Ian Daugherty v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 13, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-2015
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 13 2020, 12:30 pm

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. O’Connor Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Benjamin J. Shoptaw Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ian Daugherty, February 13, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2015 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Charnette D. Appellee-Plaintiff. Garner, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G09-1903-F6-11442

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Ian Daugherty appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, for escape, a Level 6

felony. We affirm.

Issue [2] The sole issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction.

Facts [3] On March 19, 2019, Daugherty reported to Marion County community

corrections (“MCCC”) to enroll in electronic monitoring. MCCC provided

Daugherty with an “Acknowledgment of Electronic Monitoring Terms and

Conditions” form (“Intake Contract”) that provided: “You must not tamper

with, remove, damage or destroy the electronic monitoring equipment[ ]”; and

“[i]n the event you believe your equipment is malfunctioning, you must contact

the 24-hour Operations Center . . . .” Exhibit Vol. I pp. 13-14.

[4] An undetermined time later, Daugherty cut the monitor off his ankle.

Thereafter, instead of wearing the monitor on his ankle, Daugherty carried it on

his person. On March 22, 2019, Daugherty attended a sporting event with the

electronic monitor in his pocket. During the event, Daugherty experienced

“heart palpitations,” breathing issues, and “pain in [his] heart[.]” Tr. Vol. I p.

18. Daugherty lost consciousness and was transported to Wishard Hospital.

[5] Special Deputy William Robertson (“Officer Robertson”) learned that a

Wishard patient was in possession of a removed community corrections ankle

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 2 of 6 monitor. Officer Robertson went to the patient’s room and requested the

patient’s name. The patient—Daugherty—replied that his name was “Brandon

Anderson.” Id. at 10. Officer Robertson observed a Department of Correction

(“DOC”) identification card on the floor that bore the name, “Ian Daugherty.”

Officer Robertson contacted MCCC, which confirmed that Daugherty was

subject to an electronic monitoring order. MCCC asked Officer Robertson to

arrest Daugherty for escape.

[6] Officer Robertson read the Miranda advisements to Daugherty and asked

whether Daugherty’s name was, in fact, “Ian Daugherty.” Daugherty

“confirmed it was.” Id. at 14. Officer Robertson placed Daugherty under

arrest. Officer Robertson asked why Daugherty removed the ankle monitor.

Daugherty denied doing so and claimed “he had passed out due to being

intoxicated . . . and [ ] somebody [ ] tr[ied] to steal [the ankle monitor] by

cutting it off.” Id. Officer Robertson confirmed that medical personnel did not

cut the ankle monitor off Daugherty’s ankle in the course of treating Daugherty.

[7] On March 25, 2019, the State charged Daugherty with escape, a Level 6 felony.

The trial court conducted a bench trial on July 15, 2019. Officer Robertson

testified to the foregoing facts. Case manager Jalen Reid of MCCC testified

that Daugherty initialed and signed the Intake Contract, which explicitly

prohibited any tampering with the ankle monitor and which also provided

contact information to be used in the event that the ankle monitor

malfunctioned.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 3 of 6 [8] Daugherty testified that: (1) he cut off the ankle monitor because it caused him

“major pain[,]” it “was cutting into [his] ankle and it was bleeding[,]” and he

“could not take another step with that thing on”; (2) he did not notify MCCC of

his problems with the ankle monitor because he “never had an opportunity to

get a telephone”; and (3) he lied to Officer Robertson to avoid being assessed a

replacement fee for the monitor. Id. at 19. Daugherty was convicted as

charged. The trial court sentenced Daugherty to 365 days of work release

through community corrections. Daugherty now appeals.

Analysis [9] Daugherty does not deny that he cut off his ankle monitor. He argues,

however, that he did so out of manifest necessity and that the State failed to

negate his necessity defense. When reviewing whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to negate a defendant’s claim of necessity, we apply the

same standard of review used for all sufficiency of the evidence questions. We

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Belton v.

State, 6 N.E.3d 1043, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we examine only the

evidence most favorable to the State along with all reasonable inferences to be

drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to

sustain the conviction, then it will not be set aside. Id.

[10] To establish a necessity defense, a defendant must show the following:

(1) the act charged as criminal was the result of an emergency and was done to prevent a significant harm;

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 4 of 6 (2) there was no adequate alternative to the commission of the act;

(3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided;

(4) the Defendant had a good-faith belief that his/her act was necessary to prevent greater harm;

(5) the Defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances of the case; and

(6) the Defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency.

Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 377 (Ind. 2015).

[11] Daugherty maintains that he removed the ankle monitor because it caused him

extreme pain, bleeding, impossibility of movement, and scarring. To negate a

claim of necessity, the State must disprove at least one element of the defense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Belton, 6 N.E.3d at 1046. The State may refute a

claim of the defense of necessity by direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the

sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. The decision regarding

whether a claim of necessity has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder.

Id. Where a defendant is convicted despite the claim of necessity, we will

reverse the conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the State

negated the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 5 of 6 [12] Here, the State presented evidence that negated several elements of Daugherty’s

necessity defense, including whether an adequate alternative existed to

Daugherty’s removal of the ankle monitor and whether the removal of the ankle

monitor resulted from an emergency. The record reveals that Daugherty: (1)

was aware of a remedy to address a malfunctioning ankle monitor; (2) failed to

contact MCCC before he cut off the ankle monitor; and (3) had already cut off

the monitor and was carrying it on his person before the March 2019 medical

emergency. The trial court also heard dubious testimony that Daugherty lacked

access to a phone at any time before he cut off the ankle monitor, as well as

testimony that Daugherty lied to Officer Robertson about his identity and the

circumstances surrounding the removal of the monitor.

[13] Considering the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, we find that the

State submitted sufficient evidence to negate Daugherty’s necessity defense

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Belton, 6 N.E.3d at 1046.

Conclusion [14] The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Daugherty’s defense of

necessity. We affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2015 | February 13, 2020 Page 6 of 6