Hutchinson, Anderson, Cox & Coons, P. C. v. Cronk

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Hutchinson, Anderson, Cox & Coons, P. C. v. Cronk

992 P.2d 488, 164 Or. App. 532, 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon

DecidedDecember 22, 1999

Docket16-97-06018; CA A103273

StatusPublished

This text of 992 P.2d 488 (Hutchinson, Anderson, Cox & Coons, P. C. v. Cronk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hutchinson, Anderson, Cox & Coons, P. C. v. Cronk, 992 P.2d 488, 164 Or. App. 532, 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff on its action to recover on a promissory note executed by defendant. The trial court entered the judgment after it granted a directed verdict for plaintiff under ORCP 60 at the close of plaintiffs case.¹ In his amended answer, defendant alleges several affirmative defenses, including real party in interest, waiver, laches, partial failure of consideration and complete failure of consideration. Those defenses could present factual issues, including whether the note was intended to secure payment for future legal services. See Thompson v. Dockstader, 131 Or App 254, 884 P2d 586 (1994) (reasoning that whether a note is given as security for an antecedent debt is a question for the factfinder). As a result of the trial court’s ruling, defendant was precluded from attempting to prove his affirmative defenses. ORCP 60 authorizes a motion for a directed verdict “at the close of all the evidence,” or “at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent.” Neither situation occurred here, and, consequently, the trial court erred.² Because of our disposition, we do not reach defendant’s other arguments.

Reversed and remanded.

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PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff on its action to recover on a promissory note executed by defendant. The trial court entered the judgment after it granted a directed verdict for plaintiff under ORCP 60 at the close of plaintiffs case.¹ In his amended answer, defendant alleges several affirmative defenses, including real party in interest, waiver, laches, partial failure of consideration and complete failure of consideration. Those defenses could present factual issues, including whether the note was intended to secure payment for future legal services. See Thompson v. Dockstader, 131 Or App 254, 884 P2d 586 (1994) (reasoning that whether a note is given as security for an antecedent debt is a question for the factfinder). As a result of the trial court’s ruling, defendant was precluded from attempting to prove his affirmative defenses. ORCP 60 authorizes a motion for a directed verdict “at the close of all the evidence,” or “at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent.” Neither situation occurred here, and, consequently, the trial court erred.² Because of our disposition, we do not reach defendant’s other arguments.

Reversed and remanded.

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Bluebook (online)

992 P.2d 488, 164 Or. App. 532, 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hutchinson-anderson-cox-coons-p-c-v-cronk-orctapp-1999.

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