Idalia Santaella, M.D. v. Maria Vaz, Etc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 3D2026-0283
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 27, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D26-0283 Lower Tribunal No. 24-11466-CA-01 ________________

Idalia Santaella, M.D., Petitioner,

vs.

Maria Vaz, etc., et al., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.

Hicks, Porter & Stein, P.A., and Dinah S. Stein and Michael J. Byrne; McEwan, Martinez, Dukes, Hall & Vancol, P.A., and Mary Jaye Hall (Orlando), for petitioner.

The Alvarez Law Firm, and Herb R. Borroto and Andres E. Borroto, for respondents.

Before LINDSEY, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

BOKOR, J. Petitioner Idalia Santaella seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the trial

court’s orders denying her motion for protective order, granting Respondent

Maria Vaz’s request to move forward with a compulsory medical examination

(CME) under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360, and clarifying the terms

of that examination. As explained below, we deny the petition.

I.

Vaz, as personal representative of her husband’s estate, sued

Santaella for medical malpractice. Vaz alleged that Santaella negligently

biopsied and misdiagnosed a malignancy on the decedent’s thyroid in 2022,

causing his death in 2023. Vaz’s theory of negligence stemmed from

Santaella’s supposed continued practice of medicine while showing signs of

dementia. The suit further alleged that Santaella’s husband, also a doctor,

negligently facilitated her practice during this neurocognitive decline. Vaz

filed notice of a compulsory medical examination of Santaella under rule

1.360 for the purpose of assessing Santaella’s cognitive state at the time of

the incidents giving rise to the malpractice claim.

II.

A petition for certiorari must show (1) a departure from the essential

requirements of law; (2) material injury through the remainder of the

proceedings below; and (3) an injury that is irreparable, leaving no adequate

2 remedy at law. Prichard v. Galicia, 407 So. 3d 537, 539 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA

2025). Santaella claims that the trial court departed from the essential

requirements of law by (1) ordering a compulsory medical examination of her

present cognitive abilities when only her prior cognitive abilities are in

controversy, and (2) by finding good cause for the examination without first

defining its scope. Indeed, two prerequisites of a compulsory medical

examination are (1) that the condition be “in controversy,” and (2) that “good

cause” be shown on the grounds that the condition cannot be adequately

evidenced without expert testimony flowing from the exam. Espinosa v. D.H.

Griffin Constr. Co., LLC, 187 So. 3d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). But

both prerequisites are met here.

First, the neurologist set to examine Santaella attested that the

compulsory medical examination sought would help her form an opinion on

Santaella’s cognitive abilities as they existed at the time of the incident giving

rise to Vaz’s underlying malpractice claim against Santaella. See also

Gomez v. Rendon, 126 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (explaining that

where good cause exists, “a mere review of . . . medical records is not a

sufficient substitute for a firsthand, physical examination”). As in Espinosa,

the court here “did not depart from the essential requirements of law in

determining that the condition that is the subject of the requested

3 examination is in controversy” and permitting an examination. 187 So. 3d at

1275 (quotation omitted). The action places the cognitive state of Santaella

at the time of the 2022 biopsy and diagnosis in controversy.

Second, Espinosa explained that a trial court cannot make a finding of

“good cause” as required by rule 1.360(a)(2) unless it first defines that

examination’s scope. Id. And here, the operative order sufficiently defines

the scope of exam. In Espinosa, the order on review created “merely the

appearance of a specified and limited scope” because that order authorized

the physician to conduct whatever “examination or tests . . . may be

necessary” to assess the condition in controversy. Id. at 1275 & n.1

(quotation omitted). This court held that such a blanket authorization,

potentially including “examinations or tests which the trial court may not have

considered (or intended to permit),” failed to comply with the trial court’s duty

to assess good cause under rule 1.360. Id. at 1275.

But here, the operative order allows only a virtual (telehealth)

examination via online platform, with Santaella participating “from home or

wherever she feels comfortable.” The order directs that the exam shall begin

with “about 20 minutes” of medical history followed by a “general cognitive

exam,” which term is undefined in the order but generally understood to

mean a short, non-invasive, assessment of basic mental functions. The

4 cognitive portion is to be completed in “no longer than 20 to 40 minutes,

but . . . in 10 minutes if Dr. Santaella is non-verbal.” The entire exam is

capped at 40 minutes. The order further explains that there shall be no

questions “concerning [Santaella’s] medical care of the decedent.” It allows

her to have a spouse or family member and attorney present, and it gives

her the exclusive option to videotape or transcribe the examination. So we

have none of the concerns raised in Espinosa that Santaella would be

subjected to assessments that the court did not intend or consider. The trial

court found good cause by imposing specific limitations on a defined

examination of a condition in controversy.

Petition denied.