1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Idilio Monsivais, Case No. 2:25-cv-00377-CDS-MDC
5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case
6 v.
7 Darrel Davies,
8 Defendant
9 10 Plaintiff Idilio Monsivais filed this lawsuit against defendant Darrell Davies asserting 11 subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. Compl., ECF No. 2 at 3. However, the 12 complaint alleges that both Monsivais and Davies are citizens of Nevada. Id. Monsivais was 13 therefore ordered to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 14 jurisdiction. Order, ECF No. 11. In his response, Monsivais argues that complete diversity of 15 citizenship exists because he is a citizen and resident of Washington and Davies is a citizen and 16 resident of Nevada. Resp., ECF No. 12 at 2. Monsivais further asserts that, at the time the 17 lawsuit was filed, he was domiciled in Washington. Id. 18 I. Discussion 19 A. Diversity of citizenship 20 “To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a party must ‘(a) be a citizen of the 21 United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.’” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 22 749–50 (9th Cir. 1986). Although residency is an element of domicile; a party is domiciled where 23 they (1) reside, and (2) intend “to remain permanently or indefinitely.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 749–50 24 (quoting Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940)); see also Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 25 265 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, to assess diversity jurisdiction, the court must consider 26 each party’s “domicile.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 1 As the party asserting diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its 2 existence. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857 (citing Lew, 797 F.2d at 749). As noted in Lew, the 3 determination of an individual’s domicile involves a number of factors: “current residence, voting 4 registration and voting practices, location of personal and real property, location of brokerage 5 and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other 6 organizations, place of employment or business, driver’s license and automobile registration, and 7 payment of taxes.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. Courts have also stated that domicile is evaluated in 8 terms of “objective facts,” and that “statements of intent are entitled to little weight when in 9 conflict with facts.” Id. (citation omitted). 10 Here, the question is whether Monsivais has provided sufficient evidence to establish 11 that he is domiciled in Washington. In the original pleading, Monsivais identifies himself as a 12 citizen of Nevada. ECF No. 2 at 3. Monsivais’s response to the show cause order1 fails to give any 13 explanation for why his initial description should now be ignored. Instead, Monsivais states 14 that he lived in Washington at the time of filing the complaint and he provides a copy of his 15 driver’s license, vehicle registration, and license plate, to corroborate this assertion. Id. at 5–7. 16 Although this evidence weighs in favor of Monsivais having been domiciled in Washington at 17 the relevant time, he has offered little else in terms of evidence supporting his position, and 18 physical location alone does not establish domicile. Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 19 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “numerous courts treat a person’s residence as prima facie 20 evidence of the person’s domicile”); cf. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857 (“Residency alone, however, is not 21 sufficient to show an intent to remain; only domicile is determinative.”). 22 So, although Monsivais demonstrates that he may reside in Washington, he must also 23 satisfy the intent to remain in Washington to establish domicile. “A change in domicile requires 24 the confluence of (a) physical presence at the new location with (b) an intention to remain there 25 1 Monsivais’s response violates Local Rule IC 6-1 requiring redaction of personal identifying information, 26 including but not limited to dates of birth. Further instructions are included in the conclusion of this order. 1 indefinitely.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750 (citations omitted). Monsivais’ response fails to address his 2 intent to remain in Washington indefinitely. Monsivais alleges that he “[had] to relocate” but his 3 mailing address, visits, and family all remain in Nevada, so he seeks damages in the amount of 4 $20,000 in flights, $15,000 in gas, and $40,000 for living in hotels for a period of three years. ECF 5 No. 2 at 4. This demonstrates little affirmative intent to abandon Nevada and instead be 6 domiciled in Washington. Moreover, by Monsivais’s own admission, he resides in Washington 7 but “pretty much travel[s] back and forth.” See Trial tr., ECF No. 10 at 77; 67:16–17. His activity 8 appears to be closer to that of a frequent visitor of Washington, or someone who temporarily 9 stays in the Washington, rather than someone seeking to make himself at home. Gaudin v. Remis, 10 379 F.3d 631, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2004) (a person’s physical presence with the intent to remain in a 11 new jurisdiction is sufficient to change domicile) (emphasis added). 12 Since Monsivais’s response to the show-cause order does not address the balance of the 13 Lew factors, provide substantial evidence, or offer sufficient argument to support his claims of 14 Washington citizenship, there are not enough objective facts before the court to establish 15 Monsivais’s intent to make Washington a fixed and permanent home. See In re Rodenbough, 579 16 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018) (finding that a residence may refer to living in a particular 17 locality without the intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.). 18 B. Amount in controversy 19 In his show cause response, Monsivais asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds 20 $75,000 because he seeks (1) direct and relocation costs of $13,000; (2) lost business income of 21 $50,000; (3) “reputation repair” of $25,000; and (4) legal fees of $12,000. ECF No. 12 at 2. In sum, 22 Monsivais’s response reflects an amount in controversy of $100,000. However, where the 23 plaintiff originally files in federal court, “the amount in controversy is determined from the face 24 of the pleadings.” Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 26 1 In his complaint, Monsivais prays for $20,000 in flights, $15,000 in gas, $40,000 living in 2 hotels, and “other small details now the sum well over 350k.” ECF No. 2 at 4. Again, as the party 3 asserting diversity jurisdiction, Monsivais bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance 4 of the evidence the amount in controversy is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. McCauley v. Ford 5 Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001). “A speculative argument regarding the potential 6 value of the award is insufficient” to establish diversity jurisdiction. Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford 7 Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing McCauley, 264 F.3d at 376). 8 I am not persuaded that Monsivais meets his burden demonstrating that his damages 9 exceed the jurisdictional threshold.
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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Idilio Monsivais, Case No. 2:25-cv-00377-CDS-MDC
5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case
6 v.
7 Darrel Davies,
8 Defendant
9 10 Plaintiff Idilio Monsivais filed this lawsuit against defendant Darrell Davies asserting 11 subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. Compl., ECF No. 2 at 3. However, the 12 complaint alleges that both Monsivais and Davies are citizens of Nevada. Id. Monsivais was 13 therefore ordered to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 14 jurisdiction. Order, ECF No. 11. In his response, Monsivais argues that complete diversity of 15 citizenship exists because he is a citizen and resident of Washington and Davies is a citizen and 16 resident of Nevada. Resp., ECF No. 12 at 2. Monsivais further asserts that, at the time the 17 lawsuit was filed, he was domiciled in Washington. Id. 18 I. Discussion 19 A. Diversity of citizenship 20 “To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a party must ‘(a) be a citizen of the 21 United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.’” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 22 749–50 (9th Cir. 1986). Although residency is an element of domicile; a party is domiciled where 23 they (1) reside, and (2) intend “to remain permanently or indefinitely.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 749–50 24 (quoting Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940)); see also Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 25 265 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, to assess diversity jurisdiction, the court must consider 26 each party’s “domicile.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 1 As the party asserting diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its 2 existence. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857 (citing Lew, 797 F.2d at 749). As noted in Lew, the 3 determination of an individual’s domicile involves a number of factors: “current residence, voting 4 registration and voting practices, location of personal and real property, location of brokerage 5 and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other 6 organizations, place of employment or business, driver’s license and automobile registration, and 7 payment of taxes.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. Courts have also stated that domicile is evaluated in 8 terms of “objective facts,” and that “statements of intent are entitled to little weight when in 9 conflict with facts.” Id. (citation omitted). 10 Here, the question is whether Monsivais has provided sufficient evidence to establish 11 that he is domiciled in Washington. In the original pleading, Monsivais identifies himself as a 12 citizen of Nevada. ECF No. 2 at 3. Monsivais’s response to the show cause order1 fails to give any 13 explanation for why his initial description should now be ignored. Instead, Monsivais states 14 that he lived in Washington at the time of filing the complaint and he provides a copy of his 15 driver’s license, vehicle registration, and license plate, to corroborate this assertion. Id. at 5–7. 16 Although this evidence weighs in favor of Monsivais having been domiciled in Washington at 17 the relevant time, he has offered little else in terms of evidence supporting his position, and 18 physical location alone does not establish domicile. Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 19 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “numerous courts treat a person’s residence as prima facie 20 evidence of the person’s domicile”); cf. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857 (“Residency alone, however, is not 21 sufficient to show an intent to remain; only domicile is determinative.”). 22 So, although Monsivais demonstrates that he may reside in Washington, he must also 23 satisfy the intent to remain in Washington to establish domicile. “A change in domicile requires 24 the confluence of (a) physical presence at the new location with (b) an intention to remain there 25 1 Monsivais’s response violates Local Rule IC 6-1 requiring redaction of personal identifying information, 26 including but not limited to dates of birth. Further instructions are included in the conclusion of this order. 1 indefinitely.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750 (citations omitted). Monsivais’ response fails to address his 2 intent to remain in Washington indefinitely. Monsivais alleges that he “[had] to relocate” but his 3 mailing address, visits, and family all remain in Nevada, so he seeks damages in the amount of 4 $20,000 in flights, $15,000 in gas, and $40,000 for living in hotels for a period of three years. ECF 5 No. 2 at 4. This demonstrates little affirmative intent to abandon Nevada and instead be 6 domiciled in Washington. Moreover, by Monsivais’s own admission, he resides in Washington 7 but “pretty much travel[s] back and forth.” See Trial tr., ECF No. 10 at 77; 67:16–17. His activity 8 appears to be closer to that of a frequent visitor of Washington, or someone who temporarily 9 stays in the Washington, rather than someone seeking to make himself at home. Gaudin v. Remis, 10 379 F.3d 631, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2004) (a person’s physical presence with the intent to remain in a 11 new jurisdiction is sufficient to change domicile) (emphasis added). 12 Since Monsivais’s response to the show-cause order does not address the balance of the 13 Lew factors, provide substantial evidence, or offer sufficient argument to support his claims of 14 Washington citizenship, there are not enough objective facts before the court to establish 15 Monsivais’s intent to make Washington a fixed and permanent home. See In re Rodenbough, 579 16 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018) (finding that a residence may refer to living in a particular 17 locality without the intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.). 18 B. Amount in controversy 19 In his show cause response, Monsivais asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds 20 $75,000 because he seeks (1) direct and relocation costs of $13,000; (2) lost business income of 21 $50,000; (3) “reputation repair” of $25,000; and (4) legal fees of $12,000. ECF No. 12 at 2. In sum, 22 Monsivais’s response reflects an amount in controversy of $100,000. However, where the 23 plaintiff originally files in federal court, “the amount in controversy is determined from the face 24 of the pleadings.” Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 26 1 In his complaint, Monsivais prays for $20,000 in flights, $15,000 in gas, $40,000 living in 2 hotels, and “other small details now the sum well over 350k.” ECF No. 2 at 4. Again, as the party 3 asserting diversity jurisdiction, Monsivais bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance 4 of the evidence the amount in controversy is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. McCauley v. Ford 5 Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001). “A speculative argument regarding the potential 6 value of the award is insufficient” to establish diversity jurisdiction. Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford 7 Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing McCauley, 264 F.3d at 376). 8 I am not persuaded that Monsivais meets his burden demonstrating that his damages 9 exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Aside from Monsivais’s conclusory allegation of damages 10 amounting to $425,000, the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed $75,000. The sole 11 allegation in the complaint is that Davies “testified under oath to several facts” and “grav[e]ly 12 slander[ed]” his name. ECF No. 2 at 4. This allegation is insufficient to demonstrate that the 13 amount in controversy is over $75,000. GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Martinez, 2010 WL 1931268, at *4 14 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (holding that the amount in controversy requirement was not met 15 because there were “no facts or evidence corroborating” the damages assertion); see also Romsa v. 16 Ikea U.S. W, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120984, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) (treating a 17 plaintiff’s damages estimate as insufficient to establish the amount in controversy “if it appears 18 to be only a ‘bold optimistic prediction’” (citation omitted)). 19 I therefore find that Monsivais’s allegations regarding damages are unsupported by facts 20 and, thus, fail to show the requisite amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction. In the 21 absence of diversity jurisdiction, this matter cannot proceed in federal court. 22 II. Conclusion 23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the show cause order [ECF No. 11] is discharged. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Monsivais’s complaint [ECF No. 2] is dismissed 25 without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 26 1 The Clerk of Court is kindly instructed to seal Monsivais’s response to the order to show 2|| (ECF No. 12), and further to detach and refile pages 1-3 for the public record. 3 The Clerk of Court is also kindly directed to close ig case. 4 Dated: October 10, 2025 7) tthac—<—— vil States District Judge 7 / 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26