Hunt v. Hunt

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: 422, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HUGO HUNT,1 § § No. 422, 2023 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CN21-03953 PAIGE HUNT, § Petition No. 21-17603 § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: August 23, 2024 Decided: October 16, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the Family Court record, it appears to

the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Hugo Hunt (“Ex-Husband”), filed this appeal from the Family

Court’s September 11, 2023 order resolving ancillary matters related to his divorce from

Paige Hunt (“Ex-Wife”) (the “Ancillary Matters Order”). We find no error or abuse of

discretion in the Family Court’s decision and therefore affirm.

(2) The parties were married on February 23, 1999. On July 20, 2021, Ex-

Husband filed a petition for divorce, claiming that the parties had separated on November

1, 2019. Ex-Wife answered the petition on August 13, 2021, claiming that the parties had

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). separated on June 30, 2021, and asking the Family Court to retain jurisdiction over

ancillary matters—specifically, property division, alimony, court costs, and attorneys’ fees.

Thereafter, Ex-Husband moved for leave to amend the petition for divorce to include a

post-nuptial agreement purportedly reached by the parties in March 2021. Ex-Wife moved

to dismiss the motion for leave to amend, arguing that the motion had not been properly

served and that Ex-Wife had signed the post-nuptial agreement under duress. Noting Ex-

Wife’s claim of coercion, a Family Court commissioner denied Ex-Husband’s motion for

leave to amend but observed that the enforceability of the post-nuptial agreement could be

addressed during the ancillary proceedings.

(3) After several case management conferences and a pretrial conference—at

which the parties signed off on an ancillary pretrial stipulation detailing the remaining

issues in dispute—the Family Court held a two-day hearing on the merits. During the

hearing, the Family Court heard testimony from Ex-Wife, Ex-Husband, a property

appraiser who assessed the value of three land parcels partially owned by Ex-Husband, and

a property appraiser who assessed the value of the parties’ marital residence. After noting

that “[n]either party has asked [the court] to consider [the post-nuptial agreement] as

controlling,” Ex-Husband moved for its admission “for the attorney’s fees issue only.”2

The Family Court allowed its admission “for that limited purpose.”3

2 App. to Answering Br. at B-28. 3 Id. at B-29.

2 (4) On September 11, 2023, the Family Court issued the Ancillary Matters

Order. Applying the factors set forth in 13 Del. C. § 1513(a), the court held that the marital

assets were to be divided 60/40 in favor of Ex-Wife. The court also held that Ex-Wife was

entitled to monthly alimony and ordered Ex-Husband to reimburse Ex-Wife for $15,083.00

in attorneys’ fees. Ex-Husband appeals.

(5) Our review of a decision of the Family Court extends to a review of the facts

and law, as well as inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.4 Our duty is to

review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings. 5 Findings

of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 6 We will not

substitute our opinion for the inferences and deductions of the trial judge if they are

supported by the record.7 If the Family Court correctly applied the law to the facts, we

review its decision for abuse of discretion.8

(6) On appeal, Ex-Husband argues that the Family Court erred when it declined

to enforce the post-nuptial agreement and by finding that the parties separated on

September 1, 2020. Ex-Husband’s arguments are without merit. First, it is clear from the

ancillary pretrial stipulation—to which the parties were bound “absent a showing of good

4 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Clark v. Clark, 47 A.3d 513, 517 (Del. 2012).

3 cause”9 and which contains no reference to the post-nuptial agreement—that Ex-Husband

had abandoned any effort to enforce the post-nuptial agreement as of the February 28, 2023

pretrial conference. Moreover, the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel

during the proceedings, informed the court that they “agree[d]” that the post-nuptial

agreement was “not binding.”10 Second, although the parties initially disputed the date of

their financial separation, the parties—again, with the assistance of counsel—agreed at the

outset of the ancillary hearing to use September 1, 2020, as the date of their financial

separation.11 Ex-Husband cannot press claims of error on appeal that he affirmatively

waived below.12

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be

AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice

9 App. to Answering Br. at B-18. 10 Id. at B-29. 11 Id. at B-27. 12 See Pierce v. State, 270 A.3d 219, 230 (Del. 2022) (concluding that the defendant had waived his claim of error regarding the admission of palmprint evidence on appeal when trial counsel had agreed to the admission of that evidence at trial).