Hunter Bass v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0615
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0615-MR

HUNTER BASS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CR-00024

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Hunter Bass appeals from a judgment of the Ballard Circuit

Court sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment for reckless homicide. We

affirm.

The facts underlying Bass’s conviction are not germane to the

extremely narrow issue before us. A Ballard County grand jury indicted Bass in

March 2024 for wanton murder. In March 2025, a jury found Bass guilty of reckless homicide. Bass then filed a motion asking the trial court to note in the

forthcoming final judgment that he was not a violent offender.

Bass’s motion was based on the fact that amendments to Kentucky’s

violent offender statute, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 439.3401, took effect on

July 15, 2024 (after he committed the offense but before he was convicted). Bass

argued applying the 2024 amendments to him would be an ex post facto violation.

Previously, KRS 439.3401(1)(c) provided in relevant part that a

violent offender included a person who was convicted of “[a] Class B felony

involving the death of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim[.]” But

reckless homicide is a Class D felony under KRS 507.050. Now, KRS

439.3401(1)(b)1. provides in relevant part that a person is a violent offender if he

or she is convicted of “[a] felony involving the death of the victim or serious

physical injury to a victim[.]” Bass’s offense resulted in the victim’s death, so he

would facially be a violent offender under the new version of the statute.

If Bass is classified as a violent offender, he must serve 85% of his

sentence before first becoming eligible for parole under KRS 439.3401(4); if Bass

is not classified as a violent offender, as a person convicted of a Class D felony, he

must serve only 15% of his sentence before first becoming eligible for parole under

KRS 439.340(3)(a). The trial court denied Bass’s motion because it concluded

-2- classifying an inmate as a violent offender was a matter reserved for the

Department of Corrections. Bass then filed this appeal.

Bass argues that his being classified as a violent offender would be an

improper retroactive application of the 2024 amendments to KRS 439.3401. The

Commonwealth disagrees. However, we perceive that the narrow issue properly

before us is only whether the trial court properly denied Bass’s motion—not the

underlying merits of whether Bass should be classified as a violent offender. We

affirm because precedent clearly holds that a trial court is not responsible for

designating in a final judgment whether a defendant is a violent offender.

Two decades ago, we held that a trial court properly denied Kentucky

Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(f) postconviction relief to a defendant who

“argued that he has been incorrectly classified as a violent offender by the

Department of Corrections, thus resulting in a longer period of time before he will

be eligible for parole consideration than had he not been so classified.” Hoskins v.

Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Ky. App. 2005). We explained that

determining whether a defendant was a violent offender is a decision which

“would be made by the Department of Corrections. The circuit court’s only role is

to make the factual determination set forth in KRS 439.3401(1).”1 Id. at 217. We

1 KRS 439.3401(2)(a), formerly KRS 439.3401(1), requires a court to designate in the final judgment whether the victim suffered death or a violent physical injury. The trial court here properly made that designation.

-3- explained that an inmate dissatisfied with his or her parole eligibility calculation

must “proceed against the Department of Corrections with an original action before

the Franklin Circuit Court.” Id.

Hoskins is not an outlier. For example, though it declined to directly

address whether Hoskins was correctly decided, our Supreme Court has similarly

held that “[t]ypically, the DOC is in charge of classifying inmates as violent

offenders for purposes of parole. If the inmate takes issue with the classification,

he must file an action against the DOC rather than argue the issue in his direct

appeal.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 90 n.93 (Ky. 2013).

Similarly, our Supreme Court has declined a defendant’s request “to order the

Department of Corrections to classify him as a non-violent offender.” Mason v.

Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 610, 628 (Ky. 2011).

The result is that the trial court properly denied Bass’s motion because

the motion asked the trial court for relief the court was not authorized to provide.

The Department of Corrections, not the sentencing court, initially determines

whether an inmate is a violent offender. And the Department of Corrections has

never been a party to this action. Id. at 629 (citing Hoskins and declining to order

the Department of Corrections to amend its classification of a defendant since it

was not a party to the action). If Bass is dissatisfied with his classification, he

-4- must file an action against the Department of Corrections in the Franklin Circuit

Court. Newcomb, 410 S.W.3d at 90 n.93; Hoskins, 158 S.W.3d at 217.

We therefore decline to address the remaining issues and citations to

authority contained in the parties’ briefs as they lack relevance or merit in

resolving the limited issue properly before us. Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29

n.1 (Ky. App. 2021).2

For the foregoing reasons, the Ballard Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jeremy Ian Smith Russell Coleman Paducah, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Shawn D. Chapman Deputy Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky

2 The Department of Corrections has apparently now classified Bass as a violent offender. We decline to address that decision as it occurred after the issuance of the judgment on appeal and was made by an entity which has never been a party to this action. Mason, 331 S.W.3d at 629. We reiterate that if Bass wishes to challenge the Department of Corrections’ classification of him as a violent offender, he must file an action against that agency in the Franklin Circuit Court.

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