Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc.

446 F. Supp. 1109, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19017
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 15, 1978
DocketCV475-95
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 446 F. Supp. 1109 (Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1109, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19017 (S.D. Ga. 1978).

Opinion

OPINION

LAWRENCE, District Judge.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

I

This is an action by Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 304(a), against Central Truck Lines, Inc., a motor carrier subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. Plaintiff sues to recover alleged overcharges by Central, totalling $12,172.35, in violation of Tariff 169-Q of *1110 the Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference (SMCRC). 1

Hunt-Wesson claims that the overcharges resulted from being billed in accordance with the higher Class Rate established by the Tariff whereas the shipments should have been billed on the basis of the lower Point to Point Commodity Rate which was applicable thereto. 2

The casS was tried before this Court without a jury on February 16, 1978. Briefs have been filed.

The controversy over the proper freight rate involves the application and interpretation of the following provision of Tariff 517-F (page 5) Rules:

“(2) The loading ... of the freight must be performed by the shipper at his expense, without any assistance from the carrier. The carrier employee and power unit is to be released while loading ... is performed. At carriers’ option the carriers’ employee and power unit may remain during loading . but will render no assistance in loading. . . . ”

II

Background of Litigation

During the period concerned (1972-74), Hunt-Wesson maintained a food distribution center at Savannah. Shipments were made by motor carrier to consignees at various points in Florida. The customary procedure was for Hunt-Wesson to call the dispatcher of Central Truck Lines at its Savannah terminal and advise that trucks were needed for the purpose of loading and transporting shipments. A driver of the carrier would proceed with a tractor-trailer rig to the Distribution Center. The trailer would be backed up to a loading ramp preparatory to being loaded. The cartons were brought from the Distribution Center by hydraulic forklift trucks operated by employees of Hunt-Wesson. The cartons were stacked on wooden pallets supplied by the shipper.

During the loading process, Central’s drivers were constantly present. Under the quoted provision of the SMCRC Tariff, the shipper had the duty to load shipments at its expense. The lower point-to-point rate contemplated that the carrier’s driver and power unit (tractor) would be released during the loading so as to be available for services elsewhere. He had the option of remaining but was not to render any assistance in loading cargo. Hunt-Wesson presented testimony that the drivers stayed with the rig only for the purpose of checking the freight and seldom took part in the loading process. It is clear from the evidence that if a driver had disconnected the power unit and departed, the shipper would not have loaded the truck.

The carrier contends that the principal reason for the lower point-to-point commodity rate, as opposed to the straight class rate, was that in the former case the carrier’s driver and power unit could be released for other work during the period of loading by the shipper. In the Savannah operation the carrier used three tractors and approximately twenty trailers. While they were being loaded, the driver and tractor could be employed elsewhere in delivering or picking up trailers. Hunt-Wesson witnesses testified that the loading took less than an hour in most cases. There was, however, evidence that normally only three trailers would be loaded during a working day.

The fact of the matter is that with few exceptions cargo could not be properly loaded by the shipper without the assistance of *1111 Central’s driver. His services were indispensable. Union rules prohibited the forklift operators from “hand handling” any cargo once the forklifts entered the trailer. Central’s driver checked and counted the cargo. Occasionally he would direct the placement of cartons for convenience in unloading at a particular destination. He physically handled the cartons in many instances. The floor of the trailer normally held 22 pallets. However, when 24 pallets were loaded the driver would have to move the top row of cartons on the rear pallets to keep them from falling off. Where more than 22 pallets were loaded the excess pallets would be dropped on the loading dock. The driver would hand load them into the trailer. If the load was uneven in height, the cartons had to be restacked in order to equalize the load. In the case of mixed shipments (that is, foodstuffs in different sized packages or cartons) drivers would stack the cases evenly in the trailer after breaking down the pallet.

In none of these phases of the loading process did the employees of the shipper participate. The Class Rate charged by the carrier to Hunt-Wesson was based on the theory that there was no complete loading by shipper and that the driver was required to assist therein and to remain with the rig during the loading. The term “loading” would seem to embrace, at least in part, the services performed by the driver. The Interstate Commerce Commission has defined the “process of loading and unloading” as “the movement of lading past the tailgate of motor vehicle which includes the storing, stacking, and breaking out of the lading within a motor vehicle.” “We further believe,” the Commission added, “that our definition is consistent with industry usage and practice.” See 343 I.C.C. Reports 457, 466; “Definition of Loading & Unloading by Various Carriers,” No. 35445, 5/21/73. 3

The bills of lading issued by Central to Hunt-Wesson bore in most cases the typewritten notation “Shippers Load.” Plaintiff attaches importance to the omission of the words “and Count,” citing the use of the term “Shipper’s weight, load, and count” in 49 U.S.C. § 100. The effect of such language in bills of lading is to place the burden on the shipper to prove that the goods were properly loaded and counted. The term in that context is used for protection of the carrier from liability in case of damage or shortage to the shipment. See United States v. Central of Georgia Railway Company, 411 F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (E.D., Tenn.); Dublin Company v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.).

Counsel for Hunt-Wesson emphasize the fact that effective on November 30, 1974 (after the period of the shipments involved in this litigation) the Tariff was supplemented by the substitution of the words “Consignor to load and count the shipment” for “Consignor to load the shipment.” See Tariff 169-R

This Court discerns no large significance in the amendment as far as this particular case is concerned. Whoever it was that had the burden of counting the cargo under the Tariff, the carrier assumed same.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
446 F. Supp. 1109, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19017, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunt-wesson-foods-inc-v-central-truck-lines-inc-gasd-1978.