Illinois Central Railroad v. Word

147 S.W. 949, 149 Ky. 229, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 584
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 21, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 147 S.W. 949 (Illinois Central Railroad v. Word) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Illinois Central Railroad v. Word, 147 S.W. 949, 149 Ky. 229, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Passing

Affirming,

About April 5,1911, Wili Word purchased in East St. Louis, 111., six horses and six mules, and delivered them to the Illinois Central Railroad Company for shipment to Paducah, Ky., via Brookport, 111. The stock was re-received by the railroad company and transported over its lines to the point of destination, to-wit: Paducah, Ky., [230]*230where it arrived on April 7th. Upon examination, it was found that several of the animals were shinned, cut and bruised, and one of the horses was so seriously injured that it died in some three or four days thereafter.

Conceiving that the injuries to the stock were the. result of improper handling, during the. course of shipment, the owner instituted an action against the -railroad company, in which he sought to recover damages in thé sum of $455. The company denies that it had been guilty of any negligence whatever in transporting the animals. Upon this issue, the case was submitted to a jury, with the result that plaintiff recovered a verdict for $200, and the railroad company -appeals, insisting that the injury which the mules and horse sustained enroute from East St. Louis to Paducah were due to some inherent vice in one or more of the animals, rather than to any negligence on the part of the company: •

It appears that these horses and mules were loaded into a car in the afternoon of April 5th, and that, after being in the car some time and before the train to which the car was connected had left the yards in East St. Louis, it was discovered that a mare was down and could not get up. The car was thereupon returned to the yards, and the stock unloaded, and a pen, as it were, built in one end of the car, and this mare, that had been found down on the previous afternoon, was stalled off to herself, the other eleven being left loose in the car. She was skinned and had a cut on her hip at that time. In fact, she had sustained some injuries before she was purchased by appellee, though, he testified, that they were of an inconsequential nature. After the stock had been loaded, as above indicated, the car was transported over the lines of the appellant company to Paducah; and, from the evidence of all the trainmen who had it in charge from the time it left East St. Louis until it reached Paducah, the car was not subjected to any unusual treatment or rough handling. This evidence strongly supports the theory of the company that the injuries, sustained by this live stock, were the result of an inherent vice in some of the animals. On the other hand, there is testimony to the effect that, when the ear reached Paducah, some of the slats were off, and there were evidences on the car that the legs of some of the animals had passed through these openings where the slats Avere off. The stall that had been built in one end [231]*231of the car, was down, and the whole interior of the car presented a generally wrecked appearance.

Appellee testified that the mare, which some of the witnesses for appellant say was vicious, and bit and kicked at the other stock, was a gentle and kindly disposed animal, although, of course, this impression was necessarily gained by him during the short time that he observed the mare while she was being exhibited for sale and her working qualities were being demonstrated to his satisfaction. Appellant’s contention is, that these animals had been brought into East St. Louis from different parts of the country, were all strange to each other, and that it was not surprising that more or less friction developed when they were thrown together for the first time. This conclusion is in entire harmony and accord with the theory of appellant, that the damage to the stock results from the vicious, mean disposition of one of the animals; but, appellee testified that, before the stock was put into the car, it was assembled in the pen at the stockyards together for some time, and that he observed no manifestation of any viciousness on the part of any of the animals, as described by witnesses for appellant. In this connection, it is pointed out as a most significant fact that, in a memorandum made by the agent of appellant who caused the car to be returned to the stockyards and the stock unloaded when it was found that one of the mares was down, no mention was made of the vieiousness of any of the animals, nor was it stated in the memorandum that the pen was built to protect the remaining animals from the viciousness of the one put into the pen; but; on the contrary, the fair inference deducible from the language used in the memorandum is, that the pen was built for the benefit and protection of the injured mare which was found down in the car.

The sum and substance of all the evidence amounts to this: When this live stock was delivered by appellee to appellant in East St. Louis, all of them, save one, were in good condition, and the damage to this one consisted of a skinned place upon the hock and a cut upon one hip. When they reached appellee, they were all more or less damaged, cut, skinned and bruised, and one so seriously so, that it died'in a few days. Neither appellee nor any representative of his accompanied the shipment.

Under the decisions of this court in L. & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 28 Rep., 772, and C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. [232]*232Greening, 30 Rep., 1080, -when appellee had shown that the stock was in good condition when delivered to the company and in a damaged condition when it reached its destination, the burden shifted from appellee, and it thereupon became incumbent upon the company to show that it handled the stock with due care and that the injuries, of which appellee was complaining, did not result from any improper handling or treatment of the stock, while in transit. Recognizing that it was incumbent upon it to account for the injury, the company introduced its evidence showing conclusively that the car, in which this stock was shipped, was in all respects suitable for that purpose, and that it was handled throughout the journey from. East St. Louis to Paducah with due and proper care and was not, at any time, subjected to any rough handling or unusual treatment. In addition, it showed that one of the horses manifested a disposition to injure the others by biting, kicking and fighting, and that, to protect them from the viciousness of the horse, it caused one end of the car to be stalled off and this animal put therein, and that in this condition it started them on the journey. Appellee sought to rebut this evidence of viciousness on the part of one of the animals by testifying that, when he was inspecting the stock with the view of their purchase and when they were assembled in the pens preparatory to shipment, he saw no evidence of viciousness on the part of any of them. He testified that when the car reached Paducah, the pen which had been built by the agents of appellant, was torn down and some of the slats were off the car. Counsel for appellant insists that this very showing on the part of appellee lends color to its charge that the injuries were not due to improper handling, but resulted from the viciousness and meanness of this animal. It is possible that the bruises and injuries complained of were such as could readily have been received by the animals, either in fighting with each other or coming in contact with the sides and ends of the car, in their efforts to escape from the attacks of the viciously disposed mare. The evidence does not disclose the exact nature of these injuries and no attempt was made to show that they were such as might have occurred in the manner indicated.

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147 S.W. 949, 149 Ky. 229, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-central-railroad-v-word-kyctapp-1912.