computation is adjusted pursuant to section 505(a)(3.8) of the Marriage Act, which provides “the basic child support obligation is multiplied by 1.5 to calculate the shared care child support obligation. The court shall determine each parent’s share of the shared care child support obligation based on the parent’s percentage share of combined net income. The child support obligation is then computed for each parent by multiplying that parent’s portion of the shared care support obligation by the percentage of time the child spends with the other parent. The respective child support obligations are then offset, with the parent owing more child support paying the difference between the child support amounts.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024).

Typically, the finding of shared physical care results in a decreased support amount to the recipient. See id.

¶ 41 Samuel asserts the December 19, 2023, allocation judgment entitles him to more than 146 annual overnights and implies that the court should have implemented the shared physical care formula when setting his child support obligation commencing in 2024. He contends the court was required to include and average the parties’ holidays and vacations into its overnight calculation for “a fair determination” of support.

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Public Act 104-0733 amends section 505(a)(3.8) of the Marriage Act by inter alia reducing the minimum overnight threshold required to trigger the shared physical care provision. See Pub. Act 104-0733 (eff. Jan. 1, 2027). Effective January 1, 2027, the Act establishes a lower threshold of 110 annual overnights or overnight equivalents and adjusts the calculation of shared child support obligations with a sliding scale based on the number of overnights in five-night increments. Contrary to our findings under the current version of that section (infra ¶¶ 44, 47), courts will be required to be more precise in the calculation of overnights under the new version. See id.

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¶ 42 Whether section 505(a)(3.8) of the Marriage Act requires the court to include and average vacation and holidays in its overnight calculation raises an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature’s intent which is best indicated through the plain and ordinary language of the statute. Hamilton v. Industrial Comm’n, 203 Ill. 2d 250, 255 (2003).

¶ 43 The shared physical care provision in the Marriage Act does not direct a court to average variable overnights as Samuel suggests. Nor does it preclude the averaging of overnights when they vary from year to year.

¶ 44 The operative verb that begins section 505(a)(3.8) of the Marriage Act is “exercises.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024). The definition of exercise is “to bring to bear.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exercise (last visited August 27, 2026). In line with this definition, under section 505(a)(3.8), a court reviews the number of overnights that each parent actually exercises in its overnight calculation. See In re Marriage of Andrews, 2020 IL App (5th) 190373-U, ¶ 44 (upholding a finding of fewer than 146 annual overnights where mother’s work schedule prevented her from meeting the threshold despite judgment awarding her 156 annual overnights). A court is not required to determine the specific number of overnights each parent exercises, but “only that each parent exercises 146 or more overnights per year with a minor child.” In re Marriage of Sanchez, 2020 IL App (5th) 190216-U,

¶ 22 (citing 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024)). Where evidence is not available to establish whether or not a parent has actually exercised the threshold overnights, a court may depend upon reliable sources of information to deduce how many overnights each parent is entitled to exercise. See In re Marriage of Siddiqui & Noor, 2025 IL App (3d) 220355-U, ¶¶ 25, 27-28 (finding

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allocation judgment was a more reliable source of information than speculative testimony and demonstrative calendars for determining overnights when in effect less than a full year).

¶ 45 The allocation judgment had been in effect for less than a year at the time of the hearing thus depriving the parties of the ability to present evidence affirmatively establishing whether or not Samuel had actually exercised 146 overnights. See id. ¶ 25 The judgment allocates five overnights of regularly scheduled parenting time to Samuel every two weeks. As such, the court calculated a total of 130 annual overnights based on this regularly scheduled parenting time. However, the court expressly declined to consider vacation and holidays provided by the judgment in its calculation of overnights. We hold that the court erred in this blanket exclusion. Section 505(a)(3.8) contains no qualifying language restricting the types of overnights a court is to consider in its calculation. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024). Instead, the court’s task under the provision is to first determine whether each parent exercises the threshold “146 or more overnights per year” necessary to trigger the shared physical care formula. Id. Absent absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results, a court should apply the language of a statute as written. In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 560 (2010).

¶ 46 The circuit court’s concern with the variable structure of the parties’ vacation and holidays and its impact on each parent’s year-to-year overnights is worthy of consideration in its calculation. However, its blanket exclusion of vacation and holiday overnights centers on a faulty premise in that it conflates a fixed vacation schedule with variable holidays under the allocation judgment. The judgment awards Shona two consecutive weeks of vacation, and Samuel four weeks to be exercised in nonconsecutive two-week periods. As such, the court’s conclusion that the parties “have equal vacation time” and “would cancel each other out” is clearly unsupported by the record. The number of Samuel’s holiday overnights will fluctuate from year to year, depending on where

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they fall in relation to his regular parenting schedule. The record does not support the Department’s suggestion that Samuel would gain only nine vacation overnights per year, no additional holiday overnights in odd years, and a maximum of five additional holiday overnights in even years.

¶ 47 We offer no opinion on whether Samuel is entitled to 146 or more overnights based on the allocation judgment. We conclude, however, that the court abused its discretion in its blanket exclusion of the parties’ vacation and holidays in its calculation based upon an errant view of section 505(a)(3.8) of the Marriage Act. A & R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction Co., 2018 IL 123220, ¶ 15 (“It is always an abuse of discretion for a trial court to base a decision on an incorrect view of the law.”). Therefore, we reverse and remand this matter for the circuit court’s recalculation of Samuel’s overnights and a determination as to whether the overnights he is entitled to exceed the statutory threshold such that the court would be required to set child support based upon the shared parenting provisions of the Marriage Act. We reiterate that a determination of a precise number of overnights is not presently required by statute. See Sanchez, 2020 IL App (5th) 190216-U, ¶ 22; 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2024).

¶ 48 2. Parties’ Incomes

¶ 49 Samuel argues the court erred in computing his 2024 income for child support purposes in that it included his retroactive payment reflected in his 2024 paystub in calculating his income but did not include Shona’s $13,000 retroactive payment in her income calculation. Normally, a court’s findings relating to the parties’ net income and the award of child support are within its sound discretion (In re Marriage of Pratt, 2014 IL App (1st) 130465, ¶ 22) and its determination of income is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 47. Samuel has waived this contention. He had adequate opportunity to address his income and challenge Shona’s during the hearing. He failed to argue that his 2024 paystub

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admitted in evidence did not accurately reflect his income until filing a motion to reconsider. Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 963, 978 (1998) (“[I]t is well-settled that one may not raise a legal theory for the first time in a motion to reconsider.”). As such, we affirm the court’s computation of the parties’ incomes.

¶ 50 3. Birth-Related Expenses

¶ 51 Samuel’s final appellate argument is that the amount he was ordered to reimburse Shona for birth-related expenses is contrary to the amount of expenses established in the record.

¶ 52 Actions brought under the Parentage Act within two years of the child’s birth permit the circuit court to order either parent to pay reasonable expenses resulting from the mother’s pregnancy and the child’s delivery. 750 ILCS 46/802(b) (West 2024). The expenses must be tailored to the pregnancy or delivery. See Stockton v. Oldenburg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 897, 904 (1999) (holding section 14(a)(1) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 did not require father to pay for mother’s lost wages). It is incumbent upon the party seeking reimbursement to present evidence of expenses incurred relating to pregnancy or delivery. Childerson v. Hess, 198 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399 (1990). The Parentage Act lowers the evidentiary bar for admission of evidence related to these expenses, however; section 614(c) provides that “[c]ertified copies of the bills for costs incurred for pregnancy and childbirth shall be admitted into evidence at judicial or administrative proceedings without foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy.” 750 ILCS 46/614(c) (West 2024). A court has broad discretion in fashioning its order distributing responsibility for pregnancy and birth related expenses. See Sullivan v. McGaw, 134 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460 (1985) (referencing statutory sections of the Paternity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983 ch. 40, pars. 1353 and 1359), predecessor to the Parentage Act).

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¶ 53 Shona introduced the medical bills during the hearing and testified they were incurred due to Z.L.’s shoulder injury incurred during the birthing process and that she paid them. Bank records or other written proof of payment is not required. See Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 82 (2005) (“When evidence is admitted, through testimony or otherwise, that a medical bill was for treatment rendered and that the bill has been paid, the bill is prima facie reasonable.”). The court admitted the bills into evidence. Although the bills are not in the appellate record, Shona’s petition for contribution and her testimony specify that she incurred between $4,929.25 and $4,929.65 in out- of-pocket expenses. Shona’s counsel requested the court order Samuel to reimburse her for 60% of these expenses, totaling $2,957.79, consistent with the relief sought in her petition. The court’s subsequent finding that Shona’s expenses were $5,000 more than the total birth-related expenses presented, alongside its order requiring Samuel to reimburse Shona $5,957.55, lacks an evidentiary basis. We therefore vacate the portion of the order that requires Samuel to reimburse Shona $5,957.55 in birth-related expenses, and remand so that the circuit court may allocate it as it sees fit.

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 We hold the circuit court abused its discretion through its blanket exclusion of vacation and holiday time from its overnight calculation. We therefore reverse and remand for the consideration of the parties’ vacation and holiday time in calculating overnights for the purpose of determining child support from January 1, 2024, onwards. We affirm the circuit court’s determination of the parties’ incomes. Finally, we vacate the circuit court’s determination of the amount of reimbursable birth expenses and the allocation of those expenses and remand for allocation consistent with this order. The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is

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affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

¶ 56 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

¶ 57 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

¶ 58 I respectfully dissent. The majority itself catalogs respondent’s violations of our supreme court rules, which include an inadequate statement of facts (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), an incorrect and unsupported assertion that de novo review governs each issue (id. (h)(3)), and argument sections citing no authority whatsoever (id. (h)(7)). I would also add that the lone case respondent cites does not exist, conduct sanctionable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and contrary to our supreme court’s policy on artificial intelligence. Ill. S. Ct. Policy on AI (eff. Jan. 1, 2025); see In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶¶ 108-19. As the majority acknowledges, these violations of Rule 341, sanctionable under Rule 375(a), permit us to dismiss the appeal or strike a portion of respondent’s brief, and we possess the inherent authority to dismiss an appeal for rule noncompliance. Lindenmier v. City of Rockford, 156 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79 (1987). Because the obligation of compliance is shared by attorneys and self- represented litigants alike, and because self-represented litigants are not afforded more lenient treatment (Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78), I would exercise that discretion, strike respondent’s brief, and dismiss the appeal.