Hurrelbrink v. State

46 S.W.3d 350, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195, 2001 WL 324726
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 4, 2001
Docket07-99-0376-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 46 S.W.3d 350 (Hurrelbrink v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hurrelbrink v. State, 46 S.W.3d 350, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195, 2001 WL 324726 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

BOYD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Fredrick John Hurrelbrink challenges his conviction of murder and the court-assessed punishment of 99 years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice. In one issue, he alleges that the trial court erred in allowing expert evidence regarding footprint comparison and analysis. Disagreeing that reversal is required, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The victim, Curtis Drake, was found dead in his home on July 7, 1991, from stab wounds. He also suffered blunt force wounds from a pipe. The victim had been engaged in a custody dispute with his former wife, Barbara Drake, who was having a sexual relationship with appellant. A small curved knife found at the scene of the crime was identified as similar to one *352 owned by appellant, and appellant had been heard to say that if Curtis gave Barbara “a hard time or messed with her,” appellant would kill him. Appellant also told Barbara to tell her grown daughter that he had killed Curtis, allegedly for the purpose of scaring her. Additionally, a witness described a man seen running away from the crime scene as wearing clothes similar to some later taken from appellant’s home, and he also picked appellant out of a lineup as similar in appearance to the person he saw fleeing the scene. However, there was no eyewitness identification made of appellant at trial.

A bloody sock footprint was found at the crime scene which the State purported to tie to appellant through the testimony of two anthropologists as to footprint comparison and analysis. Appellant contends that the testimony of those two anthropologists should not have been permitted at trial because that testimony failed to meet the admissibility requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Appellant posits that the testimony was not grounded in a valid underlying scientific theory, there was no consistent technique used in applying the theory, and there was no proof that the technique was properly applied by the experts who testified at trial. He further argues that this was the only evidence to tie him to the offense and, because the State’s case would have faked without it, the admission of that testimony constitutes reversible error.

Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

This rule requires scientific evidence to be reliable and relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. To be reliable, three criteria must be met: (1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. All three criteria must be proven to the trial court outside the presence of the jury before the evidence is admitted. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. Factors that could affect a trial court’s determination of reliability include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the expert testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. Id.

The burden is on the proponent of the expert testimony to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony is trustworthy. Id. Furthermore, we review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard, which means the decision must be within the zone of reasonable disagreement in light of the evidence offered at the hearing and the requirements of Rule 702. Id. at 574.

The State sought to admit expert testimony to the effect that the footprint *353 found at the crime scene matched the footprint of appellant. Three experts testified at the hearing on the admissibility of the testimony — two on behalf of the State and one on behalf of appellant. The first witness was Dr. Harrell Gill-King, who is the director of the Laboratory of Human Identification and Forensic Anthropology at the University of North Texas. He has a doctorate in physical anthropology from the Institute for Earth and Man at Southern Methodist University, and post-doctorate training in forensic pathology and os-teology from the Southwestern Institute for Forensic Sciences, as well as 19 years experience in the analysis of identification and cause of death. He testified that the human footprint leaves a unique impression when it is placed on something capable of bearing an impression, which is why footprints are placed on birth certificates. Footprint comparisons based on scientific principles, such as principles of anatomy and biomechanics, are widely recognized by other experts in forensic pathology.

As relevant to this case, Dr. Gill-King received a piece of butcher paper with a foot impression and a photograph of a material, which appeared to be concrete, with a bloody footprint on it. He concluded that they probably belonged to the same person. However, because the footprint was partial and his experience was limited to complete footprints, he referred the case to Dr. Sonek, with whom he is familiar and has heard give presentations with respect to footprint comparisons. He recognizes Dr. Sonek as an expert in this particular specialty and stated that Dr. Sonek is recognized as being credible in this particular field.

On cross-examination, Dr. Gill-King stated that once a person holds a doctorate in physical anthropology and has focused their specialization in forensic anthropology, there is no other certification available. He also opined that he would prefer to have the original foot impression as opposed to a photograph. He is aware of the techniques and procedures to accomplish footprint analysis through his knowledge of the literature on the subject. Dr. Gill-King is only personally familiar with three or four persons who perform footprint analysis, one of whom is Dr. Sonek. He described the techniques as follows:

If we are given a complete foot impression, an unsheathed foot, no socks, no shoes, just a foot, longitudinal measurements are made. Assessment of the heights of arches are made. If dramatic lithie lines are present, they are also assessed. Photography is done.

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Bluebook (online)
46 S.W.3d 350, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195, 2001 WL 324726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hurrelbrink-v-state-texapp-2001.