Hurst v. Wallace Construction Co.

603 So. 2d 985, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 766, 1992 WL 187173
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedAugust 7, 1992
Docket1901930
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 603 So. 2d 985 (Hurst v. Wallace Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hurst v. Wallace Construction Co., 603 So. 2d 985, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 766, 1992 WL 187173 (Ala. 1992).

Opinion

ALMON, Justice.

William B. Hurst filed this personal injury action, alleging that Wallace Construction Company, Inc. (“Wallace Construction”), had negligently inspected his workplace and that, as a result, he sustained severe injuries to his back. His wife joined the action, claiming loss of consortium; we will not discuss her claim separately, because it is derivative. Wallace Construction filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, as a general contractor, it had not undertaken a duty to inspect the equipment of an independent subcontractor’s employee. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Wallace Construction.

To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party has [986]*986the opportunity to defeat the motion by producing substantial evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved. West v. Founders Life Assur. Co., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). “In determining whether there is substantial evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion, this Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolves all reasonable doubts against the movant.” Specialty Container Mfg., Inc. v. Rusken Packaging, Inc., 572 So.2d 403, 404 (Ala.1990).

Hurst was working as an electrician in the construction of a shopping center. His employer, AAA Electric Company, Inc. (“AAA”), was an independent subcontractor. The general contractor was Wallace Construction. The contract required the subcontractor to provide all the materials, labor, and equipment required to complete the subcontractor’s part of the work.

On the day of the accident, Hurst’s supervisor, Jerry Thornell, ordered him to install electrical mechanical tubing in certain areas of the construction project. Thornell was also an employee of AAA, not of Wallace Construction. Hurst followed Thornell’s order and began installing the tubing. The installation of the tubing required him to work from a scaffold. The record does not indicate who owned the scaffold or who assembled it, but Thornell told Hurst that the scaffold was already set up. He worked all morning and continued after his lunch break.

After his lunch, he climbed on the scaffold and continued to install the tubing. The scaffold collapsed and Hurst fell approximately 12 to 15 feet onto the concrete floor, suffering injuries to his back. Hurst alleges that the scaffold collapsed because it had been improperly assembled. He testified that, after his fall, he saw that portions of the scaffold had been assembled with wire rather than with metal pins or bolts. Furthermore, he testified that, after his fall, some of his co-employees of AAA reassembled the scaffold, using wire instead of pins at some of the junctions. Since his fall and resulting injury, Hurst has undergone two surgeries and has experienced pain and discomfort.

In his complaint, Hurst alleged that Wallace Construction was liable for his injuries because, he claimed, Wallace Construction had negligently inspected the site of the construction project for safety hazards. To recover under this theory, Hurst must prove that Wallace Construction “had (1) undertaken to inspect the construction site, particularly the area in which the injury-causing hazard [was] located, (2) performed such inspection negligently, and (3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.” Hughes v. Hughes, 367 So.2d 1384, 1387 (Ala.1979). In support of its motion for summary judgment, Wallace Construction presented evidence that the contract gave it the right, but did not impose a duty, to inspect for safety, as well as evidence that it had not undertaken a duty to inspect for safety.

Attempting to show that Wallace Construction had undertaken a duty to inspect for safety, Hurst submitted the testimony of Wallace Construction’s field superintendent, Joseph Wheeler, including the following:

“Q. Tell me again what you would be doing when you would be out in the field walking around the project. What kind of work would you be doing?
“A. Just checking to see if each sub is doing what they need to be doing in order for another sub to come in behind them and coordinate the work in the order that it should be done.
“Q. Was part of your job in walking around the project supervising to check for safety violations?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you do that on this project?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you also check each individual work area, subcontractor’s work area, for safety violations?
“A. Well, I’m looking at the job as a whole.
[987]*987“Q. You check the whole job site?
“A. Yes, sir. I made four or five trips a day walking over the job site.
“Q. What kind of safety violations would you be looking for?
“A. The biggest thing would be nails sticking up in boards where they have been wrecked from forms.
“Q. Did you ever check any of the scaffolding that had been assembled by the subcontractors?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Did you consider that part of your job, to check the scaffolding?
“A. Not for the subcontractors. I would if I had had some of my own.
“Q. You didn’t feel that it was your responsibility to make sure that the scaffolding that the subs put up was safe for the workmen?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You were just primarily interested in looking after the employees of Wallace Construction Company?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You were not concerned about—
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. —employees of the subs?
“A. Yes, sir, I was concerned about them. If I had come by a scaffold that jumped out at me that wasn’t safe, I would have said something rather than have somebody hurt.
“Q. If you would have actually noticed it, you would have said something?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. But you didn’t look for anything? In other words, you were not inspecting for dangerous scaffolding?
“A. No, sir.
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“Q. As part of the safety program, were you inspecting a job site on behalf of the employees of Wallace Construction Company?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And were you also inspecting the job site on behalf of the employees of the subcontractors?
“A. Can you rephrase that?

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Related

Stovall v. Universal Const. Co., Inc.
893 So. 2d 1090 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 2004)
Wheeler v. Wright
668 So. 2d 779 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
603 So. 2d 985, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 766, 1992 WL 187173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hurst-v-wallace-construction-co-ala-1992.