Ignacio Sanchez-Salazar v. Jefferson Sessions III

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedApril 4, 2018
Docket17-1360
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ignacio Sanchez-Salazar v. Jefferson Sessions III (Ignacio Sanchez-Salazar v. Jefferson Sessions III) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ignacio Sanchez-Salazar v. Jefferson Sessions III, (4th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1360

IGNACIO SANCHEZ-SALAZAR, a/k/a Jorge Rivera Pascual,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, US Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: March 29, 2018 Decided: April 4, 2018

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Janeen Hicks Pierre, PIERRE LAW, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director, David J. Schor, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Ignacio Sanchez-Salazar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the

Immigration Judge’s finding that his South Carolina conviction for criminal domestic

violence was categorically a “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012) that renderd him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

We review legal issues de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the [Board]’s

interpretation of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] and any attendant regulations.”

Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). “[W]here . . . the [Board]

construes statutes over which it has no particular expertise, [however,] its interpretations

are not entitled to deference.” Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566 (4th Cir. 2013).

Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). We defer to

the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence rule. Anim v. Mukasey, 535

F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).

Upon review, we conclude that Sanchez-Salazar’s South Carolina criminal

domestic violence conviction constituted a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 16(a)

(2012) that rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012). We accordingly deny the petition

for review for the reasons stated by the Board. See In re Sanchez-Salazar B.I.A. Feb. 27,

2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

2 adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED

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Related

Ali Karimi v. Eric Holder, Jr.
715 F.3d 561 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey
517 F.3d 685 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)
Anim v. Mukasey
535 F.3d 243 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)

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