Hunter Noel Casto v. State of Iowa

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-1107

Filed August 19, 2026

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Hunter Noel Casto, Applicant–Appellee,

v.

State of Iowa,

Respondent–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Sarah Crane, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit (until withdrawal) and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellant.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.

Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

After a bench trial, Hunter Casto was found guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree. He successfully appealed his twenty-five-year indeterminate sentence with a lifetime special sentence and was resentenced to a twenty-five-year indeterminate prison sentence with a ten-year special sentence. Casto then filed for postconviction relief (PCR), which the district court granted because his trial counsel failed to comply with the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(2)(c)—which requires the court to hold an in-court colloquy to ensure proper waiver of the right to a jury trial— and found Casto was prejudiced by this failure. We affirm because Casto’s decision to waive his trial by jury was not the product of any understanding of what a jury trial entailed but how a jury might react to the evidence.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS We summarized the facts of Casto’s underlying criminal conviction in State v. Casto, No. 22-1260, 2023 WL 7014248, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2023). Here, we will only discuss the facts relevant to his PCR claim.

In 2019, the State charged Casto with sexual abuse in the second degree. Before trial, he waived his right to a jury trial in a one sentence EDMS filing which read: “COMES NOW the defendant by and through his attorney and hereby waives his right to a jury trial in this matter.” However, the waiver was not put on the record. The district court did not engage Casto in a faceto -face colloquy to ensure that his waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Because of scheduling difficulties arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, the case did not proceed to trial until 2022. After a bench trial, the court found Casto guilty as charged, sentencing him to a twenty-five-year

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indeterminate sentence with a lifetime special sentence. Casto successfully appealed his sentence, and the lifetime special sentence was reduced to a ten- year special sentence. In December 2023—after winning his appeal but before resentencing—Casto filed for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR trial was held in April 2025.

Casto testified that he signed the electronic waiver by email. He claimed that his trial attorney1 did not inform him of the differences between a jury trial and bench trial. Casto testified that when the two discussed the matter, counsel recommended waiving the jury trial because he believed juries are less sympathetic to defendants accused of sex crimes. Casto claimed that counsel did not tell him that a jury would consist of twelve members of the community, that he would be able to participate in jury selection, that a jury verdict would need to be unanimous, that he would not receive a reward from the court or the State for waiving, or that a judge alone would decide his case. Casto also testified that a judge discussed or explained his rights to him. He claimed that if he knew the consequences of waiving the jury trial, he would not have done so.

Trial counsel contradicted Casto’s testimony, asserting that he adequately educated Casto on the differences between the two trials. He testified that he believed he told Casto that he was entitled to a twelvemember jury, that he would be able to take part in jury selection, that the

1 The district court noted, Trial Counsel is well known to the Court as a competent, experienced, and thoughtful criminal defense attorney. The covid-related changes to court appearances and client communication may explain the failures identified here. This case also serves as a reminder to re-visit the jury waiver and ensure the necessary colloquy has been conducted prior to proceeding with a criminal bench trial.

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verdict would need to be unanimous, and that he was simply asking a judge rather than the jury to make the factfinding. Further, he explained that he told Casto that a bench trial might be in his best interest and that he had concerns that a jury might find some of the evidence upsetting because it was a sexualabuse case. However, he acknowledged that no record of their discussion was ever made.

The PCR court found that Casto’s testimony combined with the lack of an in-court colloquy was enough to satisfy the requirements for postconviction relief. The State now appeals, contending that Casto’s evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel was limited, self-serving, and contradicted by his trial counsel’s testimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[A] PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raises a constitutional claim, and we review postconviction proceedings that raise constitutional infirmities de novo.” Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up). In reviewing such claims, “we give weight to the [PCR] court’s findings on credibility of witnesses.” Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Iowa 1984) (citing now Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g)).

DISCUSSION

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) mandates that “[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives a jury trial in open court and on the record.” The State concedes that no in-court on-the-record colloquy was held regarding waiver, resulting in a breach of duty by trial counsel. However, the State argues that violation of rule 2.17(2)(c) alone is not enough to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and that Casto failed to prove that he did not knowingly,

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voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial—that is, Casto was not prejudiced.

To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, Casto must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003). Casto must prove both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Keller, 760 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 2009) (per curiam). For the first prong, failure to ensure compliance with rule 2.17(2)(c) is a breach of duty as a matter of law. Id. at 453. To satisfy the second prong, “[Casto] must prove . . . that, but for counsel’s failure to assure compliance with the rule, [he] would not have waived [his] right to a jury trial.” Id.

The State claims that despite the violation of rule 2.17(2)(c), Casto cannot satisfy the second prong because he was not prejudiced. Whether prejudice resulted from a lack of compliance with rule 2.17(2)(c) depends on “whether, notwithstanding the violation of the rule, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.” State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Iowa 2008). “Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) is designed to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.” Id. at 705. As part of this protection, the Iowa Supreme Court requires courts to conduct “some in-court colloquy or personal contact between the court and the defendant, to ensure the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 706 (citing Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 812). A written waiver, without more, is not enough to comply with the rule. Id. at 705.

In Liddell, our supreme court laid out five components of the colloquy:

(1) that twelve members of the community compose a jury; (2) that the defendant may take part in jury selection; (3) that jury verdicts must be

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unanimous; (4) that the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial; and (5) that neither the court nor the prosecution will reward the defendant for waiving a jury trial. 672 N.W.2d at 813–14. While these subjects may point towards a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, it is not a checklist or a black letter rule. Id. at 814. Substantial compliance is acceptable. See Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d at 706.

Because it is undisputed that trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty by failing to present Casto’s jury trial waiver on the record thus failing to ensure the district court conducted the necessary colloquy, we move to the second prong of the Strickland analysis. To start, the absence of a colloquy does not itself prove Casto misunderstood the right he surrendered. See id. at 708. Rather, the question is whether, but for counsel’s failure to secure a colloquy, he would have declined to waive. See Keller, 760 N.W.2d at 453. That burden was Casto’s to prove, and we conclude he carried it for two reasons.

First, we “defer especially” to the district court’s fact findings “where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted). That is because “the district court has a front-row seat to the live testimony,” viewing the demeanor of the witness as they testify and the parties, “whereas our review is limited to reading black words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Id. The foundational Iowa rule is that appellate courts give weight to the findings made by the postconviction court regarding the credibility of witnesses. See Wycoff v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1986). When testimony at a PCR hearing is directly contradictory—for example, when the applicant’s account of events conflicts with trial counsel’s account—the resolution of that conflict is a credibility determination for the PCR court to make. See Cox v.

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State, 554 N.W.2d 712, 714–15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). And our court will not disturb the PCR court’s resolution of such conflicts merely because the testimonies are at odds. Id. at 715. Looking at a sterile transcript, we find no reason to disturb the district court’s credibility determinations.

Second, Casto’s showing is not the bare, self-serving assertion the State describes. He testified that he had wanted a jury and yielded only because counsel urged a bench trial: “I wanted to do a jury trial. But he kept on pushing on the bench trial so I went with it.” That wish is direct evidence of the counterfactual, and his waiver rested—on his account and counsel’s alike—on a single consideration, counsel’s strategic concern about how a jury might receive the evidence, not on any understanding of what a jury trial entailed. That a jury comprises twelve members whose verdict must be unanimous bears directly on a defendant’s calculus, because a jury trial can turn on persuading a single juror. A defendant already inclined toward a jury, and moved off that inclination only by strategy, could well have chosen differently had he understood that feature.

The only contemporaneous record, the email exhibit, confirms counsel’s advice addressed the strategic reason to prefer a judge and that the judge would decide—and nothing about the number of jurors, selection, or unanimity. Counsel’s testimony matched: he believed he had explained these matters but could recall no specifics and conceded “it’s been a long time.” That corroboration lifts Casto’s recollection past uncorroborated say-so, see Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2015); Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2008), and refutes the claim that he was “otherwise well-informed,” see Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d at 708 n.4.

The PCR court determined that Casto’s testimony proved that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive his right to a jury trial

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because “there is no documentation that the fundamental details of a jury trial . . . were explained to Casto.” The court found that the only relevant evidence—an email between Casto and his attorney—was not enough to ensure that Casto knew the consequences of waiving a jury trial because it only mentioned one of the Liddell topics and explained strategy behind waiving a jury trial. We agree.

AFFIRMED.