Ibanez v. Electric Hydrogen Co.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 30, 2024
• Docket: 4:24-cv-05302
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PEDRO N. IBANEZ, Case No. 24-cv-05302-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS AS 10 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN CO., et al., MOOT 11 Defendants. Re: ECF Nos. 8, 16, 17, 18, 27

12 Before the Court is Defendants Electric Hydrogen Co., Electric Hydrogen Manufacturing 13 LLC, and Raffi Garabedian’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 8, and Plaintiff Pedro N. Ibanez’s 14 motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 16), motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17), 15 motion to compel (ECF No. 18), and motion to appear by telephone (ECF No. 27). The Court will 16 grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and deny Plaintiff’s motions. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Mr. Ibanez filed this case on August 16, 2024, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent 19 Application 18/761,178 (“’178 Application”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The ’178 Application 20 allegedly describes an apparatus for producing “Commercial Power and Commercial Water from 21 oceanwater using Electrolysis, Steam Boilers, Desalination and Distillation” in which the 22 apparatus is powered by “HUNDRED PLUS BIKES TO ROTATE 1000megawatt Dynamo.” 23 Compl. at 3–4. Mr. Ibanez alleges that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 24 § 261, which “protects an inventor’s right to assign his Patent Application, even before [the] 25 patent is granted.” Compl. at 4. Mr. Ibanez further alleges Defendants Electric Hydrogen Co. and 26 Electric Hydrogen Manufacturing have “mechanical facilities” in this district “that closely 27 resemble the mechanical operations that are CLAIMS in Plaintiff’s . . . on-going and abandoned 1 patent applications.” Compl. at 2. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have 2 copied [] Claim One, Claim Two and Claim Three” of the ’178 Application. Id. at 3. The ’178 3 Application is not publicly available and has not issued as a U.S. Patent. 4 On September 25, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 5 matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim 6 under Rule 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 8 (“Mot.”). Mr. Ibanez’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to 7 dismiss was due on October 9, 2024. See N.D. Cal. L.R. 7-3(a). Mr. Ibanez filed an opposition to 8 Defendant’s motion to dismiss on November 1, 2024, along with a motion for preliminary 9 injunction, motion to compel Defendants to hire a qualified patent attorney as primary counsel and 10 a motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 16–18. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A. Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 13 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may challenge the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations in 14 a “facial” attack. A “facial” attack accepts the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but asserts that 15 they “are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 16 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court resolves a facial attack as it would a 17 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), namely by determining whether the allegations are 18 sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction while accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true and 19 drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 20 (9th Cir. 2013). 21 B. Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim 22 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 23 complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 24 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal “is appropriate only where the complaint 25 lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 26 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint 27 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 1 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Factual allegations need not be detailed, but the facts must be “enough 2 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 3 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 4 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 5 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard is not “akin to a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it 6 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 8 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 9 relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 10 In determining whether a plaintiff has met the plausibility requirement, a court must 11 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 12 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Defendants argue that Mr. Ibanez’s claim for patent infringement should be dismissed for 15 two independent reasons. First, Defendants argue that Mr. Ibanez’s failure to allege infringement 16 of an issued patent divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. at 11–12. Second, 17 Defendants argue Mr. Ibanez has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. More 18 specifically, Defendants argue that Mr. Ibanez “does not hold an issued patent and is therefore not 19 a patentee with the ability to seek relief under the Patent Act,” and “the Complaint . . . does not 20 allege patent infringement with the required specificity.” Id. at 13–14. The Court addresses each 21 argument in turn. 22 A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction 23 Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the ’178 24 Application has not issued as a patent, and even if the ’178 Application issued as a patent “during 25 the pendency of this case, it would not retroactively confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 26 Court.” Mot. at 12. Mr. Ibanez does not dispute that the ’178 Application has not issued as a 27 patent and instead argues that a patent application grants an applicant exclusive patent rights under 1 28 U.S.C. § 1338 confers “jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of 2 Congress relating to patents” to district courts. “To demonstrate that a case is one ‘arising under’ 3 federal patent law, ‘the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patents laws.” 4 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988) (“Linguistic consistency 5 . . . demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction likewise extend only to those cases in which a well- 6 pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the 7 plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 8 patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”). 9 Here, Mr. Ibanez has only alleged infringement of a pending patent application, but the 10 law is clear that “the simple act of applying for a patent does not prospectively grant the applicant 11 the full extent of the rights, protections, and privileges of holding a patent—including the right to 12 sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.” Yuksel v. N. Am. Power Tech., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 310, 313 (E.D. Pa. 13 1992); see also GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 479, 482 (Fed. Cir. 14 1996) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s action seeking declaratory judgment 15 that defendant’s not-yet-issued patent was invalid and not infringed, because “[t]he district court 16 did not know with certainty whether a patent would issue or, if so, what legal rights it would 17 confer upon [defendant]” and thus “the dispute was purely hypothetical and called for an 18 impermissible advisory opinion”); Med Five, Inc. v. Keith, No. CV 07-00389 DAE-LEK, 2008 19 WL 4107973, at *4 (D. Haw. Sept. 3, 2008) (“Accordingly, after applying patent law, it is clear 20 that Plaintiffs cannot maintain any patent law cause of action because no patent has issued.”). Mr. 21 Ibanez has not alleged infringement of any issued U.S. patent, and as such, the Court lacks subject 22 matter jurisdiction. 23 B. Mr. Ibanez Fails To State A Claim On Which Relief May Be Granted 24 Defendants argue that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate because Mr. Ibanez 25 “does not allege patent infringement with the required specificity.” Mot. at 14 (“Plaintiff is not 26 alleging that Electric Hydrogen has actually infringed on any issued patent.”). The Court agrees 27 with Defendants. 1 basis,” the complaint must “place the alleged infringer ‘on notice of what activity . . . is being 2 accused of infringement.’” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 3 2021). A “plaintiff cannot assert a plausible claim for infringement under the Iqbal/Twombly 4 standard by reciting the claim elements and merely concluding that the accused product has those 5 elements.” Id. Here, Mr. Ibanez has failed to allege any facts that “articulate why it is plausible 6 that the accused product infringes the patent claim.” Id. Mr. Ibanez’s complaint makes only two 7 brief allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged infringement.1 Neither of these statements set 8 forth factual allegations sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 9 First, Mr. Ibanez alleges that Defendants “have mechanical facilities” in San Carlos and 10 San Jose that “closely resemble the mechanical operations that are CLAIMS in Plaintiff’s . . . on- 11 going and abandoned patent applications.” Compl. at 2. This allegation, however, falls below 12 even a “[t]hreadbare recital[] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1352. 13 Whether or not Defendants’ mechanical facilities “closely resemble the mechanical operations” 14 claimed in the ’178 Application has no bearing on whether Defendants’ mechanical facilities 15 actually infringe the invention described in the ’178 Application. Accepting this allegation as true 16 does not suggest, much less plausibly show, that Defendants have infringed any claim of the ’178 17 Application. 18 Second, Mr. Ibanez alleges that “[t]he actions and events perpetrated by [D]efendants 19 . . . such as building 100megawatt electrolyzer plants in San Carlos and San Jose[,] CA will make 20 it difficult for Plaintiff to convince any investor that [Plaintiff] originated and patented the concept 21 using ELECTROLYSIS AND STEAM BOILERS together to make Hydrogen production cost- 22 effective.” Compl. at 4. This statement, too, fails to set forth a plausible claim for patent 23 infringement. The Patent Act provides relief for patentees when an infringer “makes, uses, offers 24 to sell, or sells” a patented invention during the term of the patent, but this allegation is wholly 25 1 Mr. Ibanez also makes factual allegations regarding statements made by Paul Browning, the 26 CEO of Mitsubishi Power America (“MPA”), but MPA is not a party to this action. Mr. Ibanez does not allege a relationship between Defendants and Mr. Browning or Defendants and MPA, 27 and Mr. Ibanez does not otherwise explain how Mr. Browning’s statements are relevant to 1 irrelevant to Defendants’ alleged infringement of the ’178 Application. Even if Defendants’ 2 || mechanical facilities make it “difficult for [Mr. Ibanez] to convince any investor” that he 3 “originated and patented using [electrolysis] and [steam boilers] together to make Hydrogen 4 || production cost-effective,” that fact has no bearing on whether Defendants have infringed the 5 Application. The Court finds Mr. Ibanez has failed to set forth any factual allegations to permit 6 || the Court to conclude that it is plausible Defendants’ mechanical facilities have infringed any 7 || claim of the °178 Application. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Because the Court 10 || determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not 11 possibly cure the deficiencies identified in this order, dismissal is with prejudice. Sanchez v. Los 12 || Angeles Dep’t of Transportation, 39 F.4th 548, 562 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff's motion for 13 preliminary injunction (ECF No. 16), motion to compel (ECF No. 18), motion for summary 14 || judgment (ECF No. 17), and motion to appear by telephone (ECF No. 27) are denied as moot. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 Dated: December 30, 2024 . .

M | JON S. go 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28