I-D Foods v David Deaver Brown

2014 DNH 219

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 10, 2014
• Docket: 14-cv-269-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

I-D Foods Corporation et al.

v. Case No. 14-cv-269-PB Opinion No. 2014 DNH 219 David Deaver Brown, et al.

O R D E R

I-D Foods Corporation and Fools Gold Investments

Corporation have sued David Deaver Brown, Simply Magazine, Inc.,

and ID Foods USA Corporation. Brown, acting pro se, filed a

motion to dismiss on behalf of all of the defendants contending

that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.

As a preliminary matter, I note that Brown may not

represent the corporate defendants in this action. See Rowland

v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S.

194, 201-02 (1991); In re Victor Publishers, Inc., 545 F.2d 285,

286 (1st Cir. 1976); LR 83.6(c). Accordingly, Brown’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate defendants is

denied without prejudice.

Brown’s arguments for dismissal of the claims against him

are also unpersuasive. I review his personal jurisdiction

arguments under the prima facie standard. See Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)(“the inquiry

is whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if

credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts

essential to personal jurisdiction”). If the allegations in

plaintiffs’ complaint are true, Brown intentionally undertook

action in New Hampshire to violate plaintiffs’ trademark rights.

All of plaintiffs’ claims against Brown stem at least in part

from these allegedly improper actions, and Brown cannot avoid

personal jurisdiction here merely by later engaging in

additional misconduct in a different state. These allegations,

if true, are more than sufficient to establish both that the

claims relate to Brown’s actions in New Hampshire and that he

personally availed himself of the privilege of conducting

business in this state. Brown has also failed to present an

argument to rebut the plaintiffs’ contention that the exercise

of jurisdiction here is reasonable. The court thus has specific

personal jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims against

Brown. See, e.g., Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am. Inc., 591

F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing elements of specific

personal jurisdiction test).

Brown is also not entitled to dismissal on forum non

conveniens grounds because he has not met his burden to show

that “the compendium of factors relevant to the private and

public interests implicated by the case strongly favors dismissal.” Interface Partners Int’l. Ltd. V. Hananel, 575 F.3d

97, 101 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iragorri v. Int’l Elevator,

Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)). A conclusory statement

that Brown would be inconvenienced by having to litigate a claim

here, which is all that Brown supplies, is not sufficient to

warrant the relief he seeks.

The motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 15) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge October 10, 2014

cc: Nicholas Casolaro, Esq. Michael Delaney, Esq. David Deaver Brown, pro se