NOEL, District Judge.
Before the Court are respondent’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and to transfer this libel in per-sonam.
Libelant was injured while a seaman aboard one of respondent’s vessels. He alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the respondent and/or by the unseaworthiness of its vessel. Libelant filed this action in admiralty in personam in the Galveston Division of this, the Southern District of Texas. Process was served upon an agent of the respondent in the Houston Division of this District.
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction over it, apparently on the ground that it does not do business in the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas even- though it does do business in the Houston Division. Respondent’s position is incorrect. The admiralty jurisdiction of a United States District Court is coextensive with the territorial boundaries of the state within which it sits, and the Court acquires in personam jurisdiction by service anywhere in the-state.1 Respondent’s motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
Respondent further asserts-that venue of this action is proper in-the Houston Division, not the Galveston Division, and requests transfer of the-libel accordingly. Venue, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is a wholly different question. The venue requirements in a libel in personam were stated in In re Louisville Underwriters 2 as follows:
“By the ancient and settled practice of courts of admiralty, a libel in personam may be maintained for any cause within their jurisdiction, wherever a monition can be served upon the libellee, or an attachment made of any personal property or credits of his * *
The latter criterion does not apply here-. The first does apply and, literally read, as it must be, provides that an in per-sonam libel "may be maintained * * * wherever a monition3 can be served upon the libelee.’’ (Emphasis ours.)
Now before the Court, sitting in a district divided into divisions, is the question whether venue is proper in one ■division of a district when in personam service absent foreign attachment is made in another division. It is one of first impression.
There is little doubt that service must he made at least within the district of the forum for venue to be proper.4 While there have been expressions that venue would lie anywhere in a district so long as service is made somewhere in the district,5 the precise question before this Court was not considered at the time ■of such expressions. I feel they were merely a convenient but unfortunate manner of stating that a suit may be held at the very place of service.
The purpose of courts of admiralty in adopting what is herein referred to .as the “general admiralty venue rule” is well stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Louisville Under-writers :6
“Courts of admiralty are established for the settlement of disputes between persons engaged in commerce and navigation, who, on the ■one hand, may be absent from their homes for long periods of time, and, on the other hand, often have property or credits in other places. * * * ‘Courts of admiralty have been found necessary in all commercial countries, for the safety and convenience of commerce and the speedy decision of controversies, where delay would often be ruin.’ * * * To compel suitors in admiralty (when the ship is abroad and cannot be reached by a libel in rem) to resort to the home of the defendant, and to prevent them from suing him in any district in which he might be served with a summons or his goods or credits attached, would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial of justice.”
Thus, the underlying purpose of the rule was the desire of courts of admiralty to afford a convenient forum for speedy disposition of all admiralty controversies. It was not to afford as many forums as possible for seamen, even to the extent of making venue coextensive with jurisdiction.
In fixing venue for particular causes of action accruing to seamen, Congress has not seen fit to provide them with the largest possible number of forums. For example, the venue requirements established by Congress for Jones Act cases are even more restrictive than those of the general corporate venue statute. The Jones Act provides that actions be brought in “the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” 7 By contrast, the general corporate venue statute provides that “(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.” 8 While [282]*282certainly not dispositive of the question, the provision of the Congress with respect to Jones Act venue may be looked to for guidance in determining the policy and intent of the Congress in this area.
Likewise, the courts have not expanded the rights of seamen in this area of venue. For example, in Leith v. Oil Transport Co.,9 the Court refused to supplement the Jones Act venue requirements with the general-corporate venue statute. While it is true that in a Jones Act suit brought in admiralty,10 the general admiralty venue rule will apply, this does not indicate preferred treatment for seamen,11 for if such treatment were intended to be accorded them, it would have been extended in civil actions as well as those in admiralty. It only indicates a policy on the part of the courts in all admiralty cases, to provide a speedy, convenient forum.
Thus, the determination of this important question of first impression is not to be made in the atmosphere of a compelling policy consideration heretofore created either by the Congress or by courts of admiralty, which would suggest or require that the general admiralty venue rule be so interpreted as to provide as diverse venue as possible for seamen. I feel that the problem here is to give this general venue rule, created by decision of courts of admiralty, a reasonable, common-sense interpretation in the light of the relevant facts12 and the underlying purpose of venue provisions.
[283]*283In discussing the general nature of venue, Professor Moore states13 “In state practice venue is normally geared to the county, while in federal practice [284]*284venue is geared to the district or, where the district is divided into divisions, to a division thereof.”
Venue has been held improper under the general corporate venue statute, 28 U.S.C.A.
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NOEL, District Judge.
Before the Court are respondent’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and to transfer this libel in per-sonam.
Libelant was injured while a seaman aboard one of respondent’s vessels. He alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the respondent and/or by the unseaworthiness of its vessel. Libelant filed this action in admiralty in personam in the Galveston Division of this, the Southern District of Texas. Process was served upon an agent of the respondent in the Houston Division of this District.
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction over it, apparently on the ground that it does not do business in the Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas even- though it does do business in the Houston Division. Respondent’s position is incorrect. The admiralty jurisdiction of a United States District Court is coextensive with the territorial boundaries of the state within which it sits, and the Court acquires in personam jurisdiction by service anywhere in the-state.1 Respondent’s motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
Respondent further asserts-that venue of this action is proper in-the Houston Division, not the Galveston Division, and requests transfer of the-libel accordingly. Venue, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is a wholly different question. The venue requirements in a libel in personam were stated in In re Louisville Underwriters 2 as follows:
“By the ancient and settled practice of courts of admiralty, a libel in personam may be maintained for any cause within their jurisdiction, wherever a monition can be served upon the libellee, or an attachment made of any personal property or credits of his * *
The latter criterion does not apply here-. The first does apply and, literally read, as it must be, provides that an in per-sonam libel "may be maintained * * * wherever a monition3 can be served upon the libelee.’’ (Emphasis ours.)
Now before the Court, sitting in a district divided into divisions, is the question whether venue is proper in one ■division of a district when in personam service absent foreign attachment is made in another division. It is one of first impression.
There is little doubt that service must he made at least within the district of the forum for venue to be proper.4 While there have been expressions that venue would lie anywhere in a district so long as service is made somewhere in the district,5 the precise question before this Court was not considered at the time ■of such expressions. I feel they were merely a convenient but unfortunate manner of stating that a suit may be held at the very place of service.
The purpose of courts of admiralty in adopting what is herein referred to .as the “general admiralty venue rule” is well stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Louisville Under-writers :6
“Courts of admiralty are established for the settlement of disputes between persons engaged in commerce and navigation, who, on the ■one hand, may be absent from their homes for long periods of time, and, on the other hand, often have property or credits in other places. * * * ‘Courts of admiralty have been found necessary in all commercial countries, for the safety and convenience of commerce and the speedy decision of controversies, where delay would often be ruin.’ * * * To compel suitors in admiralty (when the ship is abroad and cannot be reached by a libel in rem) to resort to the home of the defendant, and to prevent them from suing him in any district in which he might be served with a summons or his goods or credits attached, would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial of justice.”
Thus, the underlying purpose of the rule was the desire of courts of admiralty to afford a convenient forum for speedy disposition of all admiralty controversies. It was not to afford as many forums as possible for seamen, even to the extent of making venue coextensive with jurisdiction.
In fixing venue for particular causes of action accruing to seamen, Congress has not seen fit to provide them with the largest possible number of forums. For example, the venue requirements established by Congress for Jones Act cases are even more restrictive than those of the general corporate venue statute. The Jones Act provides that actions be brought in “the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” 7 By contrast, the general corporate venue statute provides that “(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.” 8 While [282]*282certainly not dispositive of the question, the provision of the Congress with respect to Jones Act venue may be looked to for guidance in determining the policy and intent of the Congress in this area.
Likewise, the courts have not expanded the rights of seamen in this area of venue. For example, in Leith v. Oil Transport Co.,9 the Court refused to supplement the Jones Act venue requirements with the general-corporate venue statute. While it is true that in a Jones Act suit brought in admiralty,10 the general admiralty venue rule will apply, this does not indicate preferred treatment for seamen,11 for if such treatment were intended to be accorded them, it would have been extended in civil actions as well as those in admiralty. It only indicates a policy on the part of the courts in all admiralty cases, to provide a speedy, convenient forum.
Thus, the determination of this important question of first impression is not to be made in the atmosphere of a compelling policy consideration heretofore created either by the Congress or by courts of admiralty, which would suggest or require that the general admiralty venue rule be so interpreted as to provide as diverse venue as possible for seamen. I feel that the problem here is to give this general venue rule, created by decision of courts of admiralty, a reasonable, common-sense interpretation in the light of the relevant facts12 and the underlying purpose of venue provisions.
[283]*283In discussing the general nature of venue, Professor Moore states13 “In state practice venue is normally geared to the county, while in federal practice [284]*284venue is geared to the district or, where the district is divided into divisions, to a division thereof.”
Venue has been held improper under the general corporate venue statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c), where suit was filed in a division in which the defendant was not doing business even though such defendant was doing business in other divisions of the same district.14
Venue has also been held improper in an in rem admiralty action where suit was brought in one division but the vessel arrested in another division of the same district.15 Although this holding was based upon a perhaps erroneous application of a civil venue statute, it, nonetheless, indicates the absence of any judicial policy extending special consideration to seamen in this area of venue and, also, the feeling of the court that venue should be geared to divisions.
Each time the question has been considered, whether by Congress, courts or scholars, the division has been asserted to be the proper unit for the application of venue provisions. Absent any policy behind the general admiralty venue rule which would dictate otherwise, the same approach should prevail in its application here. As previously discussed, the purpose underlying the general admiralty venue rule was to avoid any hardship which might result to any libelant from having to bring suit at the residence of a respondent. The purpose was not to provide a seaman with multiple forums. Gearing venue to a division rather than a district would not violate the purpose of the rule; it would' only bring to fruition that which the rule-plainly contemplates, that suit be brought at the actual place of in personam service, which is entirely consistent with the-general policy that federal venue is ordinarily geared to divisions.
The general admiralty venue rule as-now interpreted by this Court would not deprive a seaman of the effective use off Galveston as a forum for an in personam libel in a proper case. Under the holding here, such a libel could still be-brought in Galveston whenever service-upon an agent of a respondent, seizure of an offending vessel, or seizure of any other property of a respondent could be effectuated there. The holding here is limited in scope to the precise question- and facts before the Court.
The alternative to gearing venue to a-division would be to compel respondents-to use the device of transfer under §' 1404(a).16 Such an approach would undoubtedly necessitate a § 1404(a) determination for almost every seaman’s case filed in Galveston. This would cause delay, added expense to the litigants, and', unnecessary work for the Court. It would therefore appear that a rule gearing venue to divisions should be established, rather than having it depend upon an ad hoc, case-by-case 1404(a) determination.
Respondent’s latter motion is therefore granted and this libel is ordered' transferred to the Houston Division;
. The basis for the rule is not the serving of the process but is the “presence” - of the respondent, either by maintaining an office, possessing property or doing [281]*281business, at the place the process is served.