Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co.

47 N.W. 131, 83 Mich. 63, 1890 Mich. LEXIS 910
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 14, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 47 N.W. 131 (Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 83 Mich. 63, 1890 Mich. LEXIS 910 (Mich. 1890).

Opinions

Champlin, C. J.

Roberts, Throp & Co. is a manufacturing corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan, and engaged in the manufacture of threshing-machines and other agricultural implements. Complainant's intestate was a stockholder in the corporation, and she has filed the bill of complaint in this case to compel the directors of the corporation to declare and pay a dividend. The bill of complaint was dismissed by the court below, who filed a written opinion in the cause, which has been returned with the record. After a careful perusal of the testimony, I am led to the conclusion reached by the circuit judge, and mainly for the reasons given by him in his opinion, as follows:

“The defendant is a corporation duly organized under the laws of this State, and has been engaged in the business of manufacturing principally thi-eshing-machines for many years at Three Rivers, in this county. The articles of association provide for §250,-000 capital stock, but §80,000 only has ever been issued. This amount was issued before 1881, and was fully paid up. The complainant, as such administratrix, holds §6,000 of this stock, for which her former husband, Lothrop, paid, in 1881, §9,000. Since *65 then no dividend has been made by said corporation defendant, and the complainant files this bill to compel the defendant to declare a dividend on its capital stock of $80,000, alleging that it has surplus profits which should be set apart and used for that purpose. No request has ever been made to the defendant’s board of directors to declare a dividend, but since a majority of such directors have been witnesses upon this trial, and have testified that they would not have declared a dividend if a request had been made, I think it should be held for the purposes of this trial that no request was necessary.
“It is undoubtedly true that the ultimate object for which every corporation of the character of the one under consideration is formed, is the payment of dividends to its individual members. While this is true, it is also true that the declaring of such dividends must ordinarily be left to the sound discretion of boards of directors. Whether a corporation can safely make a dividend involves the exercise of knowledge and judgment, and the power of deciding this question should not be taken from the directors, and assumed by the courts, unless it clearly appears that the directors have mistaken their legal duties. Any other rule would lead to the frequent intervention of the courts, to the substitution of the court for the board of directors, and, in very many instances, would prove disastrous to the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders, and the business of trading and manufacturing would be seriously hampered and retarded. To authorize the court to intervene, and decree a dividend, it ought, in the first place, to appear clearly that' there are surplus profits to divide, and that such profits can be separated from the necessary working capital, for the purpose of a dividend, without serious detriment to the interest of the stockholders and the prosperity of the business of the corporation. It ought to appear that there is no good reason for withholding a division of the surplus earnings among the stockholders, and that they are withheld from the will or caprice of the directors. If there is reasonable cause for withholding the dividend, then it ought not to be decreed.
“ The evidence shows that the books of the company are kept in excellent system, and with great accuracy, and a full and fair showing has been made of the business and condition of the company. Although there have been losses, it cannot be said but that they were unvoidable, and incident to the necessary risks of the defendant’s business. The evidence further discloses that the directors are men of large experience in business affairs; that they are familiar with all the details of the business of the company; and that, according to their best judgment, for the best interests of the stockholders, a dividend cannot now, and could not have been, *66 made, and in this respect their opinions are at unity. The evidence entirely fails to disclose that the directors, in not declaring dividends, have been actuated by malice or improper motives. They are largely interested in the corporation, and in their testimony say that, as individuals, they would have been glad to have declared a dividend, and had themselves the benefit of it, if the condition of the finances of the company would have permitted such action; but they declare emphatically that such dividend cannot be made without great detriment to the best interests of the company and its stockholders. And, since these directors are men of high standing as business men, and of unquestioned integrity, I am bound to believe that, according to their best and united judgment, a dividend ought not to be made.
“ I am aware that it is pretty well settled by authority that ‘there can be such a condition of things as will justify a court of equity in compelling directors to declare a dividend contrary to their judgment;’ but when a board of directors made up of experienced business men, largely interested in the welfare of the corporation, familiar with all its affairs, and influenced by no improper motive, declares that a dividend cannot be made without serious detriment to all concerned, then the court ought to proceed with great caution in decreeing a dividend, and the facts proven upon the trial ought clearly to justify such action. It is necessary, therefore, to look somewhat into the condition of the company in order to determine whether the court' ought to order a dividend against the best judgment of the directors.
“In 1881 the company was largely reorganized. Before that time it had been doing a very successful business. During that year, Throp, or the Throp family, sold out their interests in the real estate, tools, and fixtures, and some other property, to Roberts, receiving in cash §60,000, and receiving’ also one-half of all the available assets of the company, consisting of paper owing to the company, and amounting in gross to $100,000, or over. As far as the evidence discloses, the $80,000 of stock was before this sale owned by Roberts and Throp. Roberts became the purchaser of the Throp interest. He thereupon sold to other persons a considerable portion of the stock on the same basis that he had bought of Throp; that is, 1J- for each share. This, upon the $80,000 paid-up stock, aggregated $40,000. Since then it has been carried upon the books, and appears in some of the annual statements as a surplus fund of $40,000. In fact, it was, regarded as a premium on the stock for the good-will of the business. So far as stock was sold, this premium was received by Roberts individually, and did not go to the benefit of the funds of the company. Considering the actual value of the company’s property,-it is questionable *67 •whether the stock of the company has any real value above par. The $40,000 for good-will was largely speculative, based upon the supposed ability of the company to make money in the future.
“When the company began business after this partial reorganization, its property consisted of its real estate, the tools, machinery, and fixtures, and probably some material and unfinished work. It had no money.

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Bluebook (online)
47 N.W. 131, 83 Mich. 63, 1890 Mich. LEXIS 910, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-v-roberts-throp-co-mich-1890.