Iginio Feliciano Guzman A/K/A Iginio Guzman v. State
This text of Iginio Feliciano Guzman A/K/A Iginio Guzman v. State (Iginio Feliciano Guzman A/K/A Iginio Guzman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NUMBER 13-15-00213-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IGINIO FELICIANO GUZMAN A/K/A IGINIO GUZMAN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 404th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez Appellant Iginio Feliciano Guzman a/k/a Iginio Guzman was convicted of one count
of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and sentenced to twenty-five years in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). This appeal followed.
Determining that any further proceedings on behalf of Guzman would be wholly
frivolous and without arguable merit, counsel filed an Anders brief in which he reviewed
the merits, or lack thereof, of the appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS
Pursuant to Anders v. California, Guzman's counsel filed a brief stating that, “[a]fter
review of the record, there are no issues of arguable merit in this case.” See 386 U.S.
738, 744–45 (1967). Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a
professional evaluation showing why there are no meritorious grounds for advancing an
appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.
proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points
of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and
procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112
S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel
has demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders by discussing
why, under controlling authority, any appeal from the judgment would be without merit
and frivolous. Counsel specifically determined, after examining the record, that: (1) the
indictment was sufficient; (2) there were no adverse rulings on pretrial motions; (3) there
were no adverse rulings during voir dire, and no error, if any, was preserved for appellate
2 purposes; (4) there were no adverse rulings during trial; (5) there were no objections to
the jury charge; (6) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (7) the sentence
was within the range of punishment allowed, and was reasonable under the law; (8) post-
trial, the trial court followed the State’s agreement to vacate Counts II, III, and IV; (9) at
the post-trial hearing on Guzman’s motion for new trial, the trial court properly denied the
motion on the basis of “no evidence” to support allegations of undue influence on a juror;
and (10) there was no fundamental error. Counsel has also informed this Court that
Guzman has been: (1) notified that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to
withdraw as his counsel; (2) provided with copies of the pleadings; (3) informed of his
right to file a pro se response,1 to review the record preparatory to filing that response,
and to seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) provided with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record,
with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly,
436 S.W.3d at 318–19; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d at 409 n.23. An adequate time has passed, and Guzman has not filed either a
timely motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record or a motion for extension of
time to do so. And he has not filed a pro se response.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination of all
1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
3 proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Pension v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, and we have found nothing that
would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it
considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but
found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, counsel has asked this Court to grant his motion to
withdraw as counsel for Guzman. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw
from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed
attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate
court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to
withdraw that this Court carried with the case on March 18, 2016. Within five days of the
date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment
to Guzman and to advise Guzman of his right to pursue a petition for discretionary
review.2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex
2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek review of this case by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled 4 parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Iginio Feliciano Guzman A/K/A Iginio Guzman v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iginio-feliciano-guzman-aka-iginio-guzman-v-state-texapp-2016.