Hunter v. United States

417 F. Supp. 272, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14316
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 1976
DocketC-76-350 AJZ
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 417 F. Supp. 272 (Hunter v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 272, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14316 (N.D. Cal. 1976).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ZIRPOLI, District Judge.'

This is a suit for wrongful death brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The United States has filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with the administrative claim requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 1

By letter dated January 20, 1975, plaintiffs’ attorney presented plaintiffs’ claim *274 for $200,000 to the San Francisco Regional Office of the Veterans Administration. The claim alleged that plaintiffs’ son died as a result of defendant’s negligence in diagnosing and treating his diabetes. By letter dated August 19, 1975, the Acting Regional Counsel of the Veterans Administration denied plaintiffs’ claim on the ground that there was no negligence involved in their son’s death. This lawsuit followed.

Defendant contends that the administrative claim filed in plaintiffs’ behalf was invalid and that therefore this court may not entertain plaintiffs’ lawsuit. First, defendant contends that the claim was invalid because it was not signed by plaintiffs but only by plaintiffs’' attorney. However, defendant has cited no regulation requiring the signature of the claimant in addition to that of the legal representative presenting the claim in the claimants’ behalf. Nor does Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971), stand for such a proposition. In Bialowas the claimant himself submitted an incomplete and unsigned form. The defects in the form were not remedied even after defendant called these defects to plaintiff’s attention. Accordingly, the court held that no administrative claim had been filed and that a district court suit could not be maintained. In the case at bar the claim was filed and signed by plaintiffs’ attorney acting in their behalf. Plaintiffs’ failure to add .their signatures to that of their attorney does not render the claim invalid. ,

Defendant next contends that plaintiffs’ administrative claim is invalid because it failed to comply with the requirement of 28 C.F.R. section 14.3(e) that a claim presented by a legal representative of the claimant be accompanied by evidence of his or her authority to act on behalf of the claimant. At least one court has interpreted this regulation as requiring some form of documentary evidence attached to the claim. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum). In the instant case no such documentary evidence accompanied plaintiffs’ claim. Instead the claim simply stated that “I represent the claimants who are the parents and sole surviving heirs of decedent.” Defendant’s Exh. 1. It is therefore apparent that section 14.3(e) has not been complied with in full.

Despite plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the requirements of 28 C.F.R. section 14.3(e), the court is not persuaded that this technical defect rendered plaintiffs’ claim invalid and thus deprived this court of jurisdiction. The purpose of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is to avoid litigation where a claim can be resolved administratively. Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F.Supp. 381 (E.D.Pa.1972). In the instant case the Veterans Administration processed plaintiffs’ claim and denied it on the merits. There is absolutely no indication in the letter denying plaintiffs’ claim that the agency was in any way hampered by the technical deficiency present in plaintiffs’ claim. Nor was this deficiency called to plaintiffs’ attention so that the defect could be remedied. Defendant’s Exh. 2. The court therefore concludes that this technical defect in the claim does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The cases cited by defendant do not compel a contrary conclusion. In Gunstream v. United States, 307 F.Supp. 366 (C.D.Cal.1969), plaintiffs attempted to file a claim in behalf of their injured son without indicating whether or not their son was a minor. Plaintiffs were informed by the administrative agency that they could file a claim in their son’s behalf only if he was a minor and only if the claim indicated that plaintiffs were filing the claim in their representative capacity as their son’s parents and natural guardians. When plaintiffs failed to remedy the defect in their claim the court held that the administrative claim was invalid and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 378 F.Supp. 1339 (M.D.Pa.1974), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975), the State of Pennsylvania attempted to file a class claim on behalf of its citizens. Al *275 though the claim was filed by an Insurance Commissioner on his official stationery, the court held that the requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e) had not been complied with because the Commissioner failed to submit any documentary or statutory evidence showing that he was authorized to proceed in behalf of individual citizens. However, a prime issue in the case was whether such class claims were permissible under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thus while the case seems to support defendant’s contention that a claim must comply with section 14.3(e), the facts of that case render it distinguishable from the case at bar. In the instant ease, there is no serious challenge to the authority of plaintiffs’ attorney to represent them.

The other cases cited by defendant are likewise inapposite to the ease at bar. Each involved a situation in which the plaintiff failed to provide information necessary to enable the administrative agency to process the claim. Further, in many of these cases the agency informed the claimant that the claim was defective and the claimant took no steps to correct the claim. See, e. g., Bialowas v. United States, supra; Hlavac v. United States, 356 F.Supp. 1274 (N.D.Ill.1972); Robinson v. United States Navy, supra; Gunstream v. United States, supra. These cases therefore lend little support to defendant’s argument.

In light of the underlying purpose of the requirement that a claimant exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and in light of plaintiffs’ compliance with that requirement through the filing of an administrative claim which was denied on the merits, the court does not believe that a technical deficiency in the claim which was neither brought to plaintiffs’ attention nor in any way hampered defendant in evaluating plaintiffs’ claim should be construed as invalidating the administrative claim.

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Bluebook (online)
417 F. Supp. 272, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-v-united-states-cand-1976.