Igor Odnovorov v. Svitlana Odnovorov.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1002
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1002

IGOR ODNOVOROV

vs.

SVITLANA ODNOVOROV.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Svitlana Odnovorov (wife), the former spouse of Igor

Odnovorov (husband), appeals from a judgment of divorce nisi

issued by a judge of the Probate and Family Court, claiming,

among other things, error in the judge's determination of

alimony and the division of assets and liabilities. We affirm.

As a preliminary matter we note that the wife's brief is

limited to "'bald assertions of error' that 'lack[] legal

argument'" and as such "'[do not] rise[ ] to the level of

appellate argument' required by rule 16" of the Massachusetts

Rules of Appellate Procedure, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019). Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass.

1001, 1003 (2011), quoting Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993). Nevertheless, we briefly address

what we understand to be the gist of her argument: that the

judge abused her discretion by not equitably awarding assets and

liabilities and by failing to award alimony.

"In making a property division and alimony determination

under G. L. c. 208, § 34, a judge must make findings indicating

that [she] has considered all factors relevant under § 34, and

has not considered any irrelevant factors." T.E. v. A.O., 82

Mass. App. Ct. 586, 592 (2012), quoting Bowring v. Reid, 399

Mass. 265, 267 (1987). "A judgment will not be disturbed on

appeal unless plainly wrong and excessive" (quotation and

citation omitted). Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 236

(2014). Here, the judge articulated sixty-six findings of fact

based on careful consideration of the § 34 factors. She

considered the length of the marriage; the parties' occupations,

vocational skills, employability, and sources of income; and the

parties' contributions to the marital estate. She detailed the

marital lifestyle and conduct of the parties during the marriage

in nine additional findings. And she further considered the

present and future needs, as well as the best interests of, the

dependent child when awarding custody and child support.

The wife appears to argue that the judge did not equally

divide the assets and liabilities of the parties. The goal of

2 G. L. c. 208, § 34, however, is "an equitable, rather than an

equal, division of property." Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619,

626 (2000). "The judge did not have to follow any specific

formula, and the weight to be accorded each of the § 34 factors

was committed to [her] discretion" (citations omitted). Bacon

v. Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 120-121 (1988). Here, the

judge ordered that the parties would retain the assets and

liabilities that each brought to the marriage. The parties were

each awarded their current vehicles, their interests in their

retirement accounts, and any other financial assets held in

their names. The wife was given time to refinance the marital

home and pay the husband the equity owed, or if unable to obtain

financing, to sell the property and split the net proceeds

equally.1 Neither party was awarded alimony. Given the short

length of the marriage, the stability of the wife's income, and

the husband's unemployment at the time of trial, the award here

was well within the judge's discretion. See id. at 122 ("That

the marital estate . . . is rationally susceptible of a

different allocation does not mean that the judge abused [her]

1 The judgment nisi set forth specific requirements for the division of proceeds should the house be sold, taking into account the outstanding mortgage and home equity line of credit balances.

3 discretion, which under the decisions interpreting § 34 is quite

broad, even if it is not limitless").

To the extent the wife argues that the judge's decision to

not award alimony was erroneously based on the husband's

submission of false financial documents and unemployment at the

time of trial, the proper avenue for seeking relief would be, as

the judge noted, to file a complaint for modification. See Chin

v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 534 (2015) ("Orders for payment of

alimony in judgments issued based on evidence in a contested

divorce generally will be subject to modification on a showing

of a material change in circumstances").2 Moreover, we find no

record support for the wife's claim that she was entitled to

retroactive child support based on the husband's 2022 and 2023

employment bonuses. The judge's findings demonstrate that she

considered the husband's 2022 and 2023 bonus targets as well as

the income shown on his 2022 Federal tax return and 2023 W-2

form.

The wife's claim concerning no-contact orders is moot. The

parties' child has reached adulthood (as have the wife's other

children) and he is able to choose if and when he has contact

2 Indeed, the judge expressly "recognize[d] that the current order will need to be modified upon Husband obtaining new employment as Husband's earning[s] have historically consisted of a base salary, RSUs and bonuses."

4 with each parent, and the wife has an active abuse prevention

order against the husband. See Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579,

583 (2022) (argument moot because relief sought was no longer

available and appellate decision would not apply to existing

rights).

Finally, the wife suggests that the judge erred by failing

to award her attorney's fees based on the husband's conduct,

which she claims was "extremely abusive, non productive and not

in good faith." We discern no error in the judge's findings

that "the parties both engaged in conflict with each other" and

that their mutual "animosity . . . required a costly litigation

process despite best efforts of counsel to resolve the matter on

behalf of their clients." See Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass.

App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995) (trial judge's credibility assessments

"close to immune from reversal on appeal except on the most

compelling of showings").

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Englander & D'Angelo, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: June 30, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.