Huston v. Linscott

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 28, 1998
• Docket: CV-98-152-SD
• Status: Published

Opinion

Huston v. Linscott CV-98-152-SD 09/28/98 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Roland E. Huston, Jr.

v. Civil No. 98-152-SD

Todd Linscott, Chairman, Hudson School Board, Hudson School District; Philip T . McLaughlin, Attorney General, State of New Hampshire

O R D E R

This is a civil rightsaction forinjunctive and declaratory

relief brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. In hiscomplaint,

plaintiff Roland Huston asserts two claims. In Count I, he

alleges deprivation of due process and equal protection of the

laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under a "state

scheme," by which a child of divorced parents with joint legal

and physical custody may attend public school at no charge only

in the district in which the child actually resides. The "state

scheme" to which Mr. Huston refers is authorized by New Hampshire

Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 193:12, I (Supp. 1998), which

states, "no person shall attend school, or send a pupil to the

school, in any district of which the pupil is not a legal

resident, without the consent of the district or of the school

board . . . ," and 193:12, 11(a)(2) (Supp. 1998), which defines the legal residence of a child of divorced parents who share

joint legal custody as "the residence of the parent with whom the

child resides."

In Count II, Mr. Huston alleges that the New Hampshire

Supreme Court's summary affirmance of a superior court's decision

ordering him to pay tuition to Hudson School District deprived

him of due process and equal protection of the laws in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Currently before this court is (1) defendant Todd Linscott's

motion to dismiss, to which plaintiff objects; (2) defendant

Philip McLaughlin's motion to dismiss, to which plaintiff

objects, and (3) plaintiff's motion to join the Governor of New

Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen and the Justices of the New Hampshire

Supreme Court, to which Governor Shaheen and the Justices object.

Background

In 1987, plaintiff Roland Huston was divorced from his wife

and moved from their home in Hudson, New Hampshire, to Nashua,

New Hampshire. As a result of their divorce decree, Mr. Huston

and his wife Colleen share joint physical and legal custody of

their two sons, Corey and Devin. In September 1994, while

attending high school in Hudson, Corey moved in with Mr. Huston

in Nashua. Claiming that Corey continued to divide his time

2 between his two parents, Mr. Huston petitioned the Hillsborough

County Superior Court for a declaratory judgment that Corey was a

resident of the Town of Hudson, thereby entitling him to attend

Hudson's public high school free of charge. Mr. Huston asserted

that he had a fundamental right under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution to send his son to

school in either the Hudson or the Nashua school system. The

superior court (Brennan, J., presiding) found after a bench trial

that for the school years 1994-1995 and 1995-1996, Corey resided

with his father in Nashua and ordered Mr. Huston to pay tuition

to the Hudson School District accordingly.

On July 17, 1997, Roland Huston filed a notice of appeal

with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. On December 2, 1997, the

New Hampshire Supreme Court summarily affirmed the superior

court's decision.

On March 17, 1998, Mr. Huston commenced this action against

Todd Linscott, Chairman of the Hudson School Board, and Philip T.

McLaughlin, Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire,

alleging that both the "state scheme" requiring him to pay for

his son's schooling, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court's

summary affirmance of the superior court's decision deprived him

of due process and equal protection of the laws in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Huston has

3 since moved to implead Jeanne Shaheen, Governor of the State of

New Hampshire, and the Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme

Court.

Discussion

1. Standard of Review

When a court is presented with a motion to dismiss filed

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "its task is necessarily a

limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974). "(A) pro se complaint, 'however inartfully

pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers' and can only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim if it appears '"beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief."'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521

(1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957))).

4 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant Linscott urges this court to dismiss both Counts I

and II,* based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits

federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, from reviewing

state court decisions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v . Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Under this doctrine, lower

federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider claims "inextricably

intertwined" with review of state court judicial proceedings, see

Feldman, supra, 460 U.S. at 483, even if the state court's action

is challenged as unconstitutional. See Schneider v. Cologio de

Abogados de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 1029 (1992). Claims are inextricably

intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that

the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. See

Pennzoil Co. v. Texas, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987).

*The court notes that the motion to dismiss is filed by "Defendants Todd Linscott, Hudson School Board, and Hudson School District." The caption of the complaint is unclear as to the number of entities plaintiff intended to name as defendants. Defendants' counsel interpreted plaintiff's intention was to name three separate school-related defendants, which he refers to in the body of the complaint as "Hudson," while the court, noting that service was made only upon Todd Linscott and Philip T. McLaughlin, considers Linscott to be the only properly named school-related defendant. The outcome of this order renders further differentiation unnecessary. 5 In his objection to defendant's motion, Mr. Huston clarifies

that he is not seeking to overturn the ruling of the state court;

rather, he is challenging the constitutionality of the "state

scheme" authorized by RSA 193:12 and of the procedural rule

enabling the New Hampshire Supreme Court to summarily affirm the

lower court's decision. Thus plaintiff argues his claims are not

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and this court indeed has

jurisdiction.

Mr. Huston is partially correct. The distinction between a

challenge to a state court judgment and to the validity of a

statute or rule is critically important for Rooker-Feldman

purposes. In Feldman, the United States Supreme Court was asked

to decide whether the federal district court had jurisdiction to

review a decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

denying respondents' request that the court waive a bar admission

rule requiring applicants to have graduated from an approved law

school. The Court stated that

United States district courts . . . have subject- matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings . . . .

6 Feldman, supra, 460 U.S. at 486. To the extent that Mr. Huston

is challenging the constitutionality of the New Hampshire

statute, not the state court decision requiring him to pay

tuition. Count I is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Count II, however, does not properly invoke this court's

subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Huston argues that the state

court judgment was issued in violation of due process and equal

protection of the laws, asserting that he "could hardly be heard

in the appeals process without reference to the transcript of the

trial, which the Supreme Court would not requisition, yet decided

the appeal on the merits, without--ipso facto--reviewing at all

what they were purporting to decide on the merits." Plaintiff's

Objection to Defendant Linscott's Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, 5 9.

By claiming that the New Hampshire Supreme Court's use of summary

disposition violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Huston seeks

to have this court review the specifics of the state proceeding

on constitutional grounds and declare it erroneous. Review of

this kind is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The

use of summary disposition is "inextricably intertwined" with the

Supreme Court's judgment in that proceeding; as a result, this

court lacks jurisdiction to hear the challenge.

Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Huston was not challenging

the state court's ruling itself, but rather was mounting a

7 general challenge to Rule 25 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court

Rules, which allows for the court's use of summary disposition,

this court would lack jurisdiction on the ground of standing.

Article III of the Constitution requires the party invoking the

court's authority to show that he or she personally has suffered

an injury-in-fact; that is, an actual or threatened injury as a

result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Thus, for a

plaintiff to have standing, there must exist more than the mere

possibility of future injury. Here, unless the New Hampshire

Supreme Court's judgment is upset, Mr. Huston's only interest in

the state court procedure is, at best, prospective and

hypothetical. Thus, if he is not seeking a modification or

vacation of the judgment against him, Mr. Huston lacks standing,

for he does not have sufficient interest in the future

application of the rules to establish a case or controversy as

required by the Constitution. U.S. C o n s t ., art. Ill, § 2. See

Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991.)

For the abovementioned reasons, this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to hear Count II of Mr. Huston's complaint.

The proper venue for a party seeking review of a final state

court judgment is to petition the United States Supreme Court for

certiorari.

8 3. Collateral Estoppel

Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Mr. Huston

from asserting a facial constitutional challenge to the New

Hampshire statute, he is nevertheless barred by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. A fundamental precept of common-law

adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral

estoppel and res judicata, "is that a right, question or fact

distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of

competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent

suit between the same parties or their privies . . . ." Southern

Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897). Under

the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment in a prior suit

generally precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and

necessary to the outcome of the first action. See Parklane

Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).

Although courts have been reluctant in civil rights cases to

collaterally estop constitutional claims which might have been,

but were not, litigated in an earlier state court action, see

Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631, 635-7 (2d Cir. 1974),

cert, denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975), where a constitutional issue

has actually been raised in state court and was necessary to the

court's decision, regardless of a lack of analysis, it may not

be relitigated in a section 1983 action. See Dieffenbach v.

9 Attorney General of Vermont, 604 F.2d 187, 198 (2d Cir. 1979);

Ornstein v. Regan, 574 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1978). In his

state court proceeding, Mr. Huston indeed raised equal protection

and due process challenges to the New Hampshire statute defining

the residence of a child of divorced parents as the residence of

the parent with whom the child actually resides. Although the

state courts did not specifically analyze Mr. Huston's

constitutional challenges, the courts by implication ruled on

them in concluding that Corey was a resident of Nashua and in

ordering Mr. Huston to pay tuition to the Hudson School District.

These facts are sufficient to trigger the collateral estoppel

bar, thereby precluding relitigation of the constitutional claims

before this court.

Lastly, Mr. Huston alleges that the state supreme court's

summary affirmance of the lower court's decision denied him a

"full and fair opportunity to litigate," and thus collateral

estoppel should not apply. See Montana v. United States, 440

U.S. 147, 153 (1979). As stated above, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes Mr. Huston's constitutional challenge to the

state court procedure. Moreover, the use of summary disposition

in civil cases is standard in both New Hampshire and federal

courts. In its summary affirmance order, the New Hampshire

Supreme Court indicated that it reviewed the plaintiff's appeal

10 and appendix before ruling that it did not disagree with the

lower court's decision. The claim, therefore, is without merit,

and this court has no basis to decline to employ the collateral

estoppel bar.

4. Plaintiff's Motion to Join Governor and Supreme Court of New

Hampshire

Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to include claims

against New Hampshire's governor and supreme court justices.

Huston's complaint against these defendants stands on the same

footing as his original complaint, thus the amendment would be

futile. See Maldonado v. Donninquez, 137 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.

1998) (leave to amend denied where amendment would be futile).

It does not make a difference that the Attorney General,

Governor Shaheen, and the Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme

Court were not parties to the previous case. The United States

Supreme Court has reaffirmed the benefits of collateral estoppel

by eliminating the requirement of mutuality; thus, as long as

issues raised in the second case were litigated and resolved in

the first, a stranger to a prior litigation may benefit from

collateral estoppel in the subsequent action. See Blonder-

Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 111. Found., 402 U.S.

313, 329 (1971). Here, Mr. Huston raised the constitutionality

11 of the New Hampshire statute in his state court proceeding; the

state courts ruled against him. Thus Mr. Huston is barred from

relitigating the issue, not only against the Hudson School

District, but also against those who were not parties to the

previous case.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Todd Linscott's motion

to dismiss (document 6) is granted; defendant Attorney General

Philip McLaughlin's motion to dismiss (document 3) is granted;

plaintiff Roland Huston's motion to implead Governor Jeanne

Shaheen and the Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court

(document 10) is denied. The clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Shane Devine, Senior Judge United States District Court

September 28, 1998

cc: Roland E. Huston, Jr., pro se Diane M. Gorrow, Esq. Suzan M. Lehmann, Esq.