Ignacio Ixta, Jr. v. County of Ventura

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 2, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-02468
StatusUnknown

This text of Ignacio Ixta, Jr. v. County of Ventura (Ignacio Ixta, Jr. v. County of Ventura) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ignacio Ixta, Jr. v. County of Ventura, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM Document 46 Filed 08/02/22 Page 1 of 20 Page ID #:429

1 Eugene P. Ramirez (State Bar No. 134865) epr@manningllp.com 2 Deann Rivard (State Bar No. 177482) dyr@manningllp.com 3 Jessica L. Becerra (State Bar No. 325884) jlb@manningllp.com 4 MANNING & KASS ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP 5 801 S. Figueroa St, 15th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-3012 6 Telephone: (213) 624-6900

7 Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF VENTURA, a public entity; VENTURA 8 COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, a public entity 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 11 IGNACIO IXTA, JR., individually; Case No. 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM 12 A.I., a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, Wendy Galvan; 13 P.I.I., a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, Ginger Martinez, 14 Plaintiffs, [DISCOVERY MATTER] 15 v. STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 16 ORDER1 COUNTY OF VENTURA, a public 17 entity; VENTURA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, a 18 public entity; CITY OF OXNARD, a public entity; OXNARD POLICE 19 DEPARTMENT, a public entity; EDWARD BALDWIN; individually 20 and in his official capacity as a peace officer; ALEX ARNETT, individually 21 and in his official capacity as a peace officer; CHRIS WILLIAMS, 22 individually and in his official capacity as a peace officer; JOHN 23 CROMBACH, individually and in his capacity as former Chief of Police of 24 the City of Oxnard; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 25 Defendants. 26 27 1 This Stipulated Protective Order is based substantially on the model protective 28 order provided under Magistrate Judge Alexander F. MacKinnon’s Procedures. Case No. 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Case 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM Document 46 Filed 08/02/22 Page 2 of 20 Page ID #:430

1 2 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 3 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 4 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 5 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may 6 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 7 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 8 Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 9 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 10 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 11 under the applicable legal principles. 12 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 13 1.1. Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 14 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need 15 for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 16 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 17 the following reasons. 18 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 19 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 20 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective 21 procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 22 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 24 to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 25 law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 26 [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 27 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 28 2 Case No. 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Case 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM Document 46 Filed 08/02/22 Page 3 of 20 Page ID #:431

1 “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. 2 Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants 3 further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can 4 threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 5 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 6 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 7 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client 8 privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of 9 their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files 10 that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 11 evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 12 legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to 13 evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, 14 evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 15 prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 16 legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. 17 United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 18 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. 19 Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 20 Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 21 States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further 22 contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 23 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 24 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 25 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 26 related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open 27 and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that 28 can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 3 Case No. 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Case 2:22-cv-02468-MCS-AFM Document 46 Filed 08/02/22 Page 4 of 20 Page ID #:432

1 measures that may be required. 2 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the 3 same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is 4 contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of 5 officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 6 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 7 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order 8 preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely 9 substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self- 10 critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from 11 witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers 12 and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace 13 officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally 14 undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can 15 and often does result in litigation. 16 1.2. Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants' 17 contentions herein above, and nothing in this Stipulation or its associated Order 18 shall resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal 19 statements and claimed privileges set forth above.

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Bluebook (online)
Ignacio Ixta, Jr. v. County of Ventura, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ignacio-ixta-jr-v-county-of-ventura-cacd-2022.