Ibrahim Rahman v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00492
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 IBRAHIM RAHMAN, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00492-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY v. RESTRAINING ORDER 10 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, et 11 al.,

12 Defendants. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Ibrahim Rahman moves for a temporary restraining order to enjoin 15 the upcoming foreclosure of his home. Dkt. No. 10. Having considered the briefing, 16 the record, and the relevant law, the Court finds that Rahman has not shown that 17 he is likely to succeed on his claims. Accordingly, the Court denies his motion for a 18 temporary restraining order. 19 20 21 22 23 1 2. BACKGROUND1 2 On March 21, 2007, Rahman executed a promissory note (“Note”) for

3 $360,000, in consideration for a loan from GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. for 4 the purchase of real property in Kent, Washington (“Property”). Rahman v. 5 Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. 6 Rahman also executed a deed of trust (“Deed of Trust”) securing the Note and 7 encumbering the Property. Chicago Title Insurance was the trustee, and the 8 Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) was named as beneficiary and

9 nominee for GreenPoint and its successors and assigns. Dkt. No. 14-3 at 3; Rahman, 10 Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. MERS later assigned its interest as 11 beneficiary in the Deed of Trust to GreenPoint, Dkt. No. 14-4 at 2, and GreenPoint 12 subsequently assigned its interest in the Deed of Trust to BAC Home Loan 13 Servicing, LP (“BAC”), Dkt. No. 14-5 at 2. Rahman, Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. 14 No. 48 at 2. 15

17 1 Both parties have asked the Court to take judicial notice of various documents. Dkt. Nos. 11, 14. A district court has broad discretion to consider evidence at the 18 preliminary injunction stage, even if that evidence might not be admissible at trial. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It 19 was within the discretion of the district court to accept this hearsay for purposes of deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction”); Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. 20 v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[t]he trial court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of preventing 21 irreparable harm before trial”). Accordingly, the Court has considered the documents submitted by both parties for purposes of this motion without ruling on 22 their admissibility. The Court RESERVES ruling on the parties' requests for judicial notice. 23 1 In November 2012, Rahman executed a “Home Affordable Modification 2 Agreement,” representing that he was in default or that default was imminent. Dkt.

3 No. 14-6 at 3; Rahman, Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. That agreement 4 modified the terms of the original loan, listing Nationstar as Lender and Servicer 5 and documenting a new principal balance of $453,069. Dkt. No. 14-6 at 2; Rahman, 6 Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. 7 By December 2018, Bank of America had become BAC’s successor and held 8 its interest as beneficiary to the Deed of Trust. See Rahman, Case No. 2:19-cv-530-

9 BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. That month, Bank of America, assigned its beneficiary 10 interest to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation in its capacity as Trustee for 11 Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2017-2 (collectively, the 12 “Freddie Mac Trust”). Dkt. No. 14-7 at 2; see also Rahman, Case No. 2:19-cv-530- 13 BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2. Later that month, an Appointment of Successor Trustee was 14 recorded, appointing Quality Loan Services Corporation of Washington (“Quality 15 Loan”) as the successor trustee under the Deed of Trust, wherein the Freddie Mac

16 Trust was listed as the beneficiary. Dkt. No. 14-8 at 2–3. 17 “On January 8, 2019, [the] Freddie Mac [Trust] authorized a Notice of 18 Default, indicating that Plaintiff had ceased making payments on the Loan in July 19 2018.” Rahman, Case No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 14-6 20 at 2–3. 21 On February 13, 2019, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was issued and recorded,

22 listing the Freddie Mac Trust as the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, Quality Loan 23 as the trustee, and the loan mortgage servicer as Nationstar. Dkt. No. 14-9 at 1. 1 That same day, Rahman sued Defendants in King County Superior Court, and 2 Defendants removed the case to the Western District of Washington. Rahman, Case

3 No. 2:19-cv-530-BJR, Dkt. No. 48 at 3. Rahman’s claims were: “Lack of 4 Standing/Wrongful Foreclosure, Breach of Contract, Quiet Title, Slander of Title, 5 Temporary Restraining Order, and Declaratory Relief.” Id. While the Court initially 6 restrained Defendants from selling the Property, it dismissed Rahman’s case with 7 prejudice soon after. Id. at 8–9. Acknowledging Rahman’s pro se status, the court 8 still found that leave to amend would be futile because it was “absolutely clear that

9 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Id. at 8 10 (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). The court further 11 found: 12 What is plain and undisputed is that Plaintiff stopped making payments on the Loan over a year ago; that a balance of over $350,000 remains 13 owing on the Loan, as modified; and that Plaintiff is well over $17,000 behind in his payments. These facts are fatal to all of Plaintiff’s claims. 14 Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Thus, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with 15 prejudice. Id. at 7–8. 16 Following the dismissal, Rahman filed for bankruptcy; his bankruptcy case 17 was dismissed on September 5, 2023. In re Ibrahim L. Rahman and Janice M. 18 Rahman, Case No. 19-13692-TWD (Bankr, W.D.). 19 On October 9, 2025, the Freddie Mac Trust executed a beneficiary 20 declaration, declaring that “Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, as trustee 21 for [the Freddie Mac Trust] is the holder of the promissory note or other obligation 22 evidencing [Rahman’s] loan.” Dkt. No. 10-4 at 30. Accordingly, the rights and 23 1 interests of Defendants remains the same as they were during the 2019 attempted 2 foreclosure and resulting litigation.

3 On November 24, 2025, a second Notice of Trustee’s Sale was issued; again, it 4 listed the Freddie Mac Trust as the Deed of Trust’s beneficiary, Quality Loan as the 5 trustee, and the loan mortgage servicer as Nationstar. Dkt. No. 14-14 at 1. The 6 notice listed the sale for April 3, 2026. Id. It also stated that as of November 2025, 7 Rahman was $191,696.04 in arrears on the Loan with a principal of $334,961.29 8 remaining. Id. at 2.

9 Rahman filed this lawsuit on December 18, 2025, in King County Superior 10 Court, and Defendants removed the case. Defendants then moved to dismiss the 11 complaint, after which Rahman filed an amended complaint and this motion for a 12 temporary restraining order. Dkt. Nos. 9; 10. The amended complaint asserts claims 13 against all Defendants under: (1) the Washington Deed of Trust Act (“DTA”); (2) the 14 Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), (3) the Real Estate Settlement 15 Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and (4) the Declaratory Judgment Act. Dkt. No. 9 at 17–

16 32. Rahman also brings claims against Quality Loan for violating the DTA by 17 breaching its statutory duty of good faith and for “[p]resale [d]amages.” Id. at 20– 18 24. In the alternative, Rahman pleads unjust enrichment against all Defendants. 19 Id. at 31–32. 20 3. DISCUSSION 21 3.1 Legal standard. “[I]njunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 22 upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. 23 1 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The proper legal standard for preliminary 2 injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate [1] ‘that he is likely to succeed on

3 the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 4 preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an 5 injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 6 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 7 The Ninth Circuit takes a “sliding-scale” approach to preliminary relief, 8 under which “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that

9 tips sharply towards the plaintiffs can support issuance of [preliminary injunctive 10 relief], so long as the plaintiffs also show that there is a likelihood of irreparable 11 injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & 12 Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 635 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). This approach allows 13 a stronger showing of one Winter factor to offset a weaker showing of another. 14 Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawaii, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky v. Labrador, 15 122 F.4th 825, 843–44 (9th Cir. 2024).

16 In all circumstances, the moving party must make “a showing on all four 17 prongs” under Winter to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. All. for the Wild 18 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 3.2 Rahman has not shown he is likely to succeed on the merits. 20 Rahman argues he is likely to show that Defendants violated the DTA such 21 that they lack authority to foreclose on his home. See generally Dkt. No. 10. This 22 argument relates to his first cause of action, which asserts violations of the DTA by 23 1 all Defendants, as well as his sixth and seventh causes of action, which seek related 2 declaratory and injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 9 at 17–20, 28–30. Because he does not

3 argue that he is likely to succeed on any other claims, the Court does not address 4 his remaining claims. 5 The DTA governs statutory deeds of trust in Washington and establishes the 6 procedures for nonjudicial foreclosure. Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 7 1188 (Wash. 2013). Under the DTA, “a deed of trust is a form of three-party 8 mortgage, involving not only a lender and a borrower, but also a neutral third-party

9 called a trustee.” Beck v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., Case No. C17-0882JLR, 2017 WL 10 6389330, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2017); Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 11 P.3d 34, 38 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). Consistent with the DTA, a lender will loan 12 money to a borrower to buy real property. The loan is evidenced by a promissory 13 note or similar instrument, held (at least initially) by the lender. The debt is 14 secured by a security instrument called a deed of trust, which authorizes the 15 neutral, third-party trustee to hold the title of the real property in trust for the

16 benefit of the lender, making the lender the beneficiary of the trust. If the borrower 17 defaults on the loan, the beneficiary may instruct the trustee to enforce the deed of 18 trust and foreclose on the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Bain, 285 19 P.3d at 38; see RCW 61.24.020. Throughout this process, the trustee must “ensure 20 that the rights of both the beneficiary and the debtor are protected.” Klem, 295 P.3d 21 at 1188; Bain, 285 P.3d at 39.

22 While the lender is initially the beneficiary and the holder of the promissory 23 note evidencing the loan, they may assign their beneficiary interest in the trust and 1 transfer the note to other parties. See Beck, 2017 WL 6389330, at *3. Thus, the DTA 2 authorizes the actual “holder” of a promissory note to instruct the trustee to enforce

3 the deed of trust. Larson v. Snohomish Cnty., 499 P.3d 957, 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 4 2021). Indeed, the statute clarifies that before issuing notice of a nonjudicial 5 foreclosure sale, “the trustee must have proof under penalty of perjury that the 6 beneficiary is the actual holder of the note.” Winters v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of 7 Wash., Inc., 454 P.3d 896, 900 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019); RCW 61.24.030(7)(a). 8 Generally, to meet this evidentiary requirement, the trustee can rely on a sworn

9 declaration by the beneficiary stating that the beneficiary is in fact the note holder. 10 RCW 61.24.030(7)(b). 11 Here, the Deed of Trust’s beneficiary—the Freddie Mac Trust—executed a 12 beneficiary declaration, confirming that “Federal Home Loan Mortgage 13 Corporation, as trustee for [the Freddie Mac Trust] is the holder of the promissory 14 note or other obligation evidencing the [relevant] loan.” Dkt. No. 10-4 at 30. This 15 would seem to satisfy the DTA’s evidentiary requirement.2 RCW 61.24.030(7).

16 Nevertheless, Rahman argues that there are numerous chain-of-title defects that 17

18 2 The Court acknowledges that Rahman alleges that Quality Loan violated its duty of good faith as trustee under RCW 61.24.010(4). See Dkt. No. 9 at 20. If this is true, 19 then Quality Loan could not rely on the Freddie Mac Trust’s declaration as proof of its noteholder status under the DTA. See RCW 61.24.030(7)(b) (“Unless the trustee 20 has violated his or her duty under RCW 61.24.010(4), the trustee is entitled to rely on the beneficiary's declaration as evidence of proof required under this 21 subsection.”). But Rahman’s motion does not explain the legal basis for his claim against Quality Loan, much less address his likelihood of success on the merits. 22 Accordingly, at this stage, the Court cannot find that Quality Loan’s reliance on the Freddie Mac Trust’s declaration poses a problem, or that Quality Loan needed to 23 gather additional evidence. 1 preclude Defendants from foreclosing on his home. The Court addresses each in 2 turn.

3 First, Rahman argues that under Washington law, MERS was never a valid 4 beneficiary of the deed of trust; thus, any subsequent assignments of interest from 5 MERS were improper. Dkt. No. 9 at 17. True, the Washington Supreme Court has 6 held that MERS is not a valid beneficiary under the DTA because it does not 7 actually hold promissory notes. Bain, 285 P.3d at 47; see also Zhong v. Quality Loan 8 Serv. Corp. of Wash., Case No. C13–0814JLR., 2013 WL 5530583, at *3 (W.D. Wash.

9 Oct. 7, 2013). However, the Washington Court of Appeals has expressly found that 10 “the designation of MERS as a beneficiary of a deed of trust, even though ineligible 11 to hold that position under the DTA does not . . . invalidate the deed of trust.” 12 Larson, 499 P.3d at 978; see also Zhong, 2013 WL 5530583, at *3 (Plaintiff “cites no 13 authority for her assertion that MERS is incapable of transferring its interest in a 14 deed of trust.”). Here, neither Party contends that MERS is the current holder of 15 the Note. Accordingly, the Court rejects Rahman’s MERS argument.

16 Second, relying on a press release, Rahman asserts that GreenPoint ceased 17 all operations on August 20, 2007. Dkt. No. 10-4 at 9. Thus, according to Rahman, 18 GreenPoint could not have authorized the assignment of interest executed after 19 August 20, 2007. But the press release he cites does not state that GreenPoint 20 ceased all operations or to exist as a legal entity. Id. It states: “GreenPoint 21 Mortgage will cease making new loan commitments immediately, however, it will

22 continue to meet its contractual obligations to customers for loan commitments that 23 are in the pipeline with rates locked.” Id. (emphasis added). A company’s decision to 1 stop originating new loans is not the same as dissolution, and Rahman has not 2 shown that GreenPoint lacked the corporate capacity to transfer existing loans after

3 August 20, 2007. Thus, the Court rejects this argument. 4 Third, Rahman claims that the Deed of Trust is somehow unenforceable 5 because “[e]very assignment [of interest in the Deed of Trust] was signed by 6 someone claiming to act as attorney-in-fact for another entity” but “[n]o Power of 7 Attorney has ever been produced for any attorney-in-fact signature in the chain.” 8 Dkt. No. 10 at 5. While he seems to claim that these documents were fraudulently

9 signed, but he produces no evidence and alleges no facts suggesting that any 10 individual fraudulently signed them. And the Court “need not consider allegations 11 ‘unsupported by citations to the record or legal authority.’” Saevik v. Swedish Med. 12 Ctr., Case No. C19-1992-JCC, 2021 WL 5918595, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2021) 13 (quoting Cyntegra, Inc. v. IDEXX Lab’ys, Inc., 322 F. App’x 569, 571 n.2 (9th Cir. 14 2009)). Moreover, individuals may sign corporate instruments in various 15 representative capacities—as officers, authorized agents, or attorneys-in-fact—and

16 the absence of a recorded power of attorney does not, without more, establish that 17 the signer lacked authority. 18 Fourth, Rahman asserts that the Freddie Mac Trust closed in 2017, before 19 his Note was transferred to it, meaning the Freddie Mac Trust cannot be the Note’s 20 holder or beneficiary. Dkt. No. 9 at 18–19. He claims, “[t]his is not a technical 21 timing issue,” but rather a “fundamental question of ownership.” Id. at 18. Rahman

22 argues that under these circumstances, “Defendants must produce the endorsed 23 promissory note and demonstrate when and how it was delivered to the Trust.” Id. 1 at 19. Again, Rahman’s argument lacks legal authority. Rahman also bases his 2 argument on a news release that states: “Freddie Mac . . . today announced the

3 settlement of its third Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer (SCRT) offering . . . .” Dkt. No. 4 10-4 at 6. Contrary to Rahman’s assertion, it is not apparent from the document 5 that the Freddie Mac Trust was closed in 2017 to all other transactions. 6 Finally, Rahman argues that Defendants violated the DTA because they 7 failed to produce “the original promissory note with a complete endorsement chain 8 across four foreclosure attempts spanning approximately eighteen years.” Dkt. No.

9 9 at 19. But he cites no law that would require Defendants to produce this. 10 Because Rahman has not shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 11 claims, preliminary injunctive relief is unavailable to him. See Matsumoto v. 12 Labrador, 122 F.4th 787, 804 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We have long recognized that 13 likelihood of success on the merits is the most important factor[.]”). The Court 14 recognizes that Rahman faces the potential loss of his home, a harm that courts 15 have recognized as irreparable. See Sundance Land Corp. v. Cmty. First Fed. Sav. &

16 Loan Ass’n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988). But a TRO is extraordinary relief, 17 and it requires more than just irreparable harm; it requires at minimum “serious 18 questions going to the merits.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. On this 19 record, Rahman has not raised such questions. Due to this failure, a TRO is 20 inappropriate. See id. (moving party must make “a showing on all four prongs” 21 under Winter to obtain relief).

22 23 1 4. CONCLUSION

9 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a temporary 3 restraining order. Dkt. No. 10.

A Dated this 19th day of March, 2026.

6 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23