Hunter v. Galvan

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided June 30, 2026·No. 24-5435·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES R. HUNTER, No. 24-5435 D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01228-SRB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

COURTNEY YVONNE GALVAN, In her capacity as the Personal Representative of The Estate of Charles Galvan,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

CHARLES L RYAN, AKA Charles Ryan, DAVID SHINN, THEODORA PAUL, UNKNOWN PARTIES, Galvan; Fox; Chandar,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner James R. Hunter appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo. Sheltra v. Christensen, 124 F.4th 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024).

We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hunter failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.

See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638, 643-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate

must exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing suit, and

describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are

effectively unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (explaining that

exhaustion “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules”); see also Sheltra, 124 F.4th at 1201 (explaining the limited

circumstances in which the continuing-violations doctrine applies in the Prison

Litigation Reform Act exhaustion context).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunter’s motion for

reconsideration because Hunter failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

2 24-5435 Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

We reject as without merit Hunter’s contention that the district court

improperly admonished him for making personal attacks against opposing counsel.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-5435

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES R. HUNTER, No. 24-5435 D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01228-SRB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

COURTNEY YVONNE GALVAN, In her capacity as the Personal Representative of The Estate of Charles Galvan,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

CHARLES L RYAN, AKA Charles Ryan, DAVID SHINN, THEODORA PAUL, UNKNOWN PARTIES, Galvan; Fox; Chandar,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner James R. Hunter appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo. Sheltra v. Christensen, 124 F.4th 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024).

We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hunter failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.

See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638, 643-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate

must exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing suit, and

describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are

effectively unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (explaining that

exhaustion “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules”); see also Sheltra, 124 F.4th at 1201 (explaining the limited

circumstances in which the continuing-violations doctrine applies in the Prison

Litigation Reform Act exhaustion context).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunter’s motion for

reconsideration because Hunter failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

2 24-5435 Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

We reject as without merit Hunter’s contention that the district court

improperly admonished him for making personal attacks against opposing counsel.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-5435

Hunter v. Galvan, (9th Cir. 2026).

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