Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Commission

156 N.E. 319, 325 Ill. 102
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 20, 1927
DocketNo. 18047. Judgment reversed and award set aside.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 156 N.E. 319 (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Commission, 156 N.E. 319, 325 Ill. 102 (Ill. 1927).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Thompson

delivered the opinion of the court:

This writ of error is prosecuted by leave of court to review the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county confirming an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of defendant in error, Mary K. Mulligan.

On Saturday, October 8, 1921, defendant in error was employed by plaintiff in error as a switchboard operator at its main office in the city of Chicago and had been so employed for nearly two years. In her work she used a head-set, which held the receiver to her right ear. She testified that while she was working at her board about noon she “got an awful bang in the earthat the noise was so violent that she could neither speak nor hear for an instant; that her ear and head began to ache and continued to ache until her collapse the following day; that as soon as she recovered her speech she reported to her supervisor, Miss Brussow, that she had sustained a bang in the ear which had made her ill and that she would have to go home; that the supervisor refused to permit her to leave her work; that she was suffering from a severe earache and headache and was trembling so that she worked with difficulty; that she told other girls working near her about the bang in the ear; that she had to change the head-set so that she could use her left ear, because she could not hear with her right ear; that she continued to work until 5 :3o P. M. and then went home; that she suffered with earache and headache throughout the night and did not sleep well; that she arose about ten o’clock Sunday morning, had breakfast and then went to church; that she became ill during the church service and had to return home; that she ate a light lunch about 12 :3o P. M. and then went to her room; that about two P. M., while she was stooping over a dresser drawer, her left side became paralyzed and she fell to the floor; that she was removed to Mercy Hospital, where she remained for about two months; that she regained some use of her left arm and left leg and continued to improve until May 1, 1922, when she returned to work; that she was given a light board, so that she could operate it with her right hand alone, and that she continued her employment with the company until March 6, 1924, when she was discharged because she was unable to do her work satisfactorily. She testified further that she reported on Monday, October 10, to Miss Stuber, a supervisor employed by plaintiff in error to visit employees who were absent from work because of illness, that she was injured at her employment Saturday noon, and asked her whether the company would pay her hospital bill and would compensate her for her disability, and that Miss Stuber replied that it would. The supervisor visited her occasionally until she was able to return to work, but she was not attended by any of the company’s physicians until May, 1922. When she reported for work she was examined by physicians employed by the company, and these examinations were repeated from time to time throughout the period of her employment. Her two sisters, with whom she occupied the apartment in which she lived, paid the hospital bill and the attending physician’s bill. They did not ask the'company to pay these bills until after defendant in error had been discharged.

Margaret Mulligan, a sister of defendant in error, testified that at the time of the accident they lived together in an apartment on the third floor at 4300 Ellis avenue; that she was at home when Mary arrived from work Saturday evening, October 8, 1921; that Mary was pale and extremely nervous; that she did not sleep well that night; that she went to church with Mary the following morning and had to take her out of the church because she seemed to be faint; that Mary collapsed about two o’clock Sunday afternoon; that she called in Dr. Caldwell; that he had Mary taken to Mercy Hospital and kept her there for nearly two months; that Dr. ICleutgen also attended her at the hospital; that she called the main office of plaintiff in error and reported to the chief operator that Mary was ill as the result of an accident which had occurred at the exchange on Saturday, and that the chief operator replied that she would send the visiting supervisor to see Mary; that Miss Stuber came to the hospital and reported that she was the visiting supervisor; that she told Miss Stuber about the accident which had occurred at the exchange Saturday afternoon and asked what the company would do about it; that Miss Stuber said she would make inquiry and report the next day; that on Tuesday she saw Miss Stuber, and she reported that the company would take care of all the expenses; that she spoke to Miss Stuber about the bills after her sister had left the hospital, and that Miss Stuber told her not to worry about the bills because the company would take care of them. Another sister, Beatrice, testified to substantially the same facts.

Dr. Arthur C. Kleutgen testified that he first saw defendant in error at Mercy Hospital on Sunday evening, October 9, 1921; that she was then suffering from a left hemiplegia; that she gave him a history of her family and of herself; that he examined her carefully and found her arteries soft and pliable with no signs of arteriosclerosis, her kidneys normal with no signs of Bright’s disease, and her heart healthy; that the Wasserman tests were negative ; that, assuming the testimony of defendant in error as true, he was of the opinion that there was a causal relationship between the bang in the ear and the hemorrhage which caused the paralysis; that he formed this opinion from the fact that her family and personal history and his examination did not reveal any condition which could have caused the hemorrhage, and therefore the rupture of the blood vessel had to be accounted for by the increased blood pressure resulting from the nervous condition caused by the sudden shock.

Dr. Nathaniel H. Adams testified that he examined defendant in error on two occasions, the first on December 1, 1924, and the second about a week before the hearing before the arbitrator; that he found a post-hemiplegic state and that he considers her present condition permanent. He expressed the opinion that, assuming the testimony of defendant in error to be true, the bang in the ear might have produced the rupture of the blood vessel which caused the paralysis. He was unable to account for her condition in any other way.

On behalf of plaintiff in error Miss Elizabeth Brussow testified that on October 8, 1921, she was on duty, and that she remembered that was the last day defendant in error worked before her illness; that defendant in error did not report to her that day that she had sustained a severe bang in the ear; that she did not report to her that she was ill and that she did not ask for permission to go home; that she visited defendant in error at Mercy Hospital and talked with her about her trouble; that defendant in error told her she first noticed something wrong while she was preparing for church, and that she did not say that she had been injured at the telephone office.

Miss Anna B.

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Bluebook (online)
156 N.E. 319, 325 Ill. 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-bell-telephone-co-v-industrial-commission-ill-1927.