Icu Medical, Inc. v. Rymed Technologies, Inc.

673 F. Supp. 2d 228, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112546, 2009 WL 4496023
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedDecember 3, 2009
DocketCivil Action 07-468-JJF
StatusPublished

This text of 673 F. Supp. 2d 228 (Icu Medical, Inc. v. Rymed Technologies, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Icu Medical, Inc. v. Rymed Technologies, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 228, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112546, 2009 WL 4496023 (D. Del. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff ICU Medical, Inc. (“ICU”) filed this case against Defendant RyMed Technologies, Inc. (“RyMed”) alleging infringement of United States Patent Nos. 5,865,-866 (the “'866 Patent”); 5,873,862 (the “'862 Patent”); 5,928,204 (the “'204 Patent”); and 6,572,592 (the “'592 Patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). The parties briefed their respective positions on claim construction, and the Court conducted a Markman hearing on the disputed terms. This Memorandum Opinion provides constructions of the disputed terms.

BACKGROUND

The patents-in-suit relate to needleless intravenous medical connector valves. Such valves are used to facilitate both the transmission of medication and fluids into a patient’s bloodstream, as well as the withdrawal of a patient’s blood. Before the patents-in-suit, the traditional technique for changing or adding fluid bags to an existing intravenous line required the insertion of an external needle into a needle access port, which was then connected to the existing intravenous line. Numerous problems existed with this traditional practice, for example, detachment of the needle, or contamination of the needle posed serious safety risks to patients, and accidental needle sticks posed the risk of infection to medical personnel.

DISCUSSION

I. The Legal Principles of Claim Construction

Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed.Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). When construing the claims of a patent, a court considers the literal language of the claim, the patent specification and the prosecution history. Id. at 979. Of these sources, the specification is “always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2005)(citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). However, “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir.2004)(citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002)).

A court may consider extrinsic evidence, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises, in order to assist it in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art and how the invention works. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80 (citations omitted). However, extrinsic evidence is considered less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Phillips, *232 415 F.3d at 1318-19 (discussing “flaws” inherent in extrinsic evidence, and noting that extrinsic evidence “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of a patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence”).

In addition to these fundamental claim construction principles, a court should also interpret the language in a claim by applying the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words in the claim. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed.Cir.1984). The ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms denotes the meaning that a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would ascribe to the terms in the context of the entire patent, including its specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d, at 1313. If the inventor clearly supplies a different meaning, however, then the claim should be interpreted according to the meaning supplied by the inventor. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (noting that patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, but emphasizing that any special definitions given to words must be clearly set forth in patent). If possible, claims should be construed to uphold validity. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984) (citations omitted).

II. Decision

ICU has asserted against RyMed the following claims of the patents-in-suit: claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the '866 Patent; claims 1-3 of the '862 Patent; claims 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9-12 of the '204 Patent; and claim 45 of the '592 Patent. (D.I. 116, at 1.) Although the patents contain different claims, they share a common specification (the “Common Specification”). 1 From these claims, the parties have identified several disputed claim terms and/or phrases, but have been unable to reach agreement as to whether all require interpretation by the Court.

Several of the disputed terms have been considered or construed by other courts in prior proceedings concerning this family of ICU patents. See ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., No. CV04-0689 MRP, 2006 WL 6133688, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96077 (C.D.Cal. Jul. 17, 2006), aff'd, 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed.Cir.2009) [hereinafter Alaris ]; ICU Med., Inc. v. B. Braun Med., Inc., 344 F.Supp.2d 663 (N.D.Cal. 2004) [hereinafter Braun]. The Court has determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable, but that the Alaris and Braun claim constructions are persuasive authority. For the reasons that follow, the Court construes the disputed terms as follows:

A. Compressed State/Decompressed State

ICU’s Construction_RyMed’s Construction

Compressed State Compressed State

The position of the [flexible A state (i.e.condition) of element] seal when it is un- axial compression der axial compression from a medical implement and opens the valve

Decompressed State Decompressed State

The position of the [flexible A state (i.e.condition) of no element] seal when it is not axial compression under axial compression from a medical implement_

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ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.
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In Re Yujiro Yamamoto, and Dictaphone Corp., Intervenor
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Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.
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344 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. California, 2004)

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673 F. Supp. 2d 228, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112546, 2009 WL 4496023, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/icu-medical-inc-v-rymed-technologies-inc-ded-2009.