Hussain v. Baker

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3075
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAMKIN HUSSAIN,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 3075 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan NATALIE A. BAKER, Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In June 2021, Pakistani citizen Tamkin Hussain filed an application for an EB-2 visa, which

provides a path to permanent residence for highly skilled foreign professionals. The U.S. Embassy

in Pakistan interviewed Dr. Hussain in 2024, and then placed her application in administrative

processing. Since then, the Department of State has taken no further action on Dr. Hussain’s

application. Dr. Hussain sued Natalie A. Baker, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan,

and Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, seeking an order to compel them to adjudicate her visa

application. The Defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although the Court is aware of the systemic delays in our immigration

system and sympathetic to Dr. Hussain’s frustrations, it cannot grant the relief that she seeks.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Dr. Hussain is a citizen of Pakistan. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1. She previously spent time in

the United States while completing her Ph.D. program. Compl. ¶ 4. On June 2, 2021, Dr. Hussain submitted all the necessary paperwork to apply for an EB-2 visa, which “is available to noncitizens

with ‘advanced degrees’ or ‘exceptional ability.’” Masroor v. Noem, No. 25-cv-256, 2025 WL

2439176, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A)); Compl. ¶¶ 2, 18, 20.

In 2024, Dr. Hussain completed an interview for her visa at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Compl.

¶ 21. Following that interview, Dr. Hussain’s application was placed in “administrative

processing,” where it has since remained. Id. ¶ 22.

In September 2025, Dr. Hussain sued the Secretary of State and Chargé d’Affaires at the

U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Id. She alleges that the Defendants have unreasonably delayed

adjudicating her visa application, and she seeks a writ of mandamus and relief under the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. ¶ 11. In January 2026, the Defendants moved to dismiss

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5. That

motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 7; Reply, ECF No. 9.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts ‘must construe the complaint in

favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from

the facts alleged.’” Sadiq v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-2448, 2026 WL 913084, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2026)

(quoting Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). “But courts need not

accept as true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ nor an inference unsupported

by the facts set forth in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir.

2006)).

2 DISCUSSION

The Defendants make several arguments in support of dismissal, including that they have

no duty to take further action on Dr. Hussain’s visa application and that her claims are barred under

the doctrine of consular non-reviewability. Mot. Dismiss 1. “The Court has previously addressed

and rejected identical arguments in similar cases.” Sadiq, 2026 WL 913084, at *2 (first citing

Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL 2418402, at *7–11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); and then

citing Motevali v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-1029, 2025 WL 885116, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025)). But

here, “the Court need not address these arguments because, even assuming that [Dr. Hussain]

prevails on those issues, [her] claims ultimately fail.” Id.; see Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S.

899, 908 n.4 (2024) (“[T]he doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not jurisdictional[.]”);

Sereshti v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1288, 2024 WL 4625802, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2024) (assuming

without deciding the existence of a nondiscretionary duty and collecting cases).

“The standards for reviewing agency inaction—including visa processing delays—are the

same under the APA and Mandamus Act, so the Court will address both claims together.”

Doroodchi v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-3170, 2025 WL 1865114, at *2 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025).

“Unreasonable delay is measured by six factors,” known as the “TRAC factors.” Motevali, 2025

WL 885116, at *6; see Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d

70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The factors are:

1. the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; 2. where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; 3. delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; 4. the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority;

3 5. the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and 6. the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind the agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *6 (quoting Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL

6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2023)). “[C]ourts applying the TRAC factors at the

motion-to-dismiss stage apply them ‘not to determine whether there has been an unreasonable

delay, but to determine if a plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim

for unreasonable administrative delay.’” Id. (quoting Giza v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1641, 2024 WL

3967284, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024)). Here, Dr. Hussain’s Complaint does not sufficiently

allege a claim of unreasonable delay.

1. TRAC Factors One & Two

The first TRAC factor “asks whether the [agency’s] response time is governed by a ‘rule of

reason’” and “is widely understood to be the ‘most important’ aspect of the analysis.’” Id. at *7

(quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). “The second factor

‘gives content to the first’: ‘where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the

speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme

may supply content for this rule of reason.’” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *12 (first quoting In re

United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999); and then quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Neither Party has identified a mandatory timeline for visa adjudication. In

such cases, “courts in this District ‘typically turn to case law as a guide’” to determine whether a

delay is unreasonable. Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *7 (quoting Niyomwungere v. Blinken, No.

24-cv-1990, 2024 WL 5075827, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024)).

“Courts in this District label delays ‘between three to five years’ as reasonable.” Id.

(quoting Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2024)). And “[u]nder this District’s

4 prevailing approach, ‘the proper method for calculating delay is the length of time between the last

action the government took on a visa application and the filing of plaintiff’s complaint.’” Sadiq,

2026 WL 913084, at *3 (cleaned up) (quoting Isse v. Whitman, No. 22-cv-3114, 2023 WL

4174357, at *6 n.4 (D.D.C. June 26, 2023)). Although Dr. Hussain alleges that she filed her EB-2

application in 2021, Compl. ¶ 18, the Court must calculate her delay based on the government’s

last action, which was an interview at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan on August 27, 2024, Compl.

¶ 21. So Dr. Hussain’s delay totals just over one year between August 2024 and when Dr. Hussain

filed her Complaint in September 2025. Because this delay does not exceed what courts in this

District recognize as reasonable, the first and second TRAC factors weigh in the Defendants’ favor.

2. TRAC Factor Four

“The fourth factor addresses the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of

a higher or competing priority.” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “This factor ‘strongly disfavors’ plaintiffs whose request is akin to cutting the

line of applications ahead of them, which would ‘disrupt competing agency priorities with no

overall improvement in the [agency’s] backlog.’” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *8 (quoting Da

Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). According to the

Defendants, this is such a queue-jumping scenario. Mot. Dismiss 17. Dr. Hussain responds that

the Defendants have not provided any evidence about how they order their priorities or whether

they use a queue to complete administrative processing. Compl. ¶ 52. “But at the

motion-to-dismiss stage, the focus is on the ‘factual matter’ alleged in the Complaint.” Sadiq, 2026

WL 913084, at *4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Dr. Hussain’s suggestion that the Defendants

do not use a queue or other formal ordering system is “‘entirely speculative’ because [her]

Complaint ‘pleaded no facts to support it.’” Id. (quoting Niyomwungere, 2024 WL 5075827, at *5).

5 “In similar cases—i.e., challenges to visa-application delays in which the complaint is silent about

the effect of relief on other visa applicants—courts have held that this factor favors defendants.”

Id. (collecting cases). The same is true here.

3. TRAC Factors Three & Five

TRAC factors three and five “focus on the interests affected by agency delay.” Afghan and

Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2024). They “examine ‘the nature and extent

of the interests prejudiced by the delay,’ including whether ‘human health and welfare’ might be

implicated.” Isse, 2023 WL 4174357, at *7 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Dr. Hussain reports

that she has suffered emotionally, professionally, and financially because of the delay in

adjudicating her visa. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. Multiple employers have told her that she is not an eligible

candidate due to her lack of a visa. Id. ¶ 5. As a result, Dr. Hussain has not been able to achieve

financial independence and has suffered considerable stress and anxiety. Id. ¶ 5–7. The Court takes

these injuries seriously. TRAC factors three and five thus tip slightly in Dr. Hussain’s favor. See

Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (finding

that professional and financial harms “at least arguably tilt in Plaintiffs’ favor”); Ahmadi v.

Scharpf, No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024) (finding that TRAC

factors three and five weigh in the plaintiffs’ favor because a visa delay caused them to suffer

anxiety in addition to financial, professional, and personal harms).

4. TRAC Factor Six

Lastly, “TRAC factor six asks the court to consider ‘whether there is any impropriety

lurking behind agency lassitude.’” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *8 (quoting Da Costa., 80 F.4th

at 345). As Dr. Hussain has not alleged impropriety, “this factor is neutral.” Id.

6 * * *

The Court recognizes Dr. Hussain’s frustration with “the well-documented delays in our

visa-adjudication system.” Sadiq, 2026 WL 913084, at *4. But here, the facts alleged in her

Complaint are insufficient to state a claim for unreasonable delay. The Court must grant the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. A

separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: June 24, 2026