Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ray

148 So. 233, 165 Miss. 885, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 319
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedMay 8, 1933
DocketNo. 30608.
StatusPublished

This text of 148 So. 233 (Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ray, 148 So. 233, 165 Miss. 885, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Mich. 1933).

Opinion

Ethridge, P. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The declaration in this suit was in two counts against both the Illinois Central Eailroad Company and the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company; and, on the trial, the second count was abandoned and a nonsuit taken as to the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company.

It was alleged that the appellant was engaged in interstate commerce on April 3,1932, on which date the plaintiff’s intestate was killed in the south yards of the railroad company at Memphis, Tennessee; that the plaintiff’s intestate was a car inspector and repairman, whose duties required him to assist in switching, classifying, handling, inspecting, and repairing cars in the yards. That, under the instructions of his foreman, about 9 o ’clock on said date, he went to a car that had just been *890 switched ou track No. 2 in the said yards, and was inspecting it, and that such inspection showed a coupler on the south end thereof to be defective and inoperative; that he began to repair the coupler, but before going on the track at the south end of the car, according to custom, he gave the usual and proper notice of his said intention to the employees of the railroad company engaged in switching operations at that point. It was further alleged that an insufficient number of car men were employed,- and that the plaintiff’s intestate was required to work very hurriedly and to repair cars on the track without interfering with switching operations; that it was the duty of the switchmen not to let any cars be kicked on track Njo. 2, they well knowing the dangerous position of Ray at the end of the car, but that they opened the switch to track No-. 2 and let two- other cars come in on that track at a high and dangerous rate of speed, so that the said two cars collided violently with the ear on which Ray was working, causing injuries which resulted in his death. It was further alleged that it was the established custom for switchmen to, ascertain whether car inspectors or repairmen were engaged in work on the tracks in the yard before kicking cars on said track; that all the switchmen knew that car men were required to inspect and do light repairs on cars in the yards, including track No-. 2, and that it was the custom and duty of the engine and switching crews to give warning of the approach of any cars.to said tracks, so that car inspectors might protect themselves; and that without regard to this duty, two cars were kicked with unnecessary and unusual force against the one on which Ray was working, causing his death.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, giving notice thereunder that the risks and dangers at the time and place mentioned in the declaration were such as were incident to' the occupation of Ray; were open, obvious, and apparent, and were known to and assumed by Ray; *891 and gave further notice that Ray was careless and negligent in failing to observe the rules of defendant governing work at the time and place; and that such negligence contributed to and caused the injuries sustained by him.

Defendant pleaded that Ray disobeyed and ignored the following rule: “A blue flag displayed at one or both ends of an engine, car or train, indicates that workmen are under or about it. When thus protected, it must not be coupled to or moved. The same workmen that displayed the blue signals alone are authorized to remove them. Other equipment must not be placed on the same track so as to intercept the view of the blue signal without first notifying the workmen. When emergency repair work is to be done under or about cars the engineer and firemen will be notified, and protection must be given those engaged in making the repairs.”

The trial of this case resulted in a verdict for ten thousand dollars in favor of Mrs. Lorine Ray, administratrix.

No one saw Ray, the deceased, at the exact time of his injury, but a witness named James testified that he was in the south yards on the morning in question for the purpose of trying to secure a pass to a Northern point; that he talked to a man named Dye, who was in charge of the switching yards, but that Dye refused to get the pass because it was Sunday; that he (James) knew Ray and saw him approaching the car which injured him and go behind it; that almost immediately he came out from behind the car and gave Dye signals to stop further cars coming into that.track, and that Diye received the signal and answered it; that he (James) knew the signals and their meaning; and that Ray’s signal meant that no other cars were to be brought into said track until another signal had been given authorizing cars to come into said switch. James also testified that, while he was talking to Dye, after these signals had been given, two cars were switched into track No. 2 moving at a rapid rate, but that he went away and did not see the accident. *892 This witness also testified that it was the custom iu switching operations to give such signals as were given by Ray and Dye instead of putting out a blue flag, and that it was not customary to display a blue flag when only slight repairs were made. The testimony of the witness, James, was contradicted by the railroad company, but was corroborated by other witnesses in many material and important respects.

Mr. Dye, the man who was doing the switching, denied that Ray gave him any signals, and that he knew Ray was behind the car at the time he was injured. He says, however, that he saw James in the yards that morning, and that another person approached him (Dye) to secure a pass, which he declined to help secure because it was Sunday, and there was an agreement that no such request would be made of the person issuing transportation on Sunday. Dye testified, in part, as follows:

“Q. Is it not a fact that minor repairs were made anywhere in that yard that they could be fixed without any great length of time, — that the car inspector would go in there and fix it without setting out a blue flag? A. I would say such as adjusting knuckle locks and putting on a hose we never used a blue flag.
“Q. In your twenty-seven years in that yard, have ever known them to use a blue flag in that yard? A. Not on light repair work, no.
“Q. How long did it take Boston to fix that knuckle? A. Not very long.
“Q. Just a minute or two? A. Y¡es sir.
‘ ‘ Q. In fixing a knuckle that would take only a minute or two to fix, they would not set out any blue flag for that on those fast tracks ? A. No, they never do unless they crawl under the car. . . .
“Q. If you don’t put a blue flag out while doing that kind of work, what precaution do the men take to protect themselves? A. They usually go in pairs and if the *893 work is dangerous, one man looks out while the other does the work.
“Q. Is there any other method of protecting themselves? A. Blue flag or light.
“Q. By the court. Do they give any stop sign? A. Sometimes they do and sometimes they never give a sign. . . .
“Q.

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148 So. 233, 165 Miss. 885, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-cent-r-co-v-ray-miss-1933.