Hurd v. Cramer

40 App. D.C. 349, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 2084
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided May 5, 1913·No. No. 2483·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The first question for consideration is whether there is jurisdiction in equity to entertain the cause of action set out in the bill. If not, there will be no ground for passing upon the evidence. It is well settled that equity has no jurisdiction where the plaintiff has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271-278, 15 L. ed. 633-635; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347—352, 30 L. ed. 451—453, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; United States v. Bitter Root Development Co. 200 U. S. 451-472, 50 L. ed. 550-560, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318. But to be plain, adequate, and complete, the remedy at law must be as practical and efficient to the ends of justice, and its prompt administration, as the remedy in equity. Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210-215, 7 L. ed. 655—657; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79—95, 36 L. ed. 82—88, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340.

[361] We are of the opinion that such remedy as a court of law would give for the conditions alleged in the bill would not be of that plain, adequate, and complete nature requisite to exclude the jurisdiction of equity; clearly, it would not be as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration. The case made out in the bill is more than a suit to recover by way of damages money obtained through a fraudulent contract, as in Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 451, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; or than a mere case of trover or trespass, as in United States v. Bitter Root Development Co. 200 U. S. 451, 472, 50 L. ed. 550, 560, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318.

The suit was brought on behalf of a man then eighty-nine years of age, who had been adjudged incapable of managing his affairs, and in respect of person and estate committed to a conservator. His memory of transactions was defective, and the books and papers which came into the hands of the conservator furnished no evidence of payments, which, moreover, extended through a period of several years. The defendant had concealed the fact that she had received money from the plaintiff. The funds so received had been converted by defendant into secured notes, the makers of which were unknown to the plaintiff. Discovery, therefore, from the defendant and from the trust company, became necessary. If plaintiff had sued at law and recovered judgment against the defendant for any amount, it could not have been collected by execution. The bill, therefore, sought to have a trust declared in such of the money as could be found, and in such securities into which it could be followed; and sought to have their disposition enjoined, and an order for their delivery to a receiver. An accounting was also prayed as a necessary part of the relief sought. “Thus there were in the case as ingredients to support the jurisdiction of equity, discovery, account, fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment.” Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79-95, 36 L. ed. 82-88, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. See George v. Ford, 36 App. D. C. 315-332. In addition to the ingredients above recited, the jurisdiction was invoked to declare a trust, to follow it into other property into which the trust [362] fund, had been converted, and for an injunction to render this remedy effectual. Thus very different conditions were shown from those presented in Buzard v. Houston, and United States v. Bitter Root Development Co. supra.

2. The learned justice who presided in the equity court was right in his conclusion that the gifts of money made to the defendant could not be set aside and the same recovered on the mere ground of mental incapacity, of the plaintiff at the time they were made. He was an extremely old man, it is true, with some of the weaknesses of old age, and was a firm believer in spiritualism, and that communications could be had with the spirits of the departed through “mediums.” Such obsessions, however, do not of themselves constitute insanity or mental incapacity 'in the legal sense. If unpractised upon by fraud or undue influence through those obsessions, he had sufficient mental power to execute a valid contract, deed, or will.

3. The gist of the case is contained in the charge of fraud and undue influence upon the aged plaintiff, and the evidence relating thereto. This evidence is unnecessarily voluminous, and much of it is irrelevant. To recite it in substance and review it in detail would cause an unnecessary and unimportant consumption of space.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Hurd v. Cramer, 40 App. D.C. 349, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 2084 (D.C. Cir. 1913).

40 App. D.C. 349 (Hurd v. Cramer) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Roberts-Douglas v. Meares
624 A.2d 405 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1992)
Clark v. United States
209 F. Supp. 895 (D. Colorado, 1962)