Hurtado Perez v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-808
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LISSETH ANDREA HURTADO PEREZ, No. 25-808 Agency No. Petitioner, A201-418-103 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: HIGGINSON, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.***

Lisseth Andrea Hurtado-Perez (“Hurtado-Perez”), a native and citizen of El

Salvador, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, sitting by designation. dismissing her appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”) protection. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hurtado-

Perez failed to raise a cognizable particular social group (“PSG”). To be

cognizable, a PSG must be “(1) composed of members who share a common

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct

within the society in question.” Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA

2014)). “Where, as here, the Board incorporates the IJ’s decision into its own

without citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), this court will

review the IJ’s decision to the extent incorporated.” Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771

F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de

novo and “both [its] underlying factual findings and [its] application of the INA to

those findings” for substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845,

851 (2026).

The record does not compel the conclusion that any of Hurtado-Perez’s

proposed PSGs are recognized by Salvadoran society. Social distinction requires

“evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes

2 25-808 persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.” Villegas Sanchez v.

Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I.

& N. Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014)). Here, the record contains no evidence that

Salvadoran society viewed Hurtado-Perez’s PSGs as distinct.1

Hurtado-Perez relies on Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.

2013) (en banc), to argue that she is particularly vulnerable because she witnessed

criminals or security forces murder members of her family. But unlike the

petitioner in Henriquez-Rivas, Hurtado-Perez did not publicly testify against

anyone in criminal proceedings. 707 F.3d at 1092 (noting the petitioner made his

“social visibility” apparent by publicly testifying against gang members in

court). Nor did she report the perpetrators’ identities to the police. She also

presents no evidence that Salvadoran law or society recognizes individuals who

merely witness crimes as a distinct group. Cf. id. (noting El Salvador enacted a

witness protection law for those “who testify against violent criminal elements”);

see also Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243–44 (rejecting a PSG where the

1 In the proceedings before the IJ and BIA, Hurtado-Perez proposed the PSGs of “Salvadorans who witnessed criminal activity” and “family members of a crime victim.” In her opening brief before this court, however, she reframes those groups as “witness[es] to a crime from alleged police officers” and “immediate family members of a crime victim of alleged Salvadoran police.” To the extent that Hurtado-Perez seeks to advance a new PSG not presented to the IJ or the BIA, those issues were not exhausted. See Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020).

3 25-808 petitioner presented no evidence that Guatemalan society recognizes those who

report gang activity to police as a distinct group, including no evidence of a

Guatemalan law or program protecting those who report).

Further, while “the family remains the quintessential particular social

group,” Hermosillo v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2018)), the record does not compel

the conclusion that family members of crime victims are perceived as “set apart, or

distinct, from other persons within [Salvadoran] society . . . .” Diaz-Reynoso v.

Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &

N. Dec. at 238). Because social distinction is dispositive to Hurtado-Perez’s PSG

determination, the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal is

supported by substantial evidence. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3

(9th Cir. 2016).2

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hurtado-

Perez failed to establish eligibility for CAT protection. She did not demonstrate

that she would more likely than not be tortured in El Salvador by, or with the

consent or acquiescence of, a public official. First, Hurtado-Perez’s speculation

2 Because the lack of social distinction is dispositive to Hurtado-Perez’s eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, we do not address her other arguments regarding those claims. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

4 25-808 that the men involved in the murders were soldiers does not compel a finding that

she is entitled to CAT relief. As the IJ and BIA explained, the record contains

insufficient evidence that the assailants were soldiers or other state actors. Second,

although the country conditions report details widespread impunity and human

rights abuses committed by both government authorities and criminal

organizations, the report also describes efforts by the military and National Police

to address crime. The police also visited the crime scene and told Hurtado-Perez

that they intended to gather evidence, although the record does not reveal the

outcome of these efforts. We have repeatedly held that “a general ineffectiveness

on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show

acquiescence.” Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). Nor

does government “acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely because it is aware

of torture but powerless to stop it.” Colin-Villavicencio v. Garland, 108 F.4th

1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034

(9th Cir. 2014)). The record thus does not compel the conclusion that Hurtado-

Perez is likely to be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a Salvadoran

official.

PETITION DENIED.3

3 The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. 2, is denied.

5 25-808