iGlobal Exports v. Shoemaker

District Court, D. Utah·Decided September 15, 2022·No. 4:22-cv-00044·Unknown

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

iGLOBAL EXPORTS, LLC, a Utah limited MEMORANDUM DECISION AND liability company doing business as ZONOS, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO Plaintiff, COMPEL ARBITRATION, DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, AND STAY v. BRIEFING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION KEVIN SHOEMAKER, an individual, Case No. 4:22-cv-00044-TC-PK Defendant. Senior District Judge Tena Campbell Magistrate Judge Paul Kohler

Plaintiff iGlobal Exports, LLC (“iGlobal”) initiated this case against Defendant Kevin Shoemaker (“Shoemaker”) alleging a claim for breach of contract arising from noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses in Shoemaker’s employment contract with iGlobal.1 iGlobal also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction2 seeking to enjoin Shoemaker from violating these clauses during the pendency of the case. Shoemaker responded by filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Stay Briefing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion to Compel Arbitration”).3 Because the parties’ employment contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause which covers iGlobal’s breach of contract claim, including iGlobal’s request for equitable injunctive relief and Shoemaker’s request for attorneys’ fees, arbitration must be compelled. However,

1 Complaint ¶¶ 25-33 at 4-5, docket no. 2, filed July 14, 2022. 2 Docket no. 5, filed July 18, 2022. 3 Docket no. 13, filed July 28, 2022. because the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability, the arbitrator could decide that some portion of iGlobal’s claim may be resolved outside of the arbitration by the District Court. Dismissal of iGlobal’s Complaint is not appropriate at this time. And briefing on iGlobal’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction must be stayed until a time, if any, that the arbitrator decides

that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction may be resolved by the District Court. Therefore, Shoemaker’s Motion to Compel Arbitration4 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. DISCUSSION Shoemaker’s Motion to Compel Arbitration raises fundamental questions regarding whether iGlobal’s breach of contract claim, including determination of whether a preliminary injunction should issue and entitlement to attorneys’ fee, must be resolved by an arbitrator.5 iGlobal concedes that its breach of contract claim is subject to mandatory and binding arbitration under the parties’ employment contract.6 Indeed, after Shoemaker filed his Motion to Compel Arbitration, iGlobal initiated an arbitration proceeding with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) as required by the employment contract.7 iGlobal nevertheless argues that the District Court may still render a determination on its Motion for Preliminary Injunction.8

Additionally, Shoemaker argues that he may be awarded attorneys’ fees in this case.9

4 Docket no. 13, filed July 28, 2022. 5 Motion to Compel Arbitration at 4-6. 6 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion re: Arbitration (“Response”) at 2, docket no. 19, filed Aug. 1, 2022; Demand for Arbitration, docket no. 19-1, filed Aug. 1, 2022. 7 Response at 2; 900 Zonos Employment Agreement – Generic (“Employment Contract”) ¶¶ 11.a.-b. at 5, docket no. 13-1, filed July 28, 2022. 8 Response at 2-5. 9 Motion to Compel Arbitration at 6. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [the party] has not agreed so to submit.”10 “[A] party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits of its dispute[.]”11 “But, where the party has agreed to arbitrate, [that party], in effect, has relinquished much of that right’s practical value.”12

“[W]ho—court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.”13 This is because when a party “ask[s] a court to review the arbitrator’s decision . . . the court will set that decision aside only in very unusual circumstances.”14 In answering “the ‘who’ question (i.e., the standard-of-review question)[,]” the Supreme Court held that “[j]ust as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.”15 “[W]hen parties agree that an arbitrator should decide arbitrability, they delegate to an arbitrator all threshold questions concerning arbitrability—including ‘whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.’”16

“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the

10 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). 11 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). 16 Belnap v. Lasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010)). formation of contracts.”17 However, the Supreme Court has “added an important qualification, applicable when courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability: Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.”18

Tenth Circuit precedent dictates that a “clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability . . . may be inferred from the parties’ incorporation in their agreement of rules that make arbitrability subject to arbitration[.]”19 Here, the parties’ employment contract plainly requires arbitration of “any and all controversies, claims, or disputes . . . arising out of, relating to, or resulting from . . . any breach of th[e] agreement[.]”20 And such arbitration is to be “administered by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in accordance with its rules then in effect for the resolution of commercial disputes.”21 Under the AAA’s commercial rules, arbitrators “shall have the power to rule on [their] own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim.”22 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

has held that “when contracting parties incorporate the AAA rules into a broad arbitration agreement, as was the case here, such an incorporation clearly and unmistakably evinces their intent to arbitrate arbitrability.”23

17 First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 944. 18 Id. (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). 19 Belnap, 844 F.3d at 1290. 20 Employment Contract ¶ 11.a. at 5 (emphasis omitted). 21 Id. (emphasis omitted). 22 AAA Commercial Rule 7(a). 23 Dish Network, LLC v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2018). Because the parties’ employment contract24 clearly and unmistakably evinces the parties’ intent to arbitrate issues of arbitrability, the arbitrability of iGlobal’s breach of contract claim must be decided by an arbitrator. This includes resolution of preliminary issues relating to the breach of contract claim such as the arbitrability of iGlobal’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

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iGlobal Exports v. Shoemaker, (D. Utah 2022).

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Related

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
514 U.S. 938 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
537 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare
844 F.3d 1272 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray
900 F.3d 1240 (Tenth Circuit, 2018)