Hunter, Dale v. Doug's Automotive

2018 TN WC 98
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJuly 3, 2018
Docket2017-08-1268
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 TN WC 98 (Hunter, Dale v. Doug's Automotive) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter, Dale v. Doug's Automotive, 2018 TN WC 98 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2018).

Opinion

FILED Jul 03, 2018 10:59 AM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT MURFREESBORO

DALE HUNTER, ) Docket No. 2017-08-1268 Employee, ) ) v. ) ) DOUG’S AUTOMOTIVE, ) State File No. 88488-2017 Employer. ) ) Judge Dale Tipps )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING BENEFITS

This matter came before the Court on June 26, 2018, for an Expedited Hearing. The present focus of this case is whether Mr. Hunter is entitled to medical and temporary disability benefits for his alleged back injury. The central legal issues are whether he is likely to establish at a hearing on the merits that he gave adequate notice of his alleged injury and whether it arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Mr. Hunter is likely to prove that he gave proper notice but cannot find he is likely to prove his injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. However, he is entitled to a panel of physicians.

History of Claim

Mr. Hunter worked for Doug’s Automotive as a mechanic. Doug and Candace Marshall are the owners of Doug’s Automotive. On October 16, 2017, Mr. Hunter was working on a car when a spring came loose. He twisted to avoid injury and felt something pop in his lower back. Mr. Hunter testified he reported the injury that day to Mr. Marshall and Phil Bradsher, who ran the front counter. Over the course of the week, Mr. Hunter told Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bradsher that he was not feeling better. They told him to return to work. He also reported the work injury to Ms. Marshall on October 19.

1 The Monday after the injury, Mr. Hunter told Mr. Marshall that he needed to see a doctor. Mr. Marshall sent him to Dr. Benjamin Boston, a chiropractor. Doug’s Automotive later provided treatment with Richard Green, FNP and then with Concentra Medical Centers.

Mr. Hunter saw Dr. Boston on October 23 for complaints of low back pain arising from an October 16 work injury. Noting that Mr. Hunter suffered a lumbar injury in a 1989 car accident, Dr. Boston diagnosed sciatica, spasm, and segment dysfunction.

Mr. Hunter saw FNP Green on October 26. He noted Mr. Hunter “had an on the job injury at Doug’s Automotive 10/16 that irritated an old injury from 1989 when he was in an accident and ruptured L4-L5 – He describes a very heavy piece of equipment about to fall on him and had to move quickly to avoid it.” Mr. Hunter reported low back pain and tingling in both legs. FNP Green diagnosed “backache” and prescribed Medrol, Tramadol, and Baclofen. He also took Mr. Hunter off work for a week.

Mr. Hunter returned to FNP Green on November 2 reporting slight improvement but still suffering from pain and numbness. He continued work restrictions through November 9.

Concentra records indicate that Mr. Hunter saw Dr. Tracye Kyles on January 9, 2018. Dr. Kyles assessed lumbar strain and ordered physical therapy. She also assigned restrictions on lifting and bending.

After Mr. Hunter’s first visit to Concentra, Mr. Marshall asked him to sign a form offering transitional work within his restrictions. However, the letter only offered five hours of work per day at a rate of $10.00 per hour, which was half of Mr. Hunter’s usual wage. Mr. Hunter declined the offer and took another job because he needed to pay his bills.

When Mr. Hunter returned on January 24, Dr. Kyles noted he was still symptomatic, but she felt he was “at functional goal, not at end of healing.” She prescribed a pain-relieving gel and stated that Mr. Hunter “was released from care as maximum medical improvement was reached for the patient’s injury(ies).” She instructed him to return if his pain worsened.

Mr. and Ms. Marshall testified that, because of an administrative problem, Doug’s Automotive had no workers’ compensation coverage at the time of Mr. Hunter’s injury, even though it had more than five employees. They also disputed that Mr. Hunter gave immediate notice of a work injury. Instead, Ms. Marshall stated that, although Mr. Hunter complained of back pain on October 16, he did not report a work-related cause of that pain until October 23. Because Mr. Hunter could not afford medical care, the

2 Marshalls volunteered to send him to Dr. Boston. They continued to pay for medical treatment with other providers.

Mr. Hunter acknowledged that Doug’s Automotive paid his medical treatment to date. However, he still suffers from pain and numbness and cannot afford medical treatment. He requested that the Court order Doug’s Automotive to provide additional medical treatment and pay temporary disability benefits.

Doug’s Automotive countered that Mr. Hunter is not entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits. It questioned whether the incident occurred as Mr. Hunter described it, based on his failure to immediately provide notice of his injury. Doug’s Automotive also contended that it provided appropriate medical treatment that Mr. Hunter willingly accepted. He never objected to the providers or requested a panel or alternative care. Further, Doug’s Automotive argued that Mr. Hunter failed to establish that he is likely to prove that his work was the primary cause of his condition.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Mr. Hunter need not prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. Instead, he must come forward with sufficient evidence from which this Court might determine he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2017); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

Compensability

To prove a compensable injury, Mr. Hunter must show that his alleged injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. To do so, he must show his injury primarily arose out of a work-related incident, or specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Further, he must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court notes that Doug’s Automotive presented no testimony or other proof to contradict Mr. Hunter’s description of the work accident on October 16. The Court found his testimony credible, but more importantly, it was unrebutted. Although Mr. and Ms. Marshall disputed Mr. Hunter’s contention that he reported the work injury the day it occurred, they acknowledged he did

3 so within a week.1 Whatever skepticism they might harbor because of this alleged delay does not constitute evidence regarding the actual occurrence of the work incident. Thus, no genuine dispute exists that Mr. Hunter established a specific incident, identifiable by time and place. The question, therefore, is whether he appears likely to prove at a hearing on the merits that his work was the primary cause of the injury. The Court cannot find at this time that Mr. Hunter is likely to meet this burden.

The Court accepted numerous medical records into evidence, but neither party submitted any medical opinions addressing the cause of Mr. Hunter’s condition.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(d)(1)

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2018 TN WC 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-dale-v-dougs-automotive-tennworkcompcl-2018.