Hunter v. State

31 S.W. 674, 34 Tex. Crim. 599, 1895 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 173
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 15, 1895
DocketNo. 542.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 31 S.W. 674 (Hunter v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter v. State, 31 S.W. 674, 34 Tex. Crim. 599, 1895 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tex. 1895).

Opinion

HENDERSON, Judge.

The appellant was convicted . of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the State penitentiary for life, and from the judgment of the lower court he prosecutes this appeal.

The deceased, Tom Daves, had been living in the neighborhood where the homicide occurred for several years, making his home with one W. B. Hudson. The last seen of him alive was on Sunday evening, the 23rd of December, 1887, just before Christmas.- His body *602 was afterwards, between the 12th and 18th of January, 1888, found in the Brazos Eiver, about two miles from where he had been last seen. The body of deceased was found floating in the river by one Eiddle, who was in a skiff at the time, and he and others brought it to. shore. It had evidently been in the water for sometime. After it was taken to shore, an examination was made then and afterwards, but no wounds or bruises were found on said body. It appears, that after the Sunday evening when deceased was last seen no one missed him for two or three days, and no inquiry was made until his employer was told about the horse of deceased being tied down near the river, and then a search was made, and at that time some indications of a hole in the ground at or near the Damon place, not far from where deceased had been last seen alive, was discovered; and this, according to the testimony, bore some indications that some person had recently been interred and subsequently exhumed. The search, however, proved futile, until the accidental discovery of the body of the deceased in the river, as before stated. It does not appear that suspicion attached to any particular person at the time deceased was missing, nor when his body was found, and public attention was not directed towards the defendant until the latter part of 1892. At this time, one John Washington was arrested on a charge of cattle stealing in Milam County, and on his way to jail, and while there, told certain parties of what he knew about the killing of Tom Daves, and accused the defendant, Hunter, of having committed the deed. The latter was indicted on the 26th of February, 1893, and was tried and convicted in the July following.

The first assignment of error insisted on by appellant is with regard to the special venire ordered in this case. The bill of exceptions shows, that the court ordered a special venire of ninety men to try said case; that the clerk subsequently drew the names of only sixty persons, and issued a writ for sixty, and the appellant insists that this was such error as ought to cause the reversal of the case. Article 608, Code of Criminal Procedure, is as follows: “The order of the court for the issuance of the writ shall specify the number of persons required to be summoned, and the time when such persons shall attend, and the time when such writ shall be returnable, and the clerk shall forthwith issue the writ in accordance with such order.” Article 610 indicates how the special venire shall be drawn. In Harrison v. The State, 3 Texas Criminal Appeals, 558, it is held, that the requirements of the law regarding special venires are to be construed strictly as against the State, and that all the essential features of the law must be complied with. In addition to the statutes already mentioned, the law requires, that after the special veniremen have been served, the defendant, if in jail,, shall be served with a copy of the list of the special veniremen so served, at least one entire day before he is brought to trial. This is for the purpose of enabling him to see who are the persons selected to try him, and afford him an opportunity to select from said list such persons as he desires to sit on his jury, and in order to *603 afford the facility of exercising his right of challenge upon said list; and in our opinion, he is entitled to have drawn the full list in number, as ordered by the court, and the clerk has no power to curtail this. After the court has made its order, the duties of the clerk are not judicial, but merely ministerial, under the statute, and he has no option but to draw the exact number of men ordered by the judge. To hold otherwise would invade the province of the court, and invest the clerk with a power never intended by the law. In this particular case the record shows that forty-seven of the sixty only were summoned, and that of these only nine were secured on the jury, when the list was exhausted. After this list was exhausted, talesmen were summoned, so that the balance of the jury was constituted out of men originally selected by the sheriff. If the law had been pursued, these would have been drawn by the jury commissioners, instead of being summoned by the sheriff. One of the objects of the passage of the law with reference to drawing special venires, as we understand it, was to take this power, as far as possible, out of the hands of the sheriff and his deputies; and in this case this intent of the Legislature was violated, and in our opinion a valuable right of the appellant was infringed, and the court should have promptly sustained the appellant’s motion to quash the venire of sixty men, and have ordered the drawing of a new special venire in accordance with the original order of the court.

The appellant complains in this case of the charge of the court on corpus delicti, which charge is as fellows: “In prosecutions for murder the State must establish clearly and satisfactorily two things— the criminal act, and defendant’s agency in the commission of such act.” On this subject the defendant asked the court to charge as follows : “Before you can convict the defendant, the corpus delicti must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and the corpus delicti consists not only of an objective crime, but of the defendant’s agency in the crime; and, before you can consider the alleged confession of the defendant as inculpatory evidence against him, the proof of the corpus delicti must be absolutely and conclusively proven beyond a reasonable doubt by other evidence in the case outside the alleged confession of the defendant.” In view of the evidence in this case, in our opinion, the court’s charge was not sufficient, and the charge asked by defendant, though going beyond the rule adopted by this court, served to call the attention of the court to the defect in the charge given by the court on the subject, and a proper charge should have been given. On this subject Mr. Wharton says: “It is essential to a conviction for any degree of culpable homicide, first, the deceased should be shown to have been killed; and secondly, this killing should have been proved to have been criminally caused. Unless the corpus delicti in both these respects is proved, a confession by the accused is not by itself sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Whart. on Horn., sec. 641; Lightfoot v. The State, 20 Texas Crim. App., 77; *604 Harris v. The State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 308. In Anderson v. The State, ante, p. 546, it was held, that the confession of the defendant alone did not establish the corpus delicti, nor did the testimony of an accomplice alone suffice for this purpose, but that the two together were sufficient.

The principal, if not the only, evidence in this case tending to show that the deceased came to his death by some criminal agency, and that the appellant was the criminal agent, is from the testimony of the witness John Washington. That he was an accomplice, we think, is clearly shown from the testimony, as before stated.

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49 S.W. 612 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1899)

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Bluebook (online)
31 S.W. 674, 34 Tex. Crim. 599, 1895 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-v-state-texcrimapp-1895.