Huntley v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange

132 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133882, 2015 WL 5672218
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 23, 2015
DocketCivil Action No. 1:15-CV-1945-AT
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 132 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (Huntley v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huntley v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133882, 2015 WL 5672218 (N.D. Ga. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER

AMY TOTENBERG, District Judge.

This putative class action concerns allegations that Defendant Chicago Board of Options Exchange (“CBOE”) is listing, and Defendant The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) is clearing, stock options that [1372]*1372they know may become worthless after a reverse stock split. Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Venue [Doc. 24] to the Northern District of Illinois, along with a supporting Memorandum. (Doc. 24-1) (“Def.’s Mem.”) For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. DISCUSSION.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states that a district court may transfer a civil action to another district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice.”

The Eleventh Circuit considers nine general factors in evaluating a motion to transfer under § 1404(a):

(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiffs choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Manuel v. Converges Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005).

When considering transfer for venue purposes, “trial judges are afforded considerable discretion” in weighing the criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Tommy Bahama Group, Inc. v. The Walking Company, No. 07-cv-1402-ODE, 2007 WL 3156254 at *2 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 19, 2007). “[T]he plaintiffs choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other considerations, and a transfer that would only shift inconvenience from the defendant to the plaintiff does not outweigh the plaintiffs choice for Section 1404(a) purposes.” Van Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir.1981). Finally, the party (or parties) seeking transfer bear the burden of establishing that the Section 1404(a) factors weigh in favor of transfer. Spanx, Inc. v. Times Three Clothier, LLC, No. 13-CV-710-WSD, 2013 WL 5636684 at *1 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 15, 2013).

A. Where the Action Could Have Been Brought.

The first issue presented by Defendants’ Motion is whether Plaintiffs action could have been brought in the Northern District of Illinois. 28 U.S. § 1404(a). Both CBOE and OCC assert (and Plaintiff does not dispute) that their principal place of business is in Chicago, in the Northern District of Illinois. (Def.’s Mem. at 11.) Accordingly, venue in that district is proper, and this action could have been brought there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (corporation is a resident of any judicial district where it would be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question).

B. Transfer Analysis Factors.

Next, the Court turns to the factors described by the Eleventh Circuit. Those factors weigh, on balance, in favor of transfer.

1. Convenience of the Witnesses.

The most important factor in considering a motion to transfer is the convenience of the witnesses. Ramsey v. Fox News Network, LLC, 323 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356 (N.D.Ga.2004) (Thrash, J.) This is especially true with respect to non-party witnesses who are not presumed to be willing to testify in a forum far from their home. Id. The moving party must make a specific showing of inconvenience to the [1373]*1373witnesses. Collegiate Licensing Co. v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 842 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1366 (N.D.Ga.2012).

In this matter, Defendants have identified John Peplinski as a key nonparty witness. Mr. Peplinski is the “former Vice President within [OCC’s] department that administered the decision to adjust the option contracts at issue in” the Complaint. (Decl. of Karen Bilek at ¶ 7) (Doc. 24-2.) The materials and affidavits submitted to the Court make his testimony seem crucial. Defendants also claim that employees of the brokerage firms used by Huntley to execute his trades are potential non-party witnesses, though they do not specifically identify any of those individuals. Nevertheless, since Huntley executed his trades through these Illinois companies, it seems very likely that they will have to supply witnesses to be deposed. Finally, Defendants note that their employees will likely be witnesses in this action and will testify as to the actions and votes underlying the fractional share distribution that Huntley complains of. (Id. ¶7; Decl. of William Spieth at ¶ 5) (Doc. 24-3.) While employees of the parties are generally presumed to be willing to appear in out-of-state actions, this fact should not be entirely ignored. See Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 1356-57 (employees of party who issued ah allegedly defamatory report located in transferee forum).

Huntley, for his part, states that witnesses to the financial harm he suffered reside in Georgia, as do other options traders who use Defendants’ services. However, he does not identify any of these individuals, weakening his argument against transfer. See Scheldt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 966 (10th Cir.1992) (trial court must be supplied with some “factual information relative to materiality of witness testimony”). More, Huntley’s unidentified witnesses would testify primarily concerning his damages. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition at 6 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (Doc. 30.)) The convenience of damages witnesses is given less weight than that of liability witnesses when conducting a transfer analysis, because there are no damages without liability. Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 1357. Finally, Huntley offers little to no eviden-tiary basis to support his contention that material witnesses, other than himself, reside in Georgia. And although he offers’ himself up as the primary witness in this matter, (Doc. 30 at 6), in truth it is very likely that the key witnesses will be current or former employees of Defendants, since what Huntley alleges is basically fraud-like conduct. It is their statements, actions, and intentions that are likely to determine the outcome of this litigation, not Huntley’s.

Therefore, based on the information before the Court, it appears that most of the key liability witnesses in this matter are located in Chicago.

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132 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133882, 2015 WL 5672218, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huntley-v-chicago-board-of-options-exchange-gand-2015.