Hupfer v. Mix

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hupfer v. Mix

26 A.D.2d 580, 272 N.Y.S.2d 965, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3880

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 27, 1966

StatusPublished

This text of 26 A.D.2d 580 (Hupfer v. Mix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hupfer v. Mix, 26 A.D.2d 580, 272 N.Y.S.2d 965, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3880 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injury and medical expenses, defendant Village of Hempstead appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered March 16, 1966, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 341-a of the Village Law. Order affirmed, without costs. We distinguish this ease from Doremus v. Village of Lynbrook (25 A D 2d 749), upon the ground that affirmative negligence is charged here in that the -village established and maintained the park, which created the special use of the street as a crossway between the park and a Youth Center (see Bown v. Village of Lynbrook, 23 A D 2d 559, revd. on the dissenting memorandum, 17 N Y 2d 826). Under such circumstances, notice pursuant to section 341-a of the Village Law is not required. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injury and medical expenses, defendant Village of Hempstead appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered March 16, 1966, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 341-a of the Village Law. Order affirmed, without costs. We distinguish this ease from Doremus v. Village of Lynbrook (25 A D 2d 749), upon the ground that affirmative negligence is charged here in that the -village established and maintained the park, which created the special use of the street as a crossway between the park and a Youth Center (see Bown v. Village of Lynbrook, 23 A D 2d 559, revd. on the dissenting memorandum, 17 N Y 2d 826). Under such circumstances, notice pursuant to section 341-a of the Village Law is not required. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

26 A.D.2d 580, 272 N.Y.S.2d 965, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hupfer-v-mix-nyappdiv-1966.