Hutchins v. State

39 N.E. 243, 140 Ind. 78, 1894 Ind. LEXIS 101
Indiana Supreme Court·Decided December 12, 1894·No. No. 17,420·Published·Cited by 19 cases

Opinion

Howard, J.

— The appellant was convicted in the circuit court of the crime of rape.

He assigns as error on this appeal, that the court overruled his motion for a new trial.

Among the reasons urged in favor of the motion was alleged misconduct on the part of the deputy prosecuting attorney and also on the part of one of the jury.

The first charge of misconduct was that the deputy prosecuting attorney, who assisted the State in the prosecution of said cause, after the jury had been charged and sent out by the court in the custody of a sworn bailiff to consult as to their verdict, held a private conversation with one of said jury, Peter B. Wicoff, its foreman, outside of the jury room.

The deputy prosecuting attorney, in a counter-affidavit, said in explanation: “That after the jury were instructed by the court and were on their way to the jury room, he did speak to Peter B. Wicoff, one of the jurors in said cause, and had the following conversation: H am going past your house this evening; do you want to send any word to your folks?’ To which said juror replied: ‘No, I guess not; yes, I do, too: If the folks are at home tell them to feed your horse and give you your supper and keep you over night. ’ That said conversation is the substance of all the conversation had between this affiant and said juror; * * * that affiant knew that said juryman had been absent from his home for several days and that he made the inquiry from said [80]*80juryman as a pure matter of accommodation to said juror and his family and not otherwise, and that in so doing he thoughtlessly and unintentionally violated the instructions of the court, with no desire or intent to be contumacious and not with any intent or purpose to influence or prejudice the jury or any juror against said defendant or his defense.”

If the prosecutor were called before the court to answer for contempt, we think this affidavit might be a sufficient excuse as to willful violation of the order of the court.

We fail, however, to see how it shows that appellant may not have suffered by the indiscretion of the representative of the State. It was undoubtedly intended, as the attorney admits, to do a kindness to the juror and his family. He does not, however, seem to understand that this defense but makes his fault the greater.

Kindness is ordinarily a virtue. But this was neither the time npr the place for manifestations of kindness and good will by the prosecuting attbrney or his deputy, to one of the jurors who were about to decide the fate of a man whom the' State had been during all the trial trying to send to State’s prison. Kindness and sympathy for the juror and his absent family at that hour might well touch the heart of the juror with sentiments of gratitude towards the lawyer, who was also apparently an intimate friend, for the juror asked him to put up at his house for the night. Without intending any wrong, the mind of the juror might well be turned in the direction of his friend’s known wishes; and if his judgment should be poised between the guilt and innocence of the prisoner, might not his heart turn the scale? Granting that no wrong was intended by either prosecutor or juror, yet the offense committed by both against a fair and impartial trial of the man accused of crime was most reprehensible.

[81]*81The alleged misconduct of the prosecutor becomes of greater moment when it appears that the juror in question was appointed foreman, and that 'he was consequently, in all probability, a man of influence in the jury .room.

The other charge of misconduct is against the same juryman. After the jury had retired to consult upon their verdict, and after Peter B. Wicoff had been selected foreman, it appears by affidavit, based on information and belief, that he refused to allow any juryman to express an opinion, or say anything of the law or the evidence in the case, unless the juror so desiring to express his opinion should first arise and address the foreman as chairman, and not until the foreman should first recognize him; and it is claimed that the jury were thereby hindered from having a fair and free opportunity of discussing the merits of the case submitted to them.

This seems to have been an arbitrary mode of procedure. A jury, and each member thereof, should be absolutely free to express their opinions of the case. It occurs often, perhaps generally, that there are men upon the jury of the soundest judgment and good sense, who are yet unfamiliar with rules of debate, and unaccustomed to rise in their places and address the chairman of a meeting in a formal manner, and according to parliamentary rules. Such men might be more or less intimidated by such a rule in the jury room as is here objected to. We can not say that the prisoner may not have suffered by the enforcement of the rule.

Whether a judgment ought to be reversed for the foregoing causes might perhaps depend upon the case as presented in the record. If it appeared clear, beyond all question from the evidence, that the prisoner was guilty as charged, it may be that the misconduct referred to, [82]*82even the gross impropriety of the deputy prosecutor's action, ought not to be considered ground sufficient to set aside a verdict which was just and proper beyond any reasonable doubt.

If, however, ■ it were at all a debatable question whether the prisoner were guilty, we think that a verdict against him should be at once set aside and a new trial granted.

The facts of this case, as we gather from the evidence, are as follows:

A Doctor Chappel and his wife lived alone on a farm near Angola, in Steuben county. On December 14, 1893, the doctor's health failing and his mind having become affected, he was, by his wife, through an arrangement with the county commissioners and the township trustee, placed in the county asylum or poor house, where he was visited frequently by his wife, and cared for more or less by her.

On the Wednesday preceding New Years she went to visit him, and staid until Friday afternoon. The first part of each night she staid with her husband, caring for him, and went to another room for rest during the latter part of the night. The trustee says the doctor was somewhat demented. The superintendent of the asylum says he was dressed part of the time, and would get up at times. He had a separate room to himself, though somewhat exposed, from the hall, to outside observation.

On Friday, which was the 29th of December, John Wentworth, a single man, who lived in a little house about forty rods from the Chappel house, went to Angola at request of Mrs. Chappel, using her team. He had known the doctor in the army, and was employed to get wood for Mrs. Chappel and care for her stock, and do such other work as she needed about the place. On this day he drove home from Angola by way of the asylum [83]*83to bring Mrs. Cbappel home. On the way he overtook the appellant, who seems to have been a friend, or at least an acquaintance, of Mrs. Chappel. On the arrival at the asylum she greeted him, shaking hands and asking him to go in with her to see her husband. She then asked him to go home with them, where it appears he was going when overtaken by Wentworth.

Mrs. Chappel got supper for the two men and herself, after which she went to stay all night with a neighbor, Mrs. Sayles, while the appellant went and staid all night at Wentworth’s house.

On Saturday morning Mrs.

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Hutchins v. State, 39 N.E. 243, 140 Ind. 78, 1894 Ind. LEXIS 101 (Ind. 1894).

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