PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the May 12, 1993, order of the Circuit Court of Logan County, West Virginia, which granted the appellee, Lewis McCoy, one-half of all net proceeds collected in the wrongful death action filed by the appellant, Stella Hunter, on behalf of the estate of Sharon Paula Dingess, when it was determined, after Sharon Dingess’ death, that Mr. McCoy was her biological father. This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
I
On July 17, 1972, the appellant, Stella Hunter (then Stella Dingess), gave birth to the decedent, Sharon Paula Dingess. Ms. Hunter was then sixteen-years old, single and living at home. When Ms. Hunter asked the appellee, Lewis McCoy, to acknowledge that he was the father of Sharon, he refused. The relationship between Ms. Hunter and Mr. McCoy subsequently ended.
On August 29, 1977, Ms. Hunter applied for Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter “DHHR”), in order to support her dependent child. The DHHR subsequently asked Mr. McCoy to acknowledge paternity of Sharon Paula Dingess when it sent to him a paternity acknowledgement form, pursuant to Public Law 93-647, which required the West Virginia Office of Child Support Enforcement to seek establishment of paternity of children who are receiving public assistance from the state. Mr. McCoy failed to sign or return this form.
On July 18, 1980, Mr. McCoy appeared at the Logan County Welfare office where, according to the DHHR’s narrative reeord-ing/data transmission log, he again denied that he was the father of Sharon Dingess. In 1980, the statute of limitations to establish paternity was three years from the birth of the child.
W.Va.Code,
48-7-1 [1969].
In that Sharon was, by 1980, seven years old, the three-year statute of limitations had already run. Thus, unless the statute was challenged, without Mr. McCoy’s voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, nothing further could be done.
On January 23,1992, when Sharon Dingess was nineteen years and six months old, she was killed in an automobile accident in Logan County. Sharon Dingess was unmarried, had no children, and died without a will. As administratrix of the estate of her daughter, Ms. Hunter filed a wrongful death action. During the pendency of that action, Mr. McCoy, who had previously denied that he was the father of Sharon Dingess, to avoid the legal obligation of paying child support and whose paternity had never been judicially determined, filed a motion to intervene,
alleging that, as Sharon’s father, he was entitled to one-half of the net proceeds recovered in the wrongful death action.
At a hearing concerning application of settlement of the wrongful death action, held on September 9, 1992, Ms. Hunter testified that 'either Mr. McCoy or Tony Belcher, the father of her oldest child, was the biological father of Sharon Dingess. In order to determine the distribution of the wrongful death proceeds, Ms. Hunter and Mr. McCoy agreed to submit to DNA testing,
to establish the paternity of Sharon Dingess. The results of the DNA testing established that the probability that Mr. McCoy was the biological father of Sharon Dingess was 99.93%.
Ms. Hunter subsequently sought to dismiss Mr. McCoy’s claim to the wrongful death proceeds on the grounds that his claim was barred under
W.Va.Code,
48A-6-2(a) [1989],
which provides that an action to establish the paternity of a child must be brought before the child reaches eighteen. In its opinion of April 16, 1993, granting Mr. McCoy’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit court ruled that the statute of limitations contained in
W.Va.Code,
48A-6-2(a) does not apply because this was not a pro-eeeding to establish paternity, though the “parties
agreed
that one of the methods commonly used in paternity actions would be adopted to see if [Mr. McCoy] was to be excluded as the father of [Sharon Dingess].” (emphasis in original). The circuit court further held that, in that Mr. McCoy has been determined to be the biological father of Sharon Dingess, he is to share in one-half of the net proceeds of the wrongful death settlement, pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of Sharon’s death.
Ms. Hunter subsequently retained new counsel and moved to file an amended answer and permissive counterclaim and what is designated as a petition for reconsideration of the circuit court’s decision, arguing the following: (1) that Mr. McCoy, who previously disavowed paternity of Sharon Dingess, should be equitably estopped from now asserting it; (2) that, should equitable estoppel not apply in this case, then Mr. McCoy’s share of the wrongful death proceeds should be set off by reimbursement of child support; and (3) that the 1992 amendments
of the
wrongful death act should be applied retroactively.
The circuit court denied Ms. Hunter’s motion to amend and petition for reconsideration, and denied, without prejudice, her motion to file a permissive counterclaim for reimbursement child support. However, the circuit judge refused to escrow Mr. McCoy’s share of the wrongful death proceeds pending resolution of the reimbursement issue.
II
As we indicated above, one of the issues on appeal to this Court is that of equitable estoppel. In that Mr. McCoy previously denied to Ms. Hunter and to the DHHR the paternity of Sharon Dingess, Ms. Hunter contends that he should be equitably estopped from now asserting it for the sole purpose of collecting wrongful death proceeds. We agree and reiterate that “[t]he doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity clearly requires it to be done.” Syl. pt. 3,
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane,
152 W.Va. 578, 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969). Indeed, if ever a case existed to which the doctrine of estoppel should be applied, this is it.
This Court articulated the elements of equitable estoppel in syllabus point 6 of
Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp.,
141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956):
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the May 12, 1993, order of the Circuit Court of Logan County, West Virginia, which granted the appellee, Lewis McCoy, one-half of all net proceeds collected in the wrongful death action filed by the appellant, Stella Hunter, on behalf of the estate of Sharon Paula Dingess, when it was determined, after Sharon Dingess’ death, that Mr. McCoy was her biological father. This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
I
On July 17, 1972, the appellant, Stella Hunter (then Stella Dingess), gave birth to the decedent, Sharon Paula Dingess. Ms. Hunter was then sixteen-years old, single and living at home. When Ms. Hunter asked the appellee, Lewis McCoy, to acknowledge that he was the father of Sharon, he refused. The relationship between Ms. Hunter and Mr. McCoy subsequently ended.
On August 29, 1977, Ms. Hunter applied for Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter “DHHR”), in order to support her dependent child. The DHHR subsequently asked Mr. McCoy to acknowledge paternity of Sharon Paula Dingess when it sent to him a paternity acknowledgement form, pursuant to Public Law 93-647, which required the West Virginia Office of Child Support Enforcement to seek establishment of paternity of children who are receiving public assistance from the state. Mr. McCoy failed to sign or return this form.
On July 18, 1980, Mr. McCoy appeared at the Logan County Welfare office where, according to the DHHR’s narrative reeord-ing/data transmission log, he again denied that he was the father of Sharon Dingess. In 1980, the statute of limitations to establish paternity was three years from the birth of the child.
W.Va.Code,
48-7-1 [1969].
In that Sharon was, by 1980, seven years old, the three-year statute of limitations had already run. Thus, unless the statute was challenged, without Mr. McCoy’s voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, nothing further could be done.
On January 23,1992, when Sharon Dingess was nineteen years and six months old, she was killed in an automobile accident in Logan County. Sharon Dingess was unmarried, had no children, and died without a will. As administratrix of the estate of her daughter, Ms. Hunter filed a wrongful death action. During the pendency of that action, Mr. McCoy, who had previously denied that he was the father of Sharon Dingess, to avoid the legal obligation of paying child support and whose paternity had never been judicially determined, filed a motion to intervene,
alleging that, as Sharon’s father, he was entitled to one-half of the net proceeds recovered in the wrongful death action.
At a hearing concerning application of settlement of the wrongful death action, held on September 9, 1992, Ms. Hunter testified that 'either Mr. McCoy or Tony Belcher, the father of her oldest child, was the biological father of Sharon Dingess. In order to determine the distribution of the wrongful death proceeds, Ms. Hunter and Mr. McCoy agreed to submit to DNA testing,
to establish the paternity of Sharon Dingess. The results of the DNA testing established that the probability that Mr. McCoy was the biological father of Sharon Dingess was 99.93%.
Ms. Hunter subsequently sought to dismiss Mr. McCoy’s claim to the wrongful death proceeds on the grounds that his claim was barred under
W.Va.Code,
48A-6-2(a) [1989],
which provides that an action to establish the paternity of a child must be brought before the child reaches eighteen. In its opinion of April 16, 1993, granting Mr. McCoy’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit court ruled that the statute of limitations contained in
W.Va.Code,
48A-6-2(a) does not apply because this was not a pro-eeeding to establish paternity, though the “parties
agreed
that one of the methods commonly used in paternity actions would be adopted to see if [Mr. McCoy] was to be excluded as the father of [Sharon Dingess].” (emphasis in original). The circuit court further held that, in that Mr. McCoy has been determined to be the biological father of Sharon Dingess, he is to share in one-half of the net proceeds of the wrongful death settlement, pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of Sharon’s death.
Ms. Hunter subsequently retained new counsel and moved to file an amended answer and permissive counterclaim and what is designated as a petition for reconsideration of the circuit court’s decision, arguing the following: (1) that Mr. McCoy, who previously disavowed paternity of Sharon Dingess, should be equitably estopped from now asserting it; (2) that, should equitable estoppel not apply in this case, then Mr. McCoy’s share of the wrongful death proceeds should be set off by reimbursement of child support; and (3) that the 1992 amendments
of the
wrongful death act should be applied retroactively.
The circuit court denied Ms. Hunter’s motion to amend and petition for reconsideration, and denied, without prejudice, her motion to file a permissive counterclaim for reimbursement child support. However, the circuit judge refused to escrow Mr. McCoy’s share of the wrongful death proceeds pending resolution of the reimbursement issue.
II
As we indicated above, one of the issues on appeal to this Court is that of equitable estoppel. In that Mr. McCoy previously denied to Ms. Hunter and to the DHHR the paternity of Sharon Dingess, Ms. Hunter contends that he should be equitably estopped from now asserting it for the sole purpose of collecting wrongful death proceeds. We agree and reiterate that “[t]he doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity clearly requires it to be done.” Syl. pt. 3,
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane,
152 W.Va. 578, 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969). Indeed, if ever a case existed to which the doctrine of estoppel should be applied, this is it.
This Court articulated the elements of equitable estoppel in syllabus point 6 of
Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp.,
141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956):
The general rule governing the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that in order to constitute equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais there must exist a false representation or a concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive of the facts; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted on it to his prejudice.
In 1977 and again, in 1980, Mr. McCoy denied to both Ms. Hunter and the DHHR that he was the biological father of Sharon Dingess. Mr. McCoy’s false representation that he was not Sharon’s father enabled him to avoid the legal and moral responsibility of paying child support. Throughout Sharon’s life, however,- he was well aware that he was her father, as evidenced by his motion to intervene, filed almost immediately upon Sharon’s death, and by his unsuccessful attempts to establish a relationship with her when she became an adult.
Furthermore, in 1980, Ms. Hunter and the DHHR were without the means of knowledge of Sharon’s paternity. As we noted above, the statute of limitations for bringing a paternity action at that time was three years from the birth of the child although that statute was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional.
W.Va.Code,
48-7-1 [1969]. However, Mr. McCoy could have freely acknowledged paternity and provided financial support for his daughter. Instead, Mr. McCoy denied the paternity of Sharon Din-gess with the intention that Ms. Hunter raise her without his assistance and with his finan
cial responsibility being assumed by the State.
A creature of equity, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is rooted in natural justice and good conscience. 7A Michie’s Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 14. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Mr. McCoy is equitably es-topped from reaping the financial benefits of the death of his daughter, Sharon Dingess, when, during her life, he disavowed paternity in order to escape legal and financial responsibility to her. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Logan County is reversed.
Reversed.