Hunter v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.

138 F. Supp. 3d 813, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136613, 2015 WL 5920283
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 5, 2015
DocketACTION NO. 4:14-CV-663-Y
StatusPublished

This text of 138 F. Supp. 3d 813 (Hunter v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 813, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136613, 2015 WL 5920283 (N.D. Tex. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

TERRY R. MEANS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Com[814]*814plaint (doc. 16). After consideration of the motion, the related briefs, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the .motion, should be and hereby is GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that they are current or retired employees of defendant Acme Building Brands, Inc. (“Acme”). Plaintiff Judy Hunter is Acme’s Chief Financial Officer and a member of both the Acme Brick Company 401(k) Retirement and Savings Plan (“the 401(k) plan”) Ih-vestment/Administrative Committee (“the 401(k) committee”) and the Rétirement/Administrative Committee (“the pension committee”) for the Acme Brick Company Pension Plan (“the pension plan”). Acme is the sponsor and a named fiduciary of both plans, and the committees are the plan administrators. All of the plaintiffs are participants in the plans.

In 2000, Justin Industries, Acme’s parent, agreed to be acquired by defendant Berkshire, Hathaway, Inc. (“Berkshire”). As a result, Justin and Berkshire entered into a merger agreement that contains the following provision:

Section 5.7 Employee Matters
(a)____ Parent [Berkshire] shall, and shall cause the Company [Acme] to, honor in accordance with their terms all employee benéfit plans (as defined in Section’3(3) of ERISA) and other employment, consulting, benefit, compensation or severance agreements, arrangements and policies of the Company (collectively, the “Company Plans”); provided, however, that Parent [Berkshire] or the Company [Acme] may amend, modify or terminate any individual Company Elans in accordance with the terms of such Plans and applicable law (including obtaining the consent of the other parties to and beneficiaries of such Company Plans to the extent required thereunder); provided further, that notwithstanding the foregoing proviso, Parent [Berkshire] will not cause the Company [Acme] to (i) reduce any benefits to employees pursuant to [the Company Plans] for a period of 12 months following the Effective Time, (ii) reduce any benefit accruals to employees pursuant to any such Plans that are defined benefit plans, or (iii) reduce the employer contribution pursuant to any such Plans that are defined contribution pension plans.....

(Compl.(doc.l) 4, ¶ 15; Defs.’ App. (doc. 17) 31) (emphasis added.) Plaintiffs allege that at the time of this agreement, the pension plan was overfunded by approximately sixty million dollars. As a result, Plaintiffs contend that this provision was “included in the Merger Agreement to secure and protect, both contractually and under ERISA, participants’ future, benefits under the Retirement Plans in light of new ownership, as well as .the significantly ov-erfunded financial position of -the Pension Plan.” (Compl.(doe.l) 4, ¶ 16.)

Beginning in 2006, however, Berkshire allegedly contacted Acme about the possibility of imposing a “hard freeze” on the pension plan that would eliminate any future accruals of benefits for plan participants and would preclude participation in the pension plan by new employees. Acme advised Berkshire that a hard freeze would violate section 5.7 of the merger agreement and ERISA. Berkshire thereafter dropped the issue until the summer of 2012, when it informed Acme that it “wanted to move forward with, reducing retirement benefits.” (Id. 6, ¶ 23.) •

During the 2012 discussions, Acme allegedly discovered that it had mistakenly reduced the 401(k) plan’s company matching contribution from fifty percent to twenty-five percent for 2010 and 2011. Acme informed Berkshire that such a reduction was not permitted under section 5.7 of the [815]*815merger agreement; Berkshire directed Acme not to- make any retroactive corrections and further mandated that Acme not prospectively restore the company, match to fifty percent. As a result,- Acme’s matching contribution remained at twenty-five percent through 2013.

In January 2013, Plaintiffs allege that Acme was forced by Berkshire to “adopt a ‘soft freeze’ immediately.” {Id. 8, ¶ 28.) As a result, effective March. 1, 2013; new employees were prevented from participating in the pension plan.

In 2014, Berkshire allegedly again contacted Acme about reducing or eliminating benefits in Acme’s retirement plans. The committees, as plan administrators, reviewed and analyzed the plans and the merger agreement (both in its current and prior forms), considered other options, and also consulted outside counsel. Ultimately, the committees concluded that section 5.7 of the merger agreement was'unambiguous and did not permit Acme to implement a ‘hard freeze’ or the reductions-requested by Berkshire and previously mistakenly implemented in 2010 and 2011 but knowingly continued through 2013.

As a result of Berkshire’s repeated requests to-reduce these benefits and alleged failure to permit Acme to return the matching contribution to fifty percent, an ethics report was filed with Berkshire’s audit committee. Despite repeatedly seeking a resolution from .this committee, none was forthcoming. As a result, on June 12, 2014, the 401(k) and pension-plan committees sent a letter to Acme’s board of directors demanding that Acme retroactively restore the fifty-percent matching contributions. The letter threatened legal action if Acme did not make the requested payments.

Berkshire allegedly responded by directing Dennis Knautz, Acme’s president -and chief executive officer, to give the committees an ultimatum: either (1) agree to a “hard freeze” of the pension plan and restore-the 401(k) plan’s employer matching contribution to fifty percent, -with the caveat that it could - be changed anytime after 2014; or (2) agree to a “hard freeze” of the pension .plan to be effective in five years and leave the 401(k) employer match at twenty-five percent. Knautz allegedly “reported that these alternatives were nonnegotiable, and that if neither of the alternatives were accepted by the Committees, then Berkshire .... intended to divest itself of Acme as a subsidiary.” {Id. 17, ¶55.) As a result, concerned both that séction 5.7 precluded them from legally amending the plans in the manner in which Berkshire demanded and that their failure to do so would -result in Berkshire’s divestiture of Acme,- the committees ultimately chose the first option and amended the pension plan accordingly on August 11, 2014.

As a result,- Plaintiffs filed this suit. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (West 2009), that (1) the terms of the plans were amended by section 5.7 of the merger agreement to include restrictions on changes, to the plans as set forth in section 5.7, and (2) that, the purported amendment to the plans dated August 11, 2014 violates the retirement plans, as amended by the merger agreement. Plaintiffs also contend that Acme breached its fiduciary duties to both plans under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 2009). Plaintiffs further complain that Berkshire knowingly participated in Acme’s breaches of fiduciary duties and also assert an alternative breach-of-contract claim against Berkshire. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, -attorney’s fees and costs.

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Bluebook (online)
138 F. Supp. 3d 813, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136613, 2015 WL 5920283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-v-berkshire-hathaway-inc-txnd-2015.