I.C. v. New York City Department of Education

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 31, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-05264
StatusUnknown

This text of I.C. v. New York City Department of Education (I.C. v. New York City Department of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
I.C. v. New York City Department of Education, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT USDC SDNY SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DATE FILED: _7/31/2 ET AL., Plaintiffs, 20-CV-05264 (ALC)

- against - ORDER NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL., Defendants.

On June 9, 2020, Plaintiff LC., individually and on behalf of S.G., initiated this action against the New York City Department of Education and Richard Carranza, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education. ECF No. 1. I.C. claims that the Defendants failed to provide S.G., a 20 years old that has been diagnosed with Attention- Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and a severe learning disability in math, a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and other federal and state law.

More specifically, LC.’s complaint alleges that the DOE, in violation of a January 7, 2020 Order by an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”), failed to pay S.G.’s full tuition at Fusion Academy for the 2019-2020 school year and did not fully reimburse the cost of $.G.’s meals, as ordered in the January 7 IHO Order. The complaint further alleges that although S.G. was scheduled to begin the 2020-2021 school year on July 6, 2020, Fusion Academy refused to enroll S.G. due to the DOE’s failure to fund S.G.’s tuition for the 2019-2020 school year. I.C. therefore prayed the Court to issue an order requiring Defendants to immediately and fully comply with the terms of the IHO’s

order by funding S.G.’s tuition at Fusion Academy for the 2019-2020 school year and reimbursing the costs of S.G.’s meals. I.C. requested that this order also require Defendants to immediately provide S.G. with funding for continued placement at Fusion Academy for the 2020-2021 school year, including tuition, transportation and meals. Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief that the

DOE had violated the IDEA and other federal and state laws. On June 9 2020, I.C. also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF Nos. 5-8. That same day, the Court denied I.C.’s request for temporary restraining order, but issued an order for the DOE to show cause why the Court should not issue the requested preliminary injunction. ECF No. 13. Upon consideration of I.C.’s motion and supporting documents, a written response from the DOE, and a July 14, 2020 show cause hearing, the Court granted I.C.’s request for preliminary injunction in part. The Court ordered the DOE to fund the

outstanding balance of S.G.'s tuition for Fusion Academy for the 2019-2020 school year by July 16, 2020 at 5:00 p.m. ECF No. 24. The DOE mailed a check for the balance of the 2019-2020 tuition to Fusion Academy on July 16, 2020 by USPS First Class Mail. ECF No. 29. After an apparent mail delay, the check reached Fusion Academy by July 22, 2020. ECF No. 29. Based on the latest status report to the Court, S.G. should by now be enrolled in school. ECF No. 30. On July 30, 2020, the Parties filed a joint status report. ECF No. 30. Therein, the Parties

asked the Court to render a decision on the issues in I.C.’s request for preliminary injunction on which the Court had not yet ruled. Those are I.C.’s request that the Court issue a preliminary injunction that the DOE reimburse I.C. for the outstanding cost of school meals incurred during the 2019-2020 school year and provide I.C. and S.G. with funding for continued placement at Fusion Academy for the 2020-2021 school year, including tuition, meals and transportation. Upon careful consideration of the Parties’ submissions, the Court hereby DENIES the remainder of I.C.’s request for preliminary injunction because I.C. has not shown irreparable harm as to the reimbursement of the cost of school meals from 2019-2020, and lacks standing as to the requested relief related to the 2020-21 tuition payments.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a "movant must show: ‘(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.’” AIM Intl Trading, LLC v. Valcucine, SpA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing See Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979). To establish irreparable harm, the movant must demonstrate “an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent[,] and that cannot be remedied by

an award of monetary damages.” Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there is an adequate remedy at law, such as an award of money damages, injunctions are unavailable except in extraordinary circumstances.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992)). Plaintiff has shown no irreparable harm to justify the Court issuing an injunction that the

DOE reimburse I.C. for the outstanding cost of school meals incurred during the 2019-2020 school year. I.C. argues that she and S.G. were irreparably harmed by S.G. being unable to enroll at Fusion Academy in 2020-2021. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any connection between the reimbursement of the cost of school meals from 2019-2020 and S.G.’s ability to attend school now. Nor has I.C. shown any other harm that is not compensable with money damages. The Court must therefore deny this requested relief. Now to the request that the Court issue an injunction ordering the DOE to provide I.C. and S.G. with funding for continued placement at Fusion Academy for the 2020-2021 school year, including tuition, the cost of school meals and transportation. There is no dispute that Fusion Academy is the pendency placement for S.G. The DOE has agreed to fund S.G.’s tuition at Fusion

Academy, and to issue payments within 27-32 days of receiving certain necessary documents from Fusion Academy concerning the cost of tuition and S.G.’s attendance at Fusion Academy. ECF No. 30 at 3. To date, no payment to Fusion Academy for the 2020-2021 school year has come due, so none has gone unpaid or been paid late. The City argues that under the circumstances, I.C. lacks standing to pursue this claim. Fusion counters that the DOE’s prior late payments merit an order setting a specific deadline for payment. The Court agrees with the DOE that I.C. lacks standing to seek an injunction requiring

payment of the 2020-2021 school year tuition. To satisfy the “'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing,” a plaintiff “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, U.S., 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). Here, I.C. has not alleged an injury in fact in relation to the 2020-2021 school year. S.G. is currently enrolled at Fusion Academy.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
504 U.S. 374 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
596 F.2d 70 (Second Circuit, 1979)
AIM International Trading, LLC v. Valcucine SpA.
188 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus
134 S. Ct. 2334 (Supreme Court, 2014)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
578 U.S. 330 (Supreme Court, 2016)
E.M. v. New York City Department of Education
758 F.3d 442 (Second Circuit, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
I.C. v. New York City Department of Education, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ic-v-new-york-city-department-of-education-nysd-2020.