Ibguy v. State

261 A.D.2d 510, 690 N.Y.S.2d 604, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 17, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 261 A.D.2d 510 (Ibguy v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ibguy v. State, 261 A.D.2d 510, 690 N.Y.S.2d 604, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

—In a claim to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death based upon medical malpractice, the defendant appeals from an interlocutory judgment of the Court of Claims (Nadel, J.), dated April 29, 1998, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against it on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the interlocutory judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the claim is dismissed.

It is well settled that neither a medical provider, in this case a psychotherapist, nor the State or governmental subdivisions employing the medical provider, may be held liable for a mere error in professional judgment (see, Darren v Safier, 207 AD2d 473; Davitt v State of New York, 157 AD2d 703; Mohan v Westchester County Med. Ctr., 145 AD2d 474; Wilson v State of New York, 112 AD2d 366). For liability to ensue, it must be shown that the medical provider’s treatment decision was “ ‘ “ ‘something less than a professional medical determination’ ” ’ ” (Darren v Safier, supra, at 474; Davitt v State of New York, supra). In this case, Dr. Frederick’s decision on the evening of January 2, 1989, to allow the decedent to voluntarily enter the hospital the next morning was a professional medical determination. The mere fact that the claimant’s expert would have opted for a different treatment, without more, “represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice” (Darren v Safier, supra, at 474; see also, Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 55 NY2d 682; Krapivka v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 119 AD2d 801). Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Joy and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Feteha v. Scheinman
2019 NY Slip Op 1199 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2019)
Park v. Kovachevich
116 A.D.3d 182 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2014)
Eckman v. Cipolla
77 A.D.3d 704 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)
Fotinas v. Westchester County Medical Center
300 A.D.2d 437 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2002)
Davis v. Patel
287 A.D.2d 479 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2001)
Weinreb v. Rice
266 A.D.2d 454 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
261 A.D.2d 510, 690 N.Y.S.2d 604, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ibguy-v-state-nyappdiv-1999.