Hunter Haddaway, Paul McCreary, Robert Sturgis, and Matthew Travis Houston v. James Dzurenda, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 9, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01876
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 HUNTER HADDAWAY, PAUL Case No. 2:25-cv-01876-ART-NJK MCCREARY, ROBERT STURGIS, AND 4 MATTHEW TRAVIS HOUSTON, ORDER STRIKING FUGITIVE DOCUMENTS AND DISMISSING AND 5 Plaintiffs, CLOSING CASE v. 6 JAMES DZURENDA, et al., (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 11, 12) 7 Defendants. 8 9 This action began with a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 10 an incomplete application to proceed in forma pauperis purportedly filed by 11 Nevada prisoners Hunter Haddaway, Paul McCreary, Robert Sturgis, and 12 Matthew Houston. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1). The initiating documents are recycled from 13 others of vexatious litigant Matthew Travis Houston’s lawsuits and direct the 14 Court to “see” those cases. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1-1 at 6–8). Because Houston 15 sought to bypass the vexatious litigant pre-filing order that applies to him when 16 initiating this lawsuit with other inmates, the Court dismissed him from this 17 action, denied the incomplete in forma pauperis application, dismissed the 18 complaint, and gave only Haddaway, McCreary, and Sturgis the opportunity to 19 proceed with this lawsuit if any of them wished to do so. (ECF No. 6). 20 To that end, the Court gave Haddaway, McCreary, and Sturgis until 21 November 19, 2025, to file a signed complaint with allegations pertaining to only 22 themselves and either pay the full $405 filing fee or each file his own new and 23 fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Id.) That deadline 24 expired without Haddaway, McCreary, or Sturgis complying with or responding 25 to the Court’s order. Houston, however, filed documents purporting, among other 26 things, to remove one plaintiff and add another, seeking injunctive relief, and 27 seeking permission to file this lawsuit. (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 11, 12). 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Non-party Houston’s documents are stricken from the docket. 3 Houston is not a party in this case. As explained in the Court’s prior order 4 and on numerous other occasions, Houston is subject to a vexatious litigant pre- 5 filing order issued by Judge Dorsey that requires him to satisfy certain 6 conditions before filing a new action in this court “using any pages he has already 7 filed in another case.” See Houston v. Encore Event Technologies, et al., Case No. 8 2:22-cv-01740-JAD-EJY, ECF No. 30 at 8 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2023). Because the 9 pre-filing order requires Houston to obtain permission from the chief judge before 10 he files a lawsuit, he cannot apply for that relief after he files a lawsuit in violation 11 of the order. Because Houston is not a party entitled to relief in this lawsuit and 12 his most recent filings violate the pre-filing order, those documents are stricken 13 from the docket. 14 B. Relevant factors favor dismissing this action. 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 16 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 17 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 18 Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 19 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 20 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 21 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 22 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 23 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 24 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 25 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 26 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 27 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 1 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 2 Cir. 1987)). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 4 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 5 dismissal of Haddaway, McCreary, and Sturgis’s claims. The third factor, risk of 6 prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 7 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 8 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 9 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring 10 disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring 11 dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 13 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 14 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 15 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 16 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 18 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 19 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 20 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 22 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 23 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 24 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 Because this action cannot realistically proceed until Haddaway, McCreary, and 26 Sturgis file a complaint and either pay the $405 filing fee or each files his own in 27 forma pauperis application, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 1 || only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The 2 || circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting a 3 || second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 4 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 5 || II. CONCLUSION 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 7 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 8 || dismissed without prejudice based on Hunter Haddaway, Paul McCreary, and 9 || Robert Sturgis’s failure to file a complaint and address the matter of the filing 10 || fee in compliance with this Court’s October 20, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court 11 || is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. If Hunter 12 || Haddaway, Paul McCreary, or Robert Sturgis wish to pursue their claims, they 13 || must do so in a new case and they must address the matter of the filing fee. 14 Non-party Matthew Travis Houston’s most recent filings (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 15 |} 11, 12) are stricken from the docket. If Houston wishes to pursue his claims, he 16 || must comply with the conditions of the pre-filing order. See Houston v. Encore 17 || Event Technologies, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-01740-JAD-EJY, ECF No. 30 at 8 (D. 18 || Nev. Oct. 24, 2023). 19 20 DATED: February 9, 2026. 21 22 j Me Vd 23 j 4 ANNE R. TRAUM 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28