Hussey v. City of Las Vegas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25-1254
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT HUSSEY, No. 25-1254 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-01295-JCM-NJK v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF LAS VEGAS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 6, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Robert Hussey challenges the adverse grant of summary judgment to his

longtime employer, the City of Las Vegas, on his retaliation and hostile work

environment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, reviewing de novo the decision to

grant summary judgment, see Zetwick v. County of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir.

2017), we affirm.

To establish retaliation under the ADEA, Hussey is required to show that “(1)

[he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action,

and (3) there was a causal link between [his] protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2007).

Even assuming that Hussey’s complaints to Human Resources (HR) and his

discussion with LuAnn Holmes constituted protected activity, Hussey failed to put

forth any evidence establishing a causal connection between that activity and the

allegedly adverse employment action he faced from his supervisor, Lance

Covington. Indeed, the adverse conduct that Hussey specifically identified in his

complaint, interrogatory responses, and deposition pre-dated his HR complaints.

And Hussey produces no evidence that Covington was aware of Hussey’s

conversation with Holmes or that Covington engaged in conduct rising to the level

of adverse employment action after that conversation. See Kortan v. Cal. Youth

Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (evidence supervisor “was less civil,

stared at [plaintiff] in a hostile fashion, and became more critical of [plaintiff’s]

performance” insufficient to show adverse employment action).

2 25-1254 Hussey similarly failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact regarding his

hostile work environment claim. Hussey identified only one specific age-related

comment and alluded to ten other comments about which he could not recall the

details. It was thus permissible to conclude that the identified conduct was not

“severe [or] pervasive enough to alter the conditions of [Hussey’s] employment.”

Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (evidence of two

regrettable incidents over a two-year period as well as several offhand comments

insufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter employment); accord Surrell v. Cal.

Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence supervisor

confronted plaintiff about job performance in front of a customer, criticized her job

performance, and commented on a few occasions she was working too slowly

similarly insufficient).

AFFIRMED.

3 25-1254