Hupp v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided March 29, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-03869·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Kristin H.,1 : : Case No. 2:22-cv-03869 Plaintiff, : : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley v. : : Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. COMMISSIONER OF : SOCIAL SECURITY, : : Defendant. OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s January 11, 2024, Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 11), which recommended that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8) be OVERRULED and that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED. Plaintiff filed an Objection pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), to this Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 12). This Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety based on an independent consideration of the issues herein. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Kristin H., filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on December 30, 2019, alleging (after amendment) disability commencing June 10, 2013. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she subsequently requested and received a phone hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jeffrey Hartranft on September 14, 2021. (ECF Nos. 8, 11).

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials. See also S.D. Ohio General Rule 22-01. Following the required five-step sequential analysis,2 the ALJ issued his decision on November 12, 2021, which concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 11). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity between June 10, 2013, and June 30, 2021. (Id.). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of left foot and ankle status-post

triple arthrodesis, right foot and ankle degenerative joint disease status-post triple arthrodesis and bunionectomy, lumbar degenerative disc disease; rheumatoid arthritis/inflammatory polyarthritis, osteoarthritis of the knees, and obesity. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) consisted of sedentary work . . . except she could occasionally operate foot controls. She could occasionally climb ramps and stairs but could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She would be capable of

2 Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), the five step sequential steps are as follows:

(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled. . . .

(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 416.909, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled. . . .

(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medial severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 subpart P of part 404 of this chapter and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled. . . .

(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled. . . .

(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled. . . .

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling and would need to avoid workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights and machinery.

(Id.). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id.). At step five, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed and the Appeals Council denied review on September 2, 2022. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff sought federal judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision on February 16, 2023, and argued in her Statement of Errors that “the ALJ reversibly erred in evaluating the medical source opinions and prior administrative medical findings.” (Id.). Plaintiff specifically asserted that the ALJ erred when he concluded (1) that the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating podiatrist were not supported by the record; (2) that those opinions were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s work activity and reported physical activities; and (3) that the opinions of the state agency reviewing physicians were consistent with and supported by the evidence, including evidence submitted after they rendered their assessments. (Id.). On January 11, 2024, Magistrate Judge Silvain issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this Court overrule Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and affirm Commissioner’s non-disability finding. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff now objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings, insisting that “the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence and are in error as a matter of law.” (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff specifically objects to the R&R in that it does not address: (1) Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly conflated the consistency factor with the supportability factor in considering the opinions of the state agency reviewers; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that the state agency reviewers did not review “a critical body of medical evidence.” (Id.). The Magistrate Judge’s R&R and Plaintiff’s Objections are now ripe for this Court’s review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Upon objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, this Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). This de novo review, in turn, requires the Court to “determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision” and to “determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria.” Inman v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2013). Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504

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