Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 19, 2025
Docket5:13-cv-02168
StatusUnknown

This text of Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. (Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., (N.D. Ala. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

BILLY JOE HUNT, ) for the use and benefit of ) United States of America, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 5:13-cv-2168-LCB ) COCHISE CONSULTANCY, ) INC., d/b/a COCHISE ) SECURITY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before the Court is Relator Billy Joe Hunt’s First Amended Complaint, Doc. 118, and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Docs. 213, 220. Hunt’s operative complaint asserts that Cochise Consultancy, Inc., and the Parsons Corporation violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., by conspiring to award Cochise a subcontract it was not qualified to receive and falsely certifying that the bid process complied with federal laws and regulations. Doc. 118 at 36. But because Hunt has abandoned the bribery and kickback allegations at the core of his FCA claims and failed to prove his alternative theories of liability, the Court WILL GRANT the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. I. Background

A. Factual Background When the United States launched its campaign against Saddam Hussein in 2003, few imagined that the war in Iraq would continue (in one form or another) for two decades, that it would cost 4,599 American servicemen and women and 3,650

government contractors their lives, and that it would cost the U.S. government an estimated $1.79 trillion. Crawford, Neta, Blood and Treasure: United States Budgetary Costs and Human Costs of 20 Years of War in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2023 at 1, 14 (Brown University, Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs)

(2023), available at https://perma.cc/GD8L-EA8Z. This case is about where some of that $1.79 trillion went, how it got there, and whether it got there legally. In 2004, as the contours of the Iraq conflict were shifting from a traditional

campaign against the Iraqi military to a nation-building and anti-insurgency effort, the United States began hiring civilian contractors to help it find and dispose of munitions left behind by Saddam’s forces. That September, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded one such munitions clean up contract (the

CMC Contract) to the Parsons Corporation, a large defense contractor. Doc. 221-23. In late January 2006, USACE “funded Task Order 10,” an amendment to the CMC contract “which required Parsons to hire a subcontractor to provide Class V security

(logistical convoys transporting explosives and ordnances) and Personnel Security Detail (‘PSD’) services (protection of people, including both USACE officials and Parsons employees, as they moved between sites outside of established U.S. military

bases in Iraq) and the operation of a ‘reception facility in Kuwait[.]’” Doc. 220 at 13 (citing Doc. 221-24). Defendant Cochise Consultancy was also active in Iraq as a civilian

contractor, including work providing at least some Class V and PSD services for USACE. Doc. 216-3. Although the full scope of Cochise’s prior work for USACE is unclear, Parsons’ bid evaluation stated that Cochise “was currently subcontracted . . . to provide some Class V and PSD functions for the USACE,”

Doc. 216-4 at 3, and an internal Parsons memo described Cochise as USACE’s “incumbent provider” and stated that Cochise “had been providing [Class V and PSD] services under a subcontract to U.S.A. Environmental (USAE) for the previous

2 years.” Doc. 221-18; see also Doc. 221-26 at 8 (Cochise capability document highlighting a 2003 contract with USAE and USACE to “provid[e] Convoy and Site Security for the Captured Enemy Ammunition program”); Doc. 231-1 at 23, 33 (testimony of Guy Irvin that the contractual relationship between Cochise and

U.S.A. Environmental was “self-evident”). On January 18, 2006—before USACE had formally funded Parsons’ proposal—Parsons sent a request for quotation (RFQ) to “to companies with which

it [already] had a Basic Ordering Agreement (‘BOA’),” which is “essentially a pre- approval of a company’s ability to perform as a subcontractor based on an analysis of both its technical and financial capabilities.” Doc. 220 at 4-5, 14. Parsons did not

send an RFQ to Cochise “because Cochise did not have a[n existing] BOA” with Parsons. Id. at 14. On January 24, Jesse Johnson, owner and president of Cochise, emailed Guy

Irvin, Parsons’ Country Security Manager in Iraq (CSM Irvin), with the “objective” of “get[ting Cochise] entered into the procedure to submit a bid” for the Class V/PSD contract and entering a BOA with Parsons. Doc. 221-77 at 3. Cochise submitted the documents required for a BOA, and the following day CSM Irvin sent Parsons

Senior Subcontract Administrator Dwight Hill (SSA Hill) an email stating that “[h]aving evaluated Cochise from a technical standpoint” he found “them acceptable for inclusion into our Basic Ordering Agreement.” Doc. 216-3 at 2.

Following SSA Hill’s evaluation, Parsons decided to re-issue its RFQ for the subcontract “at the insistence and direction” of USACE Project Manager Wayne Shaw (PM Shaw).1 Doc. 234 at 15. The reasons for USACE and PM Shaw’s insistence aren’t clear from the record, but Parsons’ sole-source justification memo

stated that Parsons canceled “[t]he initial bid process . . . due to the lack of

1 Hunt continues to use this fact to suggest impropriety, but has abandoned his allegation that Cochise gave PM Shaw bribes and gratuities “[i]n return for the favorable treatment.” (Doc. 118 at 4). Without more, no reasonable jury could conclude that PM Shaw’s concern for the exclusion of an incumbent vendor from the bidding process was criminal. U.S. ex rel., Kaimowitz v. Ansley, 250 F. App’x 912, 914 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”). competitive range,” since just two firms submitted bids. Doc. 221-18. In any event, USACE “requested that Cochise be added to the bidders list during the second bid

attempt,” and on February 8, Parsons issued a new RFQ to six total firms, including Cochise, with a bid deadline of February 10, 2006. Doc. 221-34. Three companies submitted bids this time—Sabre International Security,

ArmorGroup, and Cochise. Doc. 216-4. Crucially, ArmorGroup told Parsons that it needed twenty-six days to train and mobilize personnel, Doc. 221-3 at 18, while Cochise’s proposal stated that it had “personnel currently in country” who “will remain in country and will be immediately ready to assume the mission.” Doc. 216-

13 at 2. The afternoon of February 11, 2006, one day after the bid deadline, USACE PM Shaw emailed contacts at Parsons, including Billy Joe Hunt (the relator here),

who was serving as Deputy Program Manager of Operations for Parsons on the CMC Program. Doc. 221-36; see Doc. 216-6. PM Shaw stated that “[a]fter evaluating the proposals submitted for the PSD/Class V convoy missions,” it was his “opinion that the contractor that can best accomplish the mission is Cochise Consultancy.” Doc.

221-36. The view inside Parsons differed—the same day, Parsons Procurement Manager Hoytt Runnels (PPM Runnels) issued a memo evaluating the proposals, concluding that “[t]he proposal from Armor Group represents a cohesive and best in class proposal, and represents the best value for the government in performance of the assigned missions.” Doc. 221-35 at 6.

On February 13, PPM Runnels acknowledged PM Shaw’s endorsement of Cochise, but informed Gaines Newell (PM Newell)—Parsons’ project manager for the CMC contract—that while he “ha[d] no problem with” selecting Cochise, he

would “need something more specific ([a] directive) from the client.” Doc. 221-37 at 5.

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