Hutzler v. Astrue

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 7, 2025
• Docket: 3:11-cv-05672
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 6

WENDY L. HUTZLER, CASE NO. C11-5672-RSM 7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 8 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER THE 9 v. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(D) 10 COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 11 Defendant. 12

13 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney’s fees and expenses 14 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Dkt. #16. 15 Under EAJA, the Court must award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action such 16 as this unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified” or that special 17 circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA creates a presumption 18 that fees will be awarded to a prevailing party, but Congress did not intend fee shifting to be 19 mandatory. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995); Zapon v. United States Dep’t of 20 Justice, 53 F.3d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term 21 “substantially justified” to mean that a prevailing party is not entitled to recover fees if the 22 government’s position is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. 23 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1992). The decision to deny EAJA attorney’s fees is within the 24 1 discretion of the court. Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). Attorneys’ fees under EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 2 433 (1983). 3 This Motion is timely. Furthermore, upon review of the Motion and the record, the Court 4 determines that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and the Government’s position was not 5 substantially justified. Furthermore, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Attorney Fees on 6 December 30, 2024, only to add that “[t]he Commissioner’s attorney . . . notified [Plaintiff’s 7 attorney] that he has no objection to this motion, so this is now an unopposed motion.” Dkt. #19. 8 Even without this, the Court may consider a party’s failure to file opposition as an admission that 9 the motion has merit. See Local Civil Rule 7(b)(2). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s requested 10 EAJA fees in the amount of $7,152.40 and expenses in the amount of $23.75, a total sum of 11 $7,176.15, are reasonable. 12 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Motion, Dkt. #16, is 13 GRANTED. The Court awards Plaintiff fees in the amount of $7,176.15 to be paid by Defendant, 14 subject to verification that Plaintiff does not have a debt which qualifies for offset against the 15 awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 16 (2010). If Plaintiff has no debt, payment of this award shall be sent to Plaintiff’s attorney, Eitan 17 Kassel Yanich, either by direct deposit or by check payable to him and mailed to his address: Eitan 18 Kassel Yanich, PLLC, 203 Fourth Avenue E., Suite 321, Olympia, WA 98501. 19

20 DATED this 7th day of January, 2024. 21 A 22 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE