Hussain Mosharof v. U.S. Attorney General

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMay 28, 2019
Docket18-12447
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hussain Mosharof v. U.S. Attorney General (Hussain Mosharof v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hussain Mosharof v. U.S. Attorney General, (11th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

Case: 18-12447 Date Filed: 05/28/2019 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 18-12447 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

Agency No. A206-366-254

HUSSAIN MOSHAROF, a.k.a. Mosharof Hussain,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________

(May 28, 2019)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12447 Date Filed: 05/28/2019 Page: 2 of 7

Mosharof Hossain,1 a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of the

BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. He contends that the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) abused its discretion by not granting his motion because it (1)

failed to properly analyze the record and mischaracterized the evidence based on a

prior adverse credibility finding, (2) improperly gave affidavits in support of his

motion minimal weight, (3) required to him to meet a higher burden of proof by

requiring him to show that the conditions in Bangladesh had “significantly

worsened,” and (4) abused its discretion by not finding that he was eligible for

withholding of removal and CAT relief based on the newly submitted evidence.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2006). Our review “is limited

to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and

whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (citation and

quotation marks omitted). “Generally, [m]otions to reopen are disfavored,

especially in a removal proceedings, where, as a general matter, every delay works

to the advantage of the [removable] alien who wishes merely to remain in the

United States.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1 The caption for this case and many documents in the administrative record spell Hossain’s last name “Hussain.” However, Hossain filed a motion with the IJ to correct the spelling and order of his name, which indicated that the correct spelling of his last name was “Hossain.” Accordingly, we use Hossain. 2 Case: 18-12447 Date Filed: 05/28/2019 Page: 3 of 7

We are required to “inquire into our subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”

Gaksakuman v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 767 F.3d 1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). A petition

to review a removal order must be made within 30 days after the date of the final

order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). We have held that we lack jurisdiction to

review earlier trips through immigration proceedings. Bing Quan Lin v. U.S.

Attorney General, 881 F.3d 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2018). In Gaksakuman, we held

that we lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of a removal order because,

although the petitioner filed a petition to review that order, the petition was

subsequently dismissed and the 30-day window to file a petition for review had

passed. 767 F.3d at 1168-69.

A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing

to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material.” INA § 240(c)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B);

Verano-Velasco v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 2006). Motions

to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not

available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). To make such a showing, the alien “bears a heavy

burden, and must present evidence of such a nature that the BIA is satisfied that if

proceedings before the IJ were reopened, with all attendant delays, the new

evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.” Ali, 443 F.3d at 813

3 Case: 18-12447 Date Filed: 05/28/2019 Page: 4 of 7

(quotation omitted). The BIA may deny a motion to reopen, if the alien fails to

establish a prima facie case. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1302 (11th Cir.

2001).

To be eligible for withholding of removal under the INA, an alien must

show that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [the country of removal]

because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).

The alien has the burden of proof, and must show that he or she would more

likely than not be persecuted if returned to the country of removal. Id.;

D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2004). The alien

must also show that the persecution will be “because of” one of the five protected

grounds. Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 2004); See also

INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (noting, in asylum context, that

applicant must establish that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central

reason for persecuting the applicant”). Evidence of private violence, or that a

person would be the victim of criminal activity, “does not constitute evidence of

persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground.” Cendejas Rodriguez v.

U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013).

A “particular social group” denotes a group of persons “who share a

common immutable characteristic that the members of the group either cannot

4 Case: 18-12447 Date Filed: 05/28/2019 Page: 5 of 7

change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their

individual identities or consciences,” and such group cannot be “too numerous or

inchoate.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). An applicant must show either that he or

she would be singled out for persecution, or that there is a pattern or practice of

persecuting a group of similarly situated persons on account of a protected ground

and that the applicant is so identified with that group that it is more likely than not

that his life or freedom would be threatened if he or she returned. 8 C.F.R. §

208.16(b)(2)(i), (ii).

To be eligible for CAT relief, the applicant must “establish that it is more

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country

of removal.” Id. § 208.16(c)(2). “Torture” is defined as

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Related

Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney General
392 F.3d 434 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Ishmail A. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
388 F.3d 814 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Mohammed Salim Ali v. U.S. Atty. General
443 F.3d 804 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Clara Aurora Verano-Velasco v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
456 F.3d 1372 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Jose Cendejas Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General
735 F.3d 1302 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
Salipan Gaksakuman v. U.S. Attorney General
767 F.3d 1164 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Attorney General
881 F.3d 860 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)

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