Ihg Hotels and Resorts v. Ana Alexander
This text of Ihg Hotels and Resorts v. Ana Alexander (Ihg Hotels and Resorts v. Ana Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 8, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0920-WC
IHG HOTELS AND RESORTS APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION v. OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD ACTION NO. WC-19-81843
ANA ALEXANDER; HONORABLE TONYA M. CLEMONS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, IHG Hotels & Resorts, appeals the July 1, 2022
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) award of benefits to Appellee, Ana Alexander.
Having considered this appeal, we affirm.
Appellant employed Appellee as a housekeeper from April 23, 2019,
to May 5, 2019. On May 5, Appellee fell while working and injured her cervical
and lumbar spine, left wrist, and left knee. Appellee’s daughter took her to an
emergency room for her injuries, but the hospital released Appellee to return to
work the same day. The following day, Appellee arrived at work but shortly left
after experiencing pain from her injuries. Appellee sought treatment for her
injuries, which included physical therapy and pain medication. Appellee also
sought Workers’ Compensation benefits for her injuries, and several doctors
evaluated her and her condition for purposes of determining her compensation.
The doctors reached different conclusions.
On January 19, 2022, the ALJ conducted a hearing to determine the
compensation to which Appellee may be entitled. On the issue of what date in the
course of her treatment Appellee reached maximum medical improvement (MMI),1
the ALJ heard from several doctors. Dr. Grossfeld indicated Appellee reached
MMI for her work-related injuries on August 8, 2019. Dr. Kakel speculated
Appellee reached MMI at 8 weeks after her injuries (a little over two years before
1 MMI “refers to the time at which a worker’s condition stabilizes so that any impairment may reasonably be viewed as being permanent.” Tokico (USA), Inc. v. Kelly, 281 S.W.3d 771, 775-76 (Ky. 2009).
-2- he examined her). Finally, Dr. Fadel noted Appellee had reached MMI when he
evaluated her on June 17, 2021, “if no further treatment is anticipated.” The ALJ
heard substantially more evidence, none of which is relevant to this appeal.
After hearing this testimony, the ALJ made her findings of fact, which
included: (1) Appellee reached MMI on her cervical spine and left wrist injuries
on May 15, 2019, finding Dr. Grossfeld’s testimony on this matter persuasive, (2)
Appellee reached MMI on her lumbar spine injuries on August 8, 2019, again
finding Dr. Grossfeld’s testimony on this matter persuasive, and (3) Appellee
reached MMI on her left knee injury on June 17, 2021, finding Dr. Fadel’s
testimony on this matter persuasive. The ALJ then awarded Appellee temporary
total disability (TTD) benefits through June 17, 2021. Appellant appealed this
order to the Board, who affirmed the ALJ’s award. This appeal follows.
On appeal, “the role of [appellate courts] in reviewing decisions of the Board ‘is to
correct the Board only when we perceive that the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling law or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.’” Twin Resources, LLC v. Workman, 394
S.W.3d 417, 422 (Ky. App. 2013) (quoting Daniel v. Armco Steel Co., L.P., 913
S.W.2d 797, 798 (Ky. App. 1995) ((quoting Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827
S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992))). Crucial to the analysis we undertake here: “The
-3- [B]oard shall not substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ] as to the weight of
evidence on questions of fact.” KRS2 342.285(2).
Pursuant to KRS 342.285, the ALJ is the finder of fact in workers’
compensation actions. KRS 342.285(2). “[A]s the fact-finder, the ALJ, not this
Court and not the Board, has sole discretion to determine the quality, character,
and substance of the evidence.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Smith, 205 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Ky.
App. 2006) (citing Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999)). “Not
only does the ALJ weigh the evidence, but the ALJ may also choose to believe or
to disbelieve any part of the evidence, regardless of its source.” Id. (citing
Whitaker, 998 S.W.2d at 481). This is because the ALJ is in the best position to
make judgment calls as to the evidence presented. Accordingly, where an award
“is supported by substantial evidence, it may not be disturbed.” Beth-Elkhorn
Corp. v. Dotson, 428 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. 1968); see also Emps.’ Liability
Assurance Corp. v. Gardner, 263 S.W. 743 (Ky. 1924) (“Unless there is an entire
absence of substantial and credible evidence to support the board’s finding of facts,
this court, in the absence of fraud, cannot disturb it.”).
At issue is whether the ALJ erred in concluding Appellee did not
achieve MMI until June 17, 2021. To support its claims of error, Appellant
advances three arguments, none of which persuades this Court.
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4- First, Appellant contends Dr. Fadel’s testimony is inherently
ambiguous because the date he said MMI was achieved was the same date he first
examined her. We see no ambiguity in a determination that, on the first day Dr.
Fadel could make such a determination with any degree of medical certainty, June
17, 2021, he concluded she reached MMI. Assessment that MMI occurred before
he saw her would have been speculation. Appellant cites no authority supporting a
contrary argument.3 Dr. Fadel’s testimony is substantial evidence supporting the
ALJ’s decision. Even assuming arguendo our agreement with Appellant’s
position, the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Fadel’s testimony is not “so flagrant as to cause
gross injustice.” Twin Resources, 394 S.W.3d at 422 (citations omitted). This
argument does not persuade us that the ALJ’s findings of fact should be disturbed.
Similarly, Appellant’s belief the date chosen by Dr. Fadel was
arbitrary cannot be a basis for disturbing her findings of facts. Appellant contends
the date is arbitrary to the same extent Appellant’s office assistant could have
scheduled her visit, arbitrarily, at any time. We disagree. Dr. Fadel would have
had to determine whether Appellee had or had not reached MMI on whatever date
he saw her, regardless of the date his assistant chose to schedule her. Obviously,
the ALJ considered any proof of an earlier date to be unpersuasive. That
3 Appellant cites no caselaw in support of any of its arguments.
-5- determination of the persuasiveness of the evidence is within the exclusive purview
of the ALJ.
Finally, Appellant claims error in Dr. Fadel’s testimony as the date he
chose involved the consideration of injuries which were not work-related. Again,
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