Illinois Central Railroad v. Behrens

69 N.E. 796, 208 Ill. 20
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 17, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 69 N.E. 796 (Illinois Central Railroad v. Behrens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Illinois Central Railroad v. Behrens, 69 N.E. 796, 208 Ill. 20 (Ill. 1904).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Wilkin

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District affirming a judgment of the circuit court of Washington county for $3000 in an action by appellee against appellant, for personal injuries. The declaration consisted of two founts, the first alleging that the injury was occasioned by reason of the unsafe condition and lack of proper repair of an engine and boiler in the use of the defendant, in consequence of which it exploded. The second, that an engine operated by the defendant was so carelessly and negligently managed and cared for that the same exploded, causing the plaintiff’s injury. The plea was the general issue and the trial by jury. An instruction to the jury to find for the defendant was asked and refused, both at the conclusion of the testimony offered by the plaintiff and at the close of all the evidence.

It is contended that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the circuit court are inconsistent with and contrary to instructions given on behalf of the defendant. But that was a question for the Appellate Court, unless we shall conclude that there is an entire absence of proof in the record fairly tending to support the material allegations of the declaration.

It is again insisted that there is a variance between the evidence and the first count of the declaration, in that the count avers that the boiler exploded, while, it is said, the evidence shows that it was the fire-box which exploded. ■ Unless the variance now complained of was specifically pointed out by the defendant on the trial it could not be raised, on appeal, either in the Appellate Court or here. A motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant on the ground of a variance between the pleadings and the evidence is not sufficient to raise the question of variance, unless the defendant, by its motion, indicates specifically in what the variance consists, so as to enable the court to pass upon it intelligently, and also to enable the plaintiff to so amend his declaration as to make it conform to the evidence. (Probst Construction Co. v. Foley, 166 Ill. 31, and cases there referred to.) Counsel for the appellant fail to point out in the record wherein this inflexible rule of practice was complied with. There was, however, no material variance. The fire-box, as we understand the evidence, may be called, and is, a part of the boiler.

A single instruction was given at the instance of the plaintiff, and it is insisted that it does not correctly state the law of the case. It was intended to direct the jury as to what elements of injury might be taken into consideration, in case it found the issues for the plaintiff, in estimating his damages. We do not regard it as subject to the criticism made by counsel, but are of the opinion that it announces substantially the correct rule of law.

Witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiff, who were at the place of the explosion soon after it occurred, testified that they found a piece of the fire-box and boiler with broken bolts, and described the appearance of them, using such expressions as “they looked like there was a few that were off, and others looked like the threads were drawn out of the sheet or boiler,—the ends just stripped off; looked like they were dark color, and a few •—a part of them—looked like there was a fresh break, because they looked bright; the others looked dull.” It is argued that this testimony was in the nature of expert evidence, and inasmuch as the witnesses did not qualify as experts, it was error to allow their testimony to go to the jury. The objection seems to have been general rather than specific as to any particular question or answer, but aside from this we think the point is without merit. The testimony was in no sense expert evidence, nor did the witnesses testify as such. What they saw and described was a matter of common observation.

It is urged, with much earnestness, that the trial court erred in refusing" to instruct the jury to find the issues for the defendant. In determining whether the instruction should have been given we must confine ourselves to the single consideration whether or not the evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, as shown by the record, with all its reasonable inferences and intendments, fairly tended to support the material allegations of his declaration, the decision of the Appellate Court having conclusively settled, all controverted questions of fact adversely to the defendant, so far as such facts depend upon the mere preponderance of the testimony. In the discussion of this question it must be conceded that it was the duty of the defendant company to use all reasonable care to furnish proper and safe locomotives in the operation of its road, and a question is raised whether the plaintiff made a prima facie case by proof of the explosion, under the previous decisions of this court. We do not regard that question important or material in the decision of the case, as plaintiff did, we think, introduce competent affirmative proof tending to support the allegations of the declaration.

We are somewhat embarrassed in the consideration of the evidence of the witnesses testifying in the case, from the fact that upon the trial a model of the locomotive engine which exploded was used by counsel, both for plaintiff and defendant, in attempting to demonstrate the facts at issue, and reliance seems to have been placed upon the examination and inspection of such model by the jury and the explanations made by the witnesses. Not having that model before us, with the accompanying explanations, it is difficult to clearly understand some of the testimony in the record. There is no controversy, however, as to the following facts :

The plaintiff was a section hand employed by the defendant, and on the 17th day of May, 1900, while engaged in the line of his duty, assisted in pushing a hand-car from the main track upon a side-track on the defendant’s right of way near the village of DuBois, in Washington county, for the purpose of allowing a mail train to pass. As the engine of the approaching train came alongside the hand-car it exploded, destroying the engine, and throwing the fragments of the fire-box, crown-sheet and other parts in different directions, one of which struck the plaintiff upon his right knee, inflicting a serious injury,' for which he sues. The engine, which was numbered 915, had been in the use of defendant for several years. It was placed in the round-house of the company at Centralia about the 6th of May for repairs, and remained there until the 12th of that month, during which time, according to the testimony of employees of the defendant, it was repaired. One of the defects at that time was, that a number of the bolts necessary to hold the fire-box together had become cracked and broken. The division master mechanic, J. H. Pollard, testified that the engine was taken into the round-house on the 6th day of May, and says: “All the stay-bolts were renewed in the front sheet of the fire-box, and three on the right side and four on'the left side of the fire-box.” A great many of the bolts were hot renewed, but the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses is to the effect that by the application of usual and proper tests they were found to be in a safe condition. Prom the time the engine left the round-house on the 12th, prior to the explosion, it was not inspected.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Baker v. Board of Trustees, Etc.
23 P.2d 1071 (California Court of Appeal, 1933)
Tulo v. O'Gara Coal Co.
183 Ill. App. 423 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1913)
Johnson v. Corn Products Refining Co.
147 Ill. App. 211 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1909)
Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Stroeter
133 Ill. App. 199 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1907)
Illinois Central Railroad v. Prickett
71 N.E. 435 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1904)
City of Ottawa v. Hayne
114 Ill. App. 21 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1904)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
69 N.E. 796, 208 Ill. 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-central-railroad-v-behrens-ill-1904.