HydraFacial LLC, formerly known as Edge Systems LLC v. Medicreations, LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00855
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 HYDRAFACIAL LLC, formerly known as Case No. 2:24-cv-00855-MMD-DJA EDGE SYSTEMS LLC, 7 ORDER Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 MEDICREATIONS, LLC, Defendant. 10 11 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Plaintiff HydraFacial, LLC sued Defendant Medicreations, LLC for allegedly 14 infringing patents related to its skincare system. (ECF No. 20 at 14-69.) Before the Court 15 is Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 54 (unsealed), ECF No. 60 16 (sealed) (“Motion”).)1 The Court denies the Motion as Plaintiff’s delay prevents the 17 necessary finding of irreparable harm to entitle Plaintiff to the “extraordinary remedy” of 18 preliminary injunctive relief. 19 II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 20 The Court incorporates the facts recited in the order addressing Defendant’s 21 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 26 at 1-2.) As relevant to this Motion, Plaintiff alleges 22 Defendant’s MediSpa system infringes twelve patents (“Asserted Patents”) related to their 23 HydraFacial Systems product. (ECF No. 20 at 14-69.) The Motion seeks to enjoin all 24 accused products for alleged infringement of the Asserted Patents, but Plaintiff addresses 25 its arguments as to only claim 1 of the ‘052 Patent and claim 22 of the ‘287 Patent. (ECF 26 No. 54 at 6, 10.) The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued the 27 28 1Defendant responded (ECF No. 72) and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 82.) The Court declined to consider the parties’ supplementation. (ECF Nos. 90, 96.) The Court held 2 ‘287 Patent in January 2024. (ECF Nos. 20 at 5; 20-2 at 62-11.) Both the ‘052 and ‘287 3 Patents are set to expire in March 2026. (ECF Nos. 72 at 5; 74-4.)2 4 In October 2020, Plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter to Defendant alleging 5 infringement of multiple patents, including the ‘052 Patent. (ECF No. 20 at 12.) In May 6 2024, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging twelve counts of infringement for each Asserted Patents 7 (ECF No. 1). Defendant moved to dismiss seven of the counts entirely and five counts in 8 part. (ECF No. 22 at 2.) In February 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part 9 Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 26.) In May 2025, Plaintiff filed this 10 Motion. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A preliminary injunction “is a matter of equitable discretion.” Earth Island Inst. v. 13 Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 14 555 U.S. 7, 22, 32 (2008)). It is an “extraordinary remedy” awarded only when the plaintiff 15 makes a “clear showing” they are entitled to the relief. Id. A plaintiff seeking this relief 16 must prove four prongs: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of 17 irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of hardships favors the plaintiff; and (4) that the 18 injunction is in the public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. In the Ninth Circuit, an 19 injunction may issue under a “sliding scale” approach if there are serious questions going 20 to the merits and the balance of equities tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor. All. for the Wild 21 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff, however, must 22 still show a likelihood of irreparable harm and that an injunction is in the public interest. 23 See id. at 1135. The Court finds Plaintiff fails to meet its high burden on the prong of 24 irreparable harm. 25 A preliminary injunction serves to meet an “urgent need for speedy action to protect 26 the plaintiff’s rights.” Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 27

28 2Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this estimated expiration date provided by 2 (S.D.N.Y.1959)). When a plaintiff “sleep[s] on [their] rights,” this undermines the alleged 3 need for speedy action. Id.; see also Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co, 4 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a “long delay before seeking a preliminary 5 injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm”). This delay may “weigh 6 determinatively against a finding of irreparable harm.” Reno-Sparks Indian Colony v. 7 Haaland, 663 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1202 (D. Nev. 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-15780, 8 2024 WL 2317688 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2024) (finding a delay of a year and half between a 9 cease-and-desist letter and filing suit and a two-week post-filing delay in bringing a motion 10 for preliminary injunction prevented finding irreparable harm); see also Russell Rd. Food 11 & Bev., LLC v. Spencer, No. 2:12-CV-01514, 2013 WL 321666, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 12 2013) (“A long delay between discovery of infringement and the preliminary injunction 13 motion may undercut the sense of urgency associated with irreparable injury…. ‘Long’ is 14 somewhere between three months and one year….”) (citations omitted). 15 Here, Plaintiff was aware of the alleged infringement of multiple patents, including 16 the ‘052 Patent at issue in this Motion, by October 2020 at the very latest, since this is 17 when Plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter to Defendant.3 (ECF No. 20-2 at 57-60.) 18 Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until May 2024, approximately three and a half years later. 19 (ECF No. 1.) Moreover, Plaintiff further delayed another full year in bringing this Motion. 20 (ECF No. 54.) 21 Plaintiff claims the pre-filing delay is “irrelevant” because it did not obtain one of 22 the allegedly infringing MediSpa systems until May 2024 for disassembly and 23

24 3The ‘287 Patent was not issued until January 2024. (ECF Nos. 20 at 5; 20-2 at 62-11.) But Plaintiff does not argue the alleged irreparable harm is patent-specific but 25 rather that the harm of lost reputation and customers pertains to general patent infringement of the HydraFacial systems. (ECF No. 72 at 6.) The only time Plaintiff 26 identifies specific patents in its discussion of irreparable harm is to group the ‘052 and ‘287 Patents together as jointly “cover[ing] the primary functionality (hydrodermabrasion) 27 of the HydraFacial Systems.” (ECF No. 54 at 26.) Therefore, the Court relies on this letter for the purposes of assessing delay. But even if Plaintiff argued harm unique to the ‘287 28 Patent (which it does not), Plaintiff still waited fourteen months between issuance of that 2 Plaintiff seems to imply Defendant intentionally obstructed Plaintiff but provides no 3 evidence of this beyond HydraFacial’s failure to obtain the system and Defendant’s 4 general discretion in selling its products. (ECF Nos. 82 at 15; 57-15 at 5-6.). Moreover, 5 Plaintiff relies solely on an affidavit from its Vice President which does not evidence 6 personal knowledge of these facts. (ECF 57-15 at 5-6). Second, as Defendant notes, the 7 device has been continuously available for purchase since February 2019. (ECF No. 72 8 at 6 n.2.). Lastly, Plaintiff was apparently able to determine Defendant was infringing as 9 early as October 2020 without physical access to a MediSpa system for disassembly. 10 (Id.). Of course, as Plaintiff identifies, “[p]reliminary injunctions require more than 11 plausible allegations or assertions in a cease-and-desist letter; they require evidence.” 12 (ECF No. 82 at 15.) But in that case, Plaintiff could have requested expedited proceedings 13 and sought this evidence through the Court. Overall, this claimed reason for Plaintiff’s 14 pre-filing delay is insufficient to overcome the substantial delay in seeking this 15 extraordinary relief. 16 As for the post-filing delay, Plaintiff argues the one-year post-filing delay in bringing 17 this Motion was necessary to litigate the pleadings in this case. (ECF No. 82 at 15.) 18 Plaintiff cites to two cases where courts found plaintiffs’ delay due to ongoing litigation 19 was justifiable and did not prevent a finding of irreparable harm. The Court finds those 20 cases distinguishable. 21 First, Plaintiff cites to Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Lab'ys, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 22 1988). But this case is distinguishable because there the plaintiff was awaiting resolution 23 of litigation against a third party. (ECF No. 82 at 15.) Additionally, the district court in that 24 case found the plaintiff established good cause to seek relief against that third party first. 25 See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457. The mere availability of this argument is not sufficient. 26 See Reno-Sparks Indian Colony v. Haaland, 663 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1202 (D. Nev. 2023), 27 appeal dismissed, No. 23-15780, 2024 WL 2317688 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2024) (rejecting the 28 plaintiffs’ argument that they reasonably delayed filing for preliminary injunction while 2 conclusion it had good cause to wait until resolution of Defendant’s motion to dismiss 3 before bringing this Motion. Importantly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss only sought partial 4 dismissal. (ECF No. 22.) Even if Defendant had been entirely successful, Plaintiff’s claims 5 still would have proceeded, particularly Count I alleging infringement of the ‘052 Patent 6 at issue in this Motion. (Id. at 13, 17.) Accordingly, the reasoning in Hybritech does not 7 justify Plaintiff’s delay. 8 Second, Plaintiff cites to Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 9 No. 14-CV-02061-H-BGS, 2018 WL 9903323 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018), aff'd, 784 F. 10 App'x 786 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Notably, the plaintiff there sought a permanent rather than a 11 preliminary injunction. Id. at *6 n.7 Moreover, that plaintiff waited to bring suit until its own 12 motion for other relief was denied in earlier litigation. Id. at *6. Here, Plaintiff waited until 13 Defendant’s motion to dismiss was litigated before it sought preliminary relief. (ECF No. 14 82 at 16 (citing Defendant’s answer filed upon resolution of Defendant’s motion to 15 dismiss).) If Plaintiff was truly experiencing irreparable harm in that time, it would not be 16 “reasonable” to wait and see if the Court would grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 17 Presidio, 2018 WL 9903323, at *6 n.7. 18 Plaintiff briefly argues that the litigation against other infringers strained its 19 resources and justifiably delayed this Motion, citing to Rosen Entm't Sys, LP v. Icon 20 Enters, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 902 C.D. Cal. 2005). (ECF No. 72 at 15.) In Rosen, the 21 district court summarily concluded that the plaintiffs’ delay in filing was excused due to 22 litigation against five other infringers. See 359 F. Supp. at 910. The court there cited to 23 two cases to support this conclusion: Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 975 24 (Fed.Cir.1996) and Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457. But in Polymer, the plaintiff did not sue 25 other infringers, and the court reasoned this fact may be relevant to analyzing irreparable 26 harm “when it indicates unreasonable delay in bringing suit….” F.3d at 976. The Polymer 27 court concluded that the plaintiff only waited four months between discovery of infringing 28 activities and seeking a preliminary injunction which did not constitute delay preventing a 2 “good cause for seeking relief against” another infringer “first, given its particular situation 3 and financial resources.” Hybritech, 849 at 1457. Plaintiff provides no such evidence 4 here.4 To the extent that strain on resources might be relevant, this is better addressed 5 in the fourth Winter prong of balancing hardships. See 555 U.S. at 20. But irreparable 6 harm must still be established to obtain this extraordinary remedy. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 7 1135. 8 The Court notes that reasonable delay in seeking relief does not undermine a 9 finding of irreparable harm. See id. at *6 n.7; Hybritech, 849 at 1457. For example, a 10 plaintiff that demonstrates “ongoing, worsening injury” where the harm was “enacted over 11 a period of time and having a cumulative impact” and “the magnitude of the potential harm 12 becomes apparent gradually” may evidence “prudent delay” in seeking relief. See Arc of 13 California v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2014). But Plaintiff here does not 14 make any such showing. If Plaintiff had not delayed nearly four and a half years in seeking 15 this relief it “might have avoided” the long-term loss of customers who allegedly will not 16 return to HydraFacial or purchase new equipment for up to a decade. Lydo Enters., Inc. 17 v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1984); (ECF No. 54 at 26). At this 18 point, any irreparable harm has already made its impact and “really what is at stake from 19 a harm perspective here is a marginal increase—perhaps by a large margin—” of harm 20 “that already exist[s].” RISC v. Haaland, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 1188. 21 The Court’s ruling ultimately rests on Plaintiff’s unreasonable pre-filing and post- 22 filing delay preventing a finding of irreparable harm.5 Accordingly, the Court finds it 23 24

25 4Moreover, Defendant points out that Plaintiff’s own evidence confirms it “had ample resources to fund multiple lawsuits simultaneously – and did so.” (ECF No. 72 at 26 6 n.4 (citing ECF No. 57-15 at 3-4, 6).)

27 5The Court’s ruling is not on the basis of laches. (ECF Nos. 54 at 23-24; 72 at 22- 24; 82 at 9-10.) The Court may address this defense on the merits, but here the Court 28 merely finds Plaintiff’s delay prevents finding the necessary element of irreparable harm 1 || unnecessary to address Defendant's argument that Plaintiff fails to offer evidence to 2 || support irreparable harm to its reputation and harm in lost customers. (ECF No. 54 at 25.) 3 In sum, the Court agrees with Defendant that the significant delay pre-filing and 4 || the year’s delay post-filing does not allow the Court to find the claimed harm to be 5 || imminent and irreparable to satisfy the second Winter prong. Accordingly, the Court 6 || declines to exercise its discretion to grant the extraordinary remedy of the broad 7 || preliminary injunctive relief requested in the Motion. 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 10 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 11 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 12 || Motion before the Court. 13 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs Motion (ECF No. 54) is denied. 14 15 DATED THIS 2"¢ Day of October 2025. 16

18 MIRANDA M. DU 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28